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ABSTRACT 
Psychoanalytic theory has generally been considered politically and epistemologically 
unsuitable for ferninist and anti-racist scholarship, but despite this psychoanalytic 
language and concepts permeate colonial discourse analysis and postcolonlial theory. 
Indeed, it could even be argued that there is a tradition of psychoanalytic writing in 
postcolonial studies from Frantz Fanon's Blatýk Skin IVI)ile Alasks and Ashis Nandy's 
TI)e Ttilihiale Enevg to Horni Bhabha's TI)e Lotatioll ýI'Cullare. This dissertation 
examines the work of each of these theorists in order to better understand why they 
turn to psychoanalysis as a theoretical tool, how they put psychoanalytic concepts to 
work in their studies of colonialism, and what kinds of problems they encounter as a 
result. Though each of these writers expands and deepens our understanding of 
colonialism and its legacies, their studies do not question psychoanalysis as a colonial 
discourse itself. Furthermore, it Is highly significant that Fanon, Nandy and Bhabha's 
psychoanalytic deployments are not -able to either account for the lived experience of 
the woman of colour, or to locate her in their theoretical frameworks. Deleuze and 
Guattarl's critique of psychoanalysis in llnfi-Oedipus is used to explore some of the 
connections between psychoanalysis and colonialism that Fanon, Nandy and Bhabha 
do not discuss. Nevertheless, in order to answer the broader question of the woman 
of colour, the final chapter proposes that instead of using psychoanalysis as a 
theoretical instrument we should turn psychoanalysis into an object of colonial 
discourse analysis. 
3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... 2 
Table of contents ................................................................................................................ .... 3 Introduction: Psychoanalysis -and Postcoloni-alTheon . ................................................ .... 4 Chapter One: The Fanontan Psychoanalytic .................................................................. .. 19 Fation and the Colonial Psyche .................................................................................... .. 22 Reading Fanon's PsychoanaINTI, '* is .................................................................................. I .. 
33 
Evaluatin Fanon's Psychoanalytic Strategy .............................................................. 9 .. 43 Taking Direction from Fanon ...................................................................................... .. 54 ChapterTwo: "None of them is true but all of them are realities": Ashis Nandy's 
psychoanalytic reading of colonialism ............................................................................. .. 57 C olonialism as a Psychological Landscape: Nandy's Perspective on the Lived 
Experience of Colonialism ............................................................................................ .. 60 Psycho-historical alternativ, es to colonial discourses: Nandy's psychoanalytic 
method ............................................................................................................................. .. 64 Nandy's Psychoanalytic Technique ............................................................................. .. 73 The Limits of Culture: Problematizing Nandy's Interpretations and Uses of 
Traditional Indian Culture ............................................................................................ .. 78 ChapterThrce: "Homi Bhabha and theTruth of Psychoanalysis ............................... .. 94 Bhabha and Fanon .................................................... ........ .. 99 Bhabha and Nandv ........................................................................................................ 103 Bh,, ibha and Psychoanalysis in the Colony ................................................................. 108 Problems with Bhabha's Psychoanalytic Readings .................................................... 118 Questions From Bhabha .... ....... ........ 129 Chapter Four: Anti-dote - Deleuze and Guattari's Critique of Psychoanalysis ........ 133 Traditions and Contexts 1: Guattarl ............................................................................ 139 Traditions and Contexts 2: Deleu7e ............................................................................ 145 Reading Anti-Oedipus for Postcolonial Studies ........................................................ 150 The Women of Anti-Oedipus ...................................................................................... 163 Chapter Fiv e: Reshaping postcolonial relations with psychoanalysis ......................... 171 The postcolomal debt to Fanon, N-andv and Bh-abha ............................................... 171 Psychoanalysis After Fanon, Nandy and Bhabha ..................................................... 178 
Psychoanalysis as Postcolonial Obj )ect ........................................................................ 191 Works Cited ......................................................................................................................... 198 
4 
iNTRODUCTION: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND POSTCOLONIAL THEORY 
T\1-in Stoler has cautioned us that we should be clear in out minds about what 
we c-xpect psychoanalysis to do for us in our studies of colonial and postcolonial 
cultures (170). Although it has become common to use concepts such as projection, 
fetish, phantasy, identification and sublimation to describe the terms of the cultural 
encounter between the colonizers and the colonized, Stoler warns us that these 
concepts should not be used as shortcuts through more painstaking analysis and 
research. Benita Parrv has also expressed concern that poststructural incarnations of 
psychoanalytic theory in postcolonial studies have over- sirnpli fied our understanding 
of the colonial encounter, transforining a violent socio-political struggle between 
material bodies into an agonistic dialogue between psyches ("Signs" 12). Parry 
suggests that psychoanalytically inflected accounts of colonialism do not adequately 
allow for the material realities of colonial domination or -allow postcolonial critics to 
intenrene effectively in contemporary post-colonial battles. Although Stolcr's 
comments are addressed primarily to historians and Party's comments are addressed 
to literature scholars, their respective critiques are simply two views of the same 
question, the question that anirnates this dissertation: what theoretical work is 
psychoanalytic theory been called upon to do in postcolonial studies, and how 
effectlve is ItP 
In the chapters that follow I look at the way five critics have deployed 
ps\-choan, aIvt1c theor\, in their critiques ot colonial and posrcolorlial cuirures. in 
particular, I examine the strategies of those critics whose work supposedly gIves 
license to others to use psychoanalysis to theorize about colonial society: Frantz 
Fanoti, \,, his NancIv, Flomi Bhabha, Gitlcs Deleuze and 1-`61ix Guartart. By cxamining 
,, vIuch psychoanalytic theorists these writers draw on, how thev adapt psyclmatialysis 
to their own critical and theoretical ends, and what problems they encounter I hope 
to provide the reader with a clearer sense of how psNTchoanah-sis has been used to 
write against colonial discourses and their legacies, and some of the key problems 
with their methodolo ies. It is only after looking clearly at what strategies these 91 11 
writers employ that we can begin to decide how we should use psychoanalysis in our 
own work. Furthermore, it is olilv by looking carefulIv at the blindspots of these 
theorists' strategies that we can refine our awareness of the potentials and pitfalls of 
psychoanalytic theory. 
A broad range of scholars whose work may be described as anti-colonial, 
anu-imperial or anti-racist have simply rejected psychoanalytic theory as so deeply 
implicated in racist and racialized logic as to be virtually useless to anti-colonial and 
anti-racist scholarship. Writing about postcolonial scholarship in particular, Ania 
Looinba identifies a problem with "psychoanalytical theories which remain 
suspiciously and problematically shot through with ethnocentric assumptions whose 
transfer to all subalterns in unacceptable" ("Overworlding" 307). Though Loomba 
does not dismiss psychoanalysis completely she acknowledges a "discomfort with 
their being mapped crudely (despite 'sophisticated' manoeux-res) onto all ways of 
being" (307). Other critics, whose special theoretical focus Is the woman of colour, 
put the matter in more emphatic terms. Biodun lginla obsen-cs "the topic here is the 
(ipl)possibilýty (at this point in history and discourse) of appropriating-even of 
deploying-cither traditional or continental psychoanalytic theory for black fermnist 
critical and theoretical practices" (31). Though lginla's comments were made in the 
earlv 1990s, her comments still appear to be pertincrit. 
There is a range of reasons why psychoanalysis secti-is unsuitable for anti- 
colonial theorizing. One of the most persistent reasons is Freud's problematic 
discussion of non-Western cn-flizations. l, rcud's work rnakcs use of metaphors and 
analogies that place neurotic indiViduals, children, worncii and 'primitive' peoples in 
close relation to each other. Both TOA, lvalidTelboo and 01'stonlellls 1. 
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take their cue from analogies just like this. ' Indeed, Peter Gay highlights precisely this 
feature of Freud's work when he writes: "T he intellectual pedigree of the work, 
which includes James G. Frazer and Charles Datwin, is impressive enough ... What 
is no less IrnpressiVe is the range of material on which he draws ... he enlists 
Polynesians, the Bantu and Zulus, neurotic women and boys traversing the oedipal 
phase" (481). In Tolelv andTaboo Freud indicates that the study of the mental life of 
"savages or half-savages" (3) is of particular interest since they embody an early stage 
of civilization. He continues "If out supposition is correct, a comparison between the 
psychology of primitive peoples, as it is taught by social anthropology, and the 
psychology of neurotics, as it has been revealed by psycho-analysis, will be bound to 
show numerous points of agreement and will throw new light upon familiar subjects" 
(3). 
the point is not a simple, if offensive, one of diction. Freud writes M 
accordance with the anthropological science of his day, and his description of South 
African nations and South Pacific Islanders as 'prinu*tive' is less troubling than the set 
of values he puts into play with his metaphor. The contrast Freud makes between the 
healthy and the neurotic, the European and the non-European, is a clear example of 
how psychoanalysis as an institution "constituted itself as a form of modern 
knowledge ... which contributed significantly to the 
Othering of non-Western 
cultures, by defining them, explicitly or implicitly, as lacking or anterior in 
comparison with domestic metropolitan 'norms.. (Moore-Gilbert, Posltýolollial 142). It 
is tempting to conclude that this was a feature of psychoanalysis in its guise as late 
nineteen th-centurý- science, but psvchoatiaIN-tic theorN, has not made anv significant 
I It is sometimes argued that neither one of these -,, -orks are significant in Freuds oeuvre 
for 
their contribution to psychoanalytic theory as such. The arguincrit is that they reprcsent orilý 
a master's inustng on cultural, religious and historica I thernes. Nevertheless, writing about 
a sympathenc and acknowledged 1ýreud scholar, Cirzli: ýýifion and 1/. i Discolzlenls, Peter Gay , 
-i Fretid suins up his long-held theories of assures us that "For many, this late esSav, in %vhicl 
culture, is the only Freudian text they ever read. The choice of Civiliýýilion and [/, ý Oi, ý-colllenl. l as 
1he representative of his \vork is, for all its brcvity, quite defensible" (722). 
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attempt to work through this historical legacy. Moreover, as we shall see in the 
chapters to corne, more recent theoretical adaptations and appropriations of 
psychoanalysis have not been able to solve this problem adequately either. 
These types of analogy and metaphor are not innocent factors in science, as 
has been well-iflustrated by studies of late nineteenth-century and early twentieth- 
century scientific language. In her examination of the racial content of early twentieth 
century scientific discourses, Nancy Leys Stepan argues that the metaphor is not 
simply a whim of the scientist's style but a core component of the scientific 
knowledge or theory the scientist is attempting to describe. By placing two previously 
separate components in relation to each other, the scientific analogy says something 
new about both of those components. To paraphrase Stepan's example, the analogy 
between neurotics and savages makes two new observations: neurotics are a 
distinctive 'race'within civilization, and the mental health of savages is always already 
abnormal (364). Of course, this does not exhaust the new information that is given 
by the analogy but it terninds us that the metaphor in science does not express a 
literal sameness. It is not about saying, crudely, that savages and neurotics are one 
and the same thing. Instead, it creates new ways of looking at and studying the reafitý 
under description by bringing together what previously seemed unrelated. TMoreovcr, 
as Stepan argues, particular metaphors not only confirm theories about the world 
(here, that women, children, neurotics and savages arc all less 'civilized' than 
European men), but distract us from examining the realitXT that is not neatly 
encapsulated bý- the metaphor (what, for example, of the dissimilatitics between 
children and neurotics, or the persistent similarities between savages and white 
rncný, )- 
\nothcr significant problem with a psychoanaIN-tic nicthodologý-, as Parn-'s 
remarks suggest, is that a ps\-choanak-tic reading of the colony tends to obscure both 
the material conflicts that drl\-c colonialism as well as the possibility of anti-colonial 
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resistance. According to the terms of Bhabha's analysis, Parry argues, native 
resistance "is limited to returning the look of surveillance as the displacing gaze of 
the disciplined" ("Problems" 41). The question of whether psychoanalysis offers a 
sufficiently empowering language and theory for cmancipatory scholarship is a 
question that fen-iinist scholars, for example, have already struggled with. As 
FIzabeth i\bel observes: 
The traditional indifference of psychoanalysis to racial, class and cultural 
differences, and the tendency of psychoanalysis to insulate subjectivity from 
social practices and discourses all run contrary to a feminism increasingly 
attuned to the power of social exigencies -and differences in the constitution 
of subjectivity ... psychoanalytic accounts of subjectivity ... 
have lost its 
material groundings and with them the possibility of interpreting (and 
thereby promoting) social change (184) 
While psychoanalysis is based on close observation of social relations, it seems to 
refuse to account for the material, political and cultural factors underlying those 
relations. in political terms, for feminist and for postcolonial scholars, this creates a 
frustrating sense that there is no escape from the discourses that represent women, 
people of colour, gays and lesbians in negative or inferior terms. This reluctance to 
engage with the material, political or cultural contexts goes back to Freud himself 
who, as Brenkman puts it, though he "can entertain the possibility that civilization 
itself is a pathological process, he eschews the alternative possibility of speciý-, tng 
which processes, institutions and practices are pathological. Such evaluations would 
bring psychoanalysis too close to polifics" (4). Anne McClintock identifies much the 
same tendency in Lacan, a theorist who "cannot account either descriptively or 
analytically for historical contradictions and imbalances in power ... [andj remains 
curiously indifferent ... to accounting 
for the institutions of violence that ie the giv 
phallus and the patronym their political power in the first place" (197). Even if 
psychoanalysis is descriptive rather than prescriptive, the description is dangerously 
incomplete or unworkable for people of colour, for example. 
If in engagement with psychoanalysis has seemed impossible for 
contemporary feminist and anti-racist scholars for epistemological and political 
reasons, it has, nevertheless, proved to be a reoccurring methodology in postcolonial 
theory. This dissertation begins witli Fanon's work, written in the 1950s, continues 
on through Nandy's work, begun in the 1970s, and ends with Bhabha's work, written 
in the 1980s and 1990s. In part, the persistence of psychoanalysis is symptomatic of 
the general pervasiveness of psychoanalytic discourse in Western culture, or what lan 
Parker has termed 'psy discourses' (1). It is part of the effectiveness of psychoanalytic 
discourse that it appears so natural to us, so that "it appears to stretch back to pre- 
human history at the same time as it extends into the deepest interior of the self in 
contemporary culture" (Parker 1). Those of us living and writing in the West think 
psychoanalytically without being entirely aware that we do so. We accept the idea of 
the unconscious mind almost without question and we speak of emotional 
repressions, neuroses and fetishisms as though they are the inevitable conditions of 
human existence. 
Psychoanalysis also persists because, whether one explicitly acknowledges it 
as a conceptual tool or not, psychoanalytic assumptions permeate the practice of 
postcolonial studies much as they permeate our ordinary language. In postcolonial 
studies, as elsewhere, psvcho, -LnaINIsis is one of the "unconsidered modes of thought 
our practices rest on" (Foucault 154). Stolcr has been one of the few scholars to 
point to the problem of psychoanalytic language in these terms: 
Much colonial discourse, as Foucault's argument would suggest, has been 
framed by the search for the truth of the European bourgeois self through 
seýc ... What is disturbing is that colonial historiography has inadvertently 
embraced this notion of 'truth' as well ... Freudian notions of a repressed, 
sublimated and projected sexual impulse are invokcd to explain political 
projects in instinctual psýlclioscxual terins (171). 
Historical accounts of colonial cultures have tended to rely oil explanations with 
psychoanalytic resonances without pausing to consider the iniplica6on of such 
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characterizations. One danger, as Stoler points out, is that we confuse the colonizers' 
categories for making sense of the colony with the objects of our colonial discourse 
analysis. 
Literary theory is no less culpable in this respect. Indeed, the ontology of 
psychoanalysis so permeates the discourse of postcolonlal theory that we have lost 
track of the origins of the terms that we use such as, most notably, the well-worn 
term 'the other' derived from Lacan. The most notable recent example of such work 
is, of course, that of Homi Bhabha, work that has had an enormous irnpact on 
literary and historical studies of the colony. As I shall devote chapter three to 
Bhabha's work I do not wish to make any detailed remarks about his theory, here. I 
simply want to observe that Bhabha's work has been the occasion for a renewal of 
psychoanalytic language in postcolonial studies, not only in other scholars' 
applications of Bhabha's sophisticated psychoanalytic readings but in the sense that 
psychoanalysis represents cutting-edge theory for analyses of colonialism. 
Although there have been critiques of how particular theorists use 
psychoanalysis, there has been little discussion of what the use of psychoanalysis 
nught mean for postcolonial studies in broader terms. There have been studies that 
look critic-allv at the intersections between race and psychoanalysis, or feminism, race 
and psychoanalysis, but postcolonial studies has not reflected on the meaning of 
psychoanalysis as one of its theoretical toolS. 2 Although the studies mentioned above 
are invaluable in drawing attention to the potentials and blind spots of psychoanalysis 
in terms of race, anaIN-ses of race and gender do not cover quite the same ground as 
postcolonial studies. Although I will reference feminist scholars' problematization of 
psychoanalysis and representation, a critique of psychoanalysis from the perspective 
of postcolonial studies Should be able to contribute something more. 
' For exainples of recciit xý, -orlýz exploring the connectiolls I)et\vcell feinlinSrii, race and 
See Ahcl 18-1-20-4, Burgner 75-88, Doane 209-2-18 and Waltoti 223-25 1. 
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The value of postcolonial studies, as I understand it, is that it brings the 
history of colonialism and its legacies to bear on the ways in which we read and think 
about literature and other academic disciplines such as history and anthropology. It is 
not only concerned with bringing non-Western literatures, philosophies and histories 
into the modern, Western disciplines, but in understanding how those bodies of 
knowledge came to be 'othered' at the same time as non-Western bodies came to be 
'othercd'. I recognize that many different kinds of scholars work in postcolonial 
studies, including literarV critics, historians, anthropolo ists and sociologists, and that 91 
this definition of postcolonial studies would not be accepted by an of them. 
Nevertheless, I work from the perspective that postcolonial studies tries to 
understand and explain how colonialism has produced the categories of thought that 
we have today and to remain vigilant about how postcolonial attempts to break away 
from those categories sometimes succumb to the same problems. As Gyan Prakash 
writes: "at stake is not simply the issue as to whether or not former colonies have 
become free from domination, but also the question as to how the history of 
colonialism -and colonialism's disciplining of history can be shaken loose from the 
domination of categories and ideas it produced-colonizer and colonized, white, 
black and brown; civilized and uncivilized; modern and archaic; cultural identity; tribe 
and nation" (5). In writing this thesis from the perspective of postcolonial studies, 
then, I want to demonstrate that an effective critique of psychoanalysis is not simply 
about its suitability to represent race or gender, but its status as a modern, Western 
form of knowledge about minds and selves. 
Before I elaborate further on what I attempt in this thesis it might be 
advisable to discuss here precisely what I do and do not mean by a critique of 
psyclioanalysis. What I arn most interested in here is the form of psychoanalytic 
language that is used by particular colonial and postcolonial critics. So, for example, 
under the term 'psychoanalysis' I Mclude versiotis of psychoanalytic flicory as diverse 
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as theoretically sophisticated Lacanian theory and loosely derived Eriksonian ego- 
psychology. I am not concerned as such with a critique of how orthodox or accurate 
or fepresentative these adaptations are. Instead, I am interested in looking specifically 
-at how each particular critic uses his reading of psychoanalysis to answer the 
problems that he sees in the available accounts of the colony or the postcolonial 
society. 
In addition to limiting this discussion to colonial and postcolonial 
deployments of psychoanalysis, this dissertation is not explicitly concerned with 
writing 'better' psychoanalysis, that is to say a psychoanalysis that pays more 
, attention to cultural difference or to the material conditions of its analytical objects. 
Though it rnight be desirable to develop a psychoanalytic language that accounts for 
issues of race more accurately, it is not the task of this dissertation to examine how 
that might be done. Instead I am interested in investigating how, by understanding 
our use of psychoanalysis better, we can write better studies of colonialism and 
clearer postcolonial theory. It is for this reason that I do not directly engage with any 
psychoanalytic texts here. I will not attempt to give a postcolonial reading of either 
Freud or Lacan not only because analyses that would demonstrate Freud or Lacan's 
implication in racist and sexist thinking have already been written by others, but 
because such readings would only confirm the notion that psychoanalysis is too 
problematic for postcolonial studies without posing the more important question: 
what should we do with psychoanalysis in postcolonial studiesP 
Foucault offers us a useful way of thinking about how this kind of critique of 
a system of thought might operate: 
A critique is not a inattcr of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a 
matter of pointing out on xvhat kind of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, 
unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept 
rest ... Criticisin is a matter of 
flushing out that thought and trying to change 
it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what 
is accepted as self-evident vvill no longer be accepted as such (154) 
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The point of critique, then, is not to make Judgments -about the rights or wrongs of a 
way of thinking, rather it is to help us understand how and what we think. In terms 
of this dissertation, this means understanding what particular problems 
psychoanalysis resolves in postcolomal studies, and whether a psychoanalytic 
language is really the only solution. Psychoanalysis, as we shall see, is presumed to be 
the only language for writing about desire and identity, and as both themes have 
become more and more important in postcolonial studies, psychoanalysis has 
apparently inevitably come along with them. But perhaps the time has come to ask 
what is the price of psychoanalytic solutions in postcolonial studies? 
There are rnanv points -at which one mav enter a map of relations between 
psychoanalyfic theory and analyses of colonialism. I have to chosen to enter it via the 
work of five very different writers on the basis of three general factors. First, I have 
chosen these writers based on their direct engagement with issues of colonialism and 
postcoloulalism, including relationships in colonial societies, the history of the colony 
and the conflict of cultures M colonial and postcolonial societies. The writers 
considered here devote a significant amount of their work to understanding colonies, 
decolonization -and postcolonialism. Second, they all connect psychoanalysis to the 
colony, whether through direct -analysis (Bhal)ha, Fanon), psvchoanalvfic histories 
(Nandý), or material practices (Fanon, Deleuze and Guattari). Psychoanalysis figures 
as a critical language in various ways in each of these writers, and part of my aim here 
is to demonstrate just how varied each critic's use of psychoanalysis is and to what 
extent he is able to draw out the critical potential of psychoanalytic theory. Third, I 
have chosen writers with a recognized influence on the mainstream of postcolonial 
theory to date. Though there arc other writers who have tnade use of psychoanalysis 
to critique colonialism and racism, I-anon, NandNI and Bliablia are three of the most 
iinportant critics in postcolonial theory canon. The inclusion of the work of Delcuzc 
and Guattari is obviouslysomewhat of an exception to the criteria outlined. 
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Although Deleuze and Guattarl do make some observations on colonialismand the 
irnplication of psychoanalytic theory in colonization, their critique is more concerned 
with the philosophv and politics of the European metropolis than its colonies. 
Though their work has, until rccentIv, had relatjVelýT little impact on postcolonial 
thcorý, it is important in this thesis because of the critique of psychoanalysis that it 
offers and the terms on which it offers that critique. 
The obvious starting point of this study is the work of Frantz Fanon. As the 
recent secondary literature on Fanon's work indicates, there are few scholars working 
in postcolonial studies today, from Marxists to dcconstrucfionists, who do not cite 
Fanon as -an influence on their particular approach to colonial analysis. Marxist- 
inclined theorists like Parry, Dirlik or Lazarus have emphasized the later Fanon who 
wrote about the need for the postcoloMal world to be on guard against the native 
bourgeoisie, distracting cultural struggles -and the necessity of engaging in violent 
revolution. Critics more committed to poststructuralist interpretations, like Bhabha 
and Young, have maintained that Fanon's use of psychoanalysis allowed us to view 
colonialism as something more than a merely political or economic arrangement. 
By looking at Fanon's writing in the context of erhnopsychiatry in Africa 
(including his response to Octave Mannoni's Pro, spero and Calibaii), his own position as 
a practising psychiatrist and his final writings on mental health in The Vrelthed qý'Ilqe 
Earlh, I argue that we do not need to choose between a psychoanalytic Fanon and a 
politically revolutionary Fanon. Instead, the significance of Fallon's work is his 
explicit politicization of psychoanalytic theory and psychiatric practice. However, 
since lie maintains that revolution and dccolonization will allow the man of colour to 
regain psychological health, he does not pursue the question of how this restoration 
will take place, and lie does not sufficicntly consider the possibility that the colonized 
i-mght have cultural or psychological resources at their disposal. Most troubling of all, 
lie does not seem to be able to account for the lives of women of colour in the 
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colony. As fermiust critics point out, in Fanon's attempt to use psychoanalysis to 
write about race he replaces the theoretical position of woman with the position of 
black man pushing white women and women of colour out of the theory all together. 
Ashis Nandy uses psychoanalysis and psychojogýT specificaUy to understand 
what conditions made psycholo ical resistance to colonialism either possible or 1 191 
impossible. Although he acknowledges the importance of Fanon's work in 
foregrounding the psychological damage colonialism inflicts on the colonized, he 
suggests that Fanon places too little faith in the ability of the colonved to resist 
colonial discourse through non-violent means. For Nandy, violent resistance is a less 
politically effective means of resistance than, for example, psychological resistance 
because violence ties the colonized people firmly to the terms of colonialism. In 
other words, although violent resistance might oust the coloMzer from the physical 
space of the colony, only psychological resistance can oust the colonizer from our 
nunds and hearts. 
Nandy's brand of psychoanalysis is heavily inflected by a consideration of the 
culture of the colonized subjects. He avoids pathologizing Hindu culture through the 
language of psychology, and instead offers his own intuitive readings of how Hindu 
culture rfught be the psychological resource for creating postcolonial, or as he nught 
refer to them, 'non-colonlal'wavs of being. Nandy's work consists largely of 
biographical studies that serve as accounts of how Indian subjects negotiated their 
way bct-, vecn the modern, colonial order of things and traditional, Hindu culture. His 
interpretation of Hindu culture, cspeclaUv in terms of its ethics, is deeply insightful 
and productive but it naturally raises the question of whether we can, even in the 
most general terms, equate Flindu culture with Indian culture. Nandy does not 
consider how women, lower castes, lower classes or other rmnorities might live the 
impact of Flindu culture 11-1 different ways. In particular, he does not consider how 
Indian wornen might experience the cultural practices lie celcbratcs as actIN-cly 
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oppressive. Though Nandy recognizes that culture must he constantly reinvented, his 
theory does not include a consideration of how culture is deterrilined by and 
produced within particular social and political contexts. 
HorM Bhabha, whose work represents the most recent application of 
psychoanalytic theory to colonial critique, seems to provide some answers to the 
problems in Nandy's work with his insightful discussions of culture in the colonial 
world and the contemporary metropolitan world. While Fanon and Nandy both turn 
to psychoanalytic theory to account for the ways in which colonized subjects 
experience colonialism and resist it, Bhabha uses it to account for the ways cultures 
interact. In T1')e Lot'ation ql'Cullare psychoanalytic concepts such as fetishism, nurnicry 
and ambivalence are used to examine how cultures are performed, produced and 
authorized when they come into contact in the colonial society. In some sense, -as 
many of his critics point out, actual colonial subjects disappcar-whether male or 
femalc. How women, European or non-Europcan, experience the colonial condition 
is not something Bhabha activ ely explores. 
One of Bhabha's more well-known insights is his theory that stereotypes 
function as cultural or racial fetishes bridging and disavowing the difference between 
the culture of the colonizers and the colonized. In some sense Bhabha's writing 
seems to make much more literal use of psychoanalytic theory than either Fanon or 
Nandy. Whereas Fanon and Nandy both feel -, it liberty to interpret psychoanalytic 
theorv, loosely for their own analytical ends, Bhabha cites Freud and Lacan in 
particular -, is though their theories have the quality of truth. It seems that Bhabha 
uses psychoanalytic concepts to write -about colonial manifestations because he finds 
that psychoanalytic language perfectly dcscrll: )cs -, x, -hat happen,, in colonial cultures. 
Why this correspondence, or analogN-, bet-\k-een colonial culture and psychoanalytic 
theory should exist, or what it rmglit mean, is never e-xplorcd in Bliablia's work. 
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In the fourth chapter, then, I turn to the work of Gilles Deleuze and Fchx 
Guatt-ari who have explored the question of why psychoanalytic theory MIght seem 
to describe Western societies -and colonies so accuratelýT. Deleuze and Guattari s 
critique of psychoanalysis, .. 11wi-0edipus, until quite recently, had not figured very 
often in postcolonial theory. Robert Young's discussion of the book, together with 
recent books by Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt and Peter Hallward are three of the 
few extended discussions of Dcleuze and Guattarl's theory in the context of 
colonialism. For Deleuzcand Guattari psychoanalysis is a theory that complements 
capitalism, and works to produce the types of SUbjeCtINT1ties and relationships that 
enable capitalism to flourish. If psychoanalysis seems to describe modern 
sub'ectivities so clearly then it is not because it is true, but because it normalizes j 
those subjectivities. For Deleuze and Guattari the problem is as much about 
capitalism as it is about psychoanalytic theory, but the polut is that these theories of 
modernity reinforce and require each other. Following Deleuze and Guattari, I argue 
that is time to take their suggestion that we find 'escape routes' out of psychoanalytic 
theory more seriously. If postcolonial theory is meant to problematize the non- 
Western individual's relation to modernity, then Alifi-Ocdipus may offer a powerful 
model for intervention. 
The work of these fiv, e critics demonstrates that psychoanalytic theory itself is 
not necessarily an apolitical or even pohticaUýT blunt instrument of critique. In the 
hands of Fanon and Nandv, in particular, psychoanalysis is used to describe how the 
colonized are affected by colonial domination. In Bhabha's hands psychoanalytic 
theory provides -a framework for understanding how colonized cultures suivive and 
ate transformed by their interactioti in colonial societies. Nandy and Bhabha also 
explore how a psychoanalytIC Understanding of the relationship between the past and 
the present might provide the postcolonial society xith a means of countering the 
legacies of colonial discoursc that still operate today. In fact, for Nandv and Bhabha, 
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psychoanalysis is important as a means of destabilizing the continuing domination of 
the standards, practices and assumptions of Western knowledge. PsYchoanahtic 
discourse, like anv other discourse, can be strategically deployed. The question, then, 
is not whether psý T choanalysis can be made politically useful in the short-term but 
whether it is a sustainable methodology for postcolonial studies in the long term. 
In the concluding chapter, then, I will argue that we should abandon 
psychoanalysis as a tool for colonial and postcolonial critique precisely because its 
inability to account for the woman of colour is a significant failure in any 
postcolonial methodology. Instead, I argue that we should focus on turning 
psychoanalysis into an object of colonial discourse analysis. Feminist scholars such as 
Spillersl Walton and Seshadri-Crooks have begun this type of study, but they still 
focus more on the question of making psychoanalysis more sensitive and -adaptable 
to questions of racial difference than investigating how psychoanalysis functions as a 
discourse about race -and colonialism. Gay and lesbian studies scholars such as John 
Brenkman and Ann Pellegrini have also begun to examine psychoanalytic theory as 
an object of discourse analvsis, but with a focus on challenging the theory's 
representation of European masculinity and heterosexuality,. Although these scholars 
do not engage specifically with Deleuzc and Guattari, their work travels along a 
sUnilar trajectory. I would like to suggest that the recent work of these scholars 
combined with a postcolonial pcrspecti-,, e might provide us with the means to open 
up psychoanalysis -as an object of postcolonial critique. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE FANONIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC 
It seems obvious that -, my investigation of the relationship between 
postcolonial theory -and psychological discourses must begin with the work of Frantz 
Fanon. For some commentators, this is largely because of his psychoanalytically 
influenced book, BlackSkin, VNIe Alasks. For others, it is because of his sometimes 
experimental and often politicized psychiatric practice in the Blida-joinville hospital 
in colonial Algeria. Howevcr, though we readily acknowledge Fanon's engaL), emcnt 
I 1ý ý 
with psychoanalysis and psychiatry we have giVcn relatively little attention to how his 
engagement functioned as a strategy rather than an endorsement of psychological 
ýtlcal theories and methods. and psyclioanalýl 
It may seem countcr-intuitive to make this assertion at a time when those of 
us who read post-coloni-al studies are most familiar with Homi Bhabha's reading of 
Fanon's work. Bhabh-, t presents us with a Fanon who "speaks most effectively 
from deep within the struggle of psychic representation and social reality" (Loýwion ý/' 
Culture 183)). There is no doubt that, for Bliablia, Fanon writes in the language of 
psychoanalysis. As inanV commentators such as Robert Young, Henrv Louis Gates 
and Neil Lazarus have noted, where Fanon does not conform to Bhabha's creation 
of him, Bhabha excuses him and carries on. So it is that Bhabha's Fanon "lapses" 
into existentialist moments ("Black Man" 118), and reading Fanon's re-reading of 
Lacan he finds Fanon, "turns too hastilv from the ambivalences of identification to 
the antagonistic identities of political alienation and cultural discrýnýnation" ("Black 
Man" 121). 
Depending on one's approach to Fanon, Bhabha's wilful attempt to turn 
Fanon into a Lacatilan psychoanalyst of colonial atid racist culture is either, as Gates 
suggests, "an oddIv toudiing performance of a coaxing devotion- (460), or as Cedric 
Robinson -, -, -ritcs, less kindly, "an ungracious conceit" (79). However, Bliablia is not 
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the only postcolonial theorist to read Fanon as the best exponent of his own 
methodological preferences. Gates' demonstrates in his review of postcolonial 
writing on Fanon that a range of scholars each produces vcry different readings of 
Fanon: 
If Said made of Fation an advocate of post-postmodern counternarratlVes of 
liberations; if JanMohamed made of Fanon a Manichean theorist of 
colonialism absolute negation; and if Bhablia cloned, from Fanon's theotia, 
another Third-World post-structuralist, Parry's Fanon (which I generally find 
persuasive) turns out to confirm her own rather optimistic vision of literature 
and social action (465) 
Gates seeins enchanted by what he calls the 'porous' quality of Fanon's texts which 
allows, perhaps even encourages, such varied interpretations. Simon Glkand, offers 
readers what I think is a more useful reflection. He suggests that even if the 
postmodern Fanon evinced by Bhabha and others is enchanting "there is no doubt in 
my mind that Gordon's existential Fanon is closer to the 'real' subject ... Indeed, 
despite my own affinity for Marxist and Lacanian readings, such approaches to these 
texts have always seemed to me misplaced. The point is, we can put Fanon to 
whatever uses we want, but we should at least respect the intellectual positions he 
took" (149). ' 
What I want to focus on here is one of those moments where Fanon's 
intellectual position does indeed become obscured. Although Bh-abha recognises and, 
even celebrates, the importance of psychological discourses to Fanon's project, he 
also fails to recognize the meaning of Fanon's eclectic use of psychoanalytic theory. 
Though Fanon be ins BlackSkin IT"Nie Allasks with the premise that a psychoanalytic 
investigation of the black man is urgently required, the book illustrates clearly how a 
solely psychoanalytic explanation of the black man's situation is ultimately 
impossible. His reniqrk that "only a psychoatialytical Intel-pretatlon of the black 
problem can lay bare the anomalles of affect that arc rcsponsiblc for the structure of 
Sec Alessandrint 1-22 and Nlaccy 26-30 for ftirtlicr discussion of the ippropriations and 
mis'appropriations of Iýanoii's tlicorics in rccent postcolomal stuches. 
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the complex" (BlatkSkin IFIVIe YVIasks 12) is, therefore, an opening gambit rather 
than a declaration of allegiance. 'the Psychoanalytic explanation Fanon has in mind is 
one that reworks traditional concepts, introduces social and economic factors into 
the diagnosis and questions the rules of psychoanalytic theory itself. Abo- Te all, it is 
'an investigation of the "extent to which the conclusions of Freud or of Adler can be 
applied to the effort to understand the man of colour's view" (Black Skill WINte Masks 
141). Lewis Gordon suggests that any announcement Fanon makes about 
psychoanalysis at the start of BlatkSkin, IFIVIe Masks is meant to mislead the reader, 
because Fanon's tactic is "a provocative literary device of demonstration by failure. 
tic will show that psychoanalysis cannot explain the black by attempting to explain 
the black psychoanalytically" ("The Black" 76). 
Other crifics have argued that we simply place too much weight on Blatýk 
Skin, It"19ite Masks and should focus, instead, on Fanon's less psychoanalytically 
influenced later texts. Benita Parry and Neil Lazarus are two of the most prominent 
critics to draw our attention to the Fanon who wrote WIrettZ)ed ql'll-)e L-atYh and 
underlined the violence and tension of the colonial state in his writings. Lazar-us 
points out that Bhabha tends to read Fation "back to front, as it were ... thereby 
falsifying the testimony of his evolution as a theorist" (87). But there is a slippage 
here, between Bhabh-a's psychoanalytic thcorv and Fanon's critique of 
psychoanalysis. Even if we are reluctant to -accept Bhabha's explanations, we should 
be careful not to throw out Fanon's engagement with psychoanalytic theorv, -, is well. 
There is an implication in the critiques of Bhabha that the revolutionary, Fanon 
should supplant the psychological Ianon; that this is the 'real Fanon' or at least the 
more politically engaged Fanon. 
While I am sympathetic to the rcadings Lazatus and Parry produce of 
Fanon's work, I do not think we haý-e to discount the psychological Fanon in order 
to reap the benefits of politically rc\-Ohitionan, Fanon. Tlic use of psychological 
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discourse and the practice of psycluatry were clearly important political tools for 
Fanon throughout his brief life as a political activist. Critics such as Diana Fuss have 
sugges-ted that Fanon's work is original because it introduces the idea that psychic 
processes such as Identification are "never outside or prior to politics, what Fanon 
gives us is a politics that does not oppose the psychical but fundamentally 
presupposes It" (39). 1 would refine this statement I tittle further and argue that 
Fanon's work is original because he seeks to place the interdependence of politics 
and psychology to use in the causes of anti-colonialism and anti-racism. When Fanon 
entered the field of writing on psychology and colonialism, he was not the first writer 
to connect a psychological viewpoint with an analysis of the problems in -a colonial 
society. Writing about Fanon's psvchoanalvsls, then, does not mean adopting a 
psychoanalytic approach but rather looking at the particular wavs in which Fanon 
attempts to read, rc -write and re-deploy psychoanalytic theory. In other words, we 
need to understand Fanon's use of psychological theories and practices as strategic, 
with an accompanying set of tactics. 
Tanon and the Colonial Psyche 
During the 1920s and 1930s many health professionals who worked in the 
colonies began to look more closcly at the mental health of those in their care. Prior 
to this mental health in the colonies had not been a high priority for the colonial 
medical sen-ices compared, for example, with the need to deal with tropical diseases 
that affected many of the colonizer population. Indeed, in his study of 
ctlitiopsychiatty in colonial Africa, 
_lock 
Ntc(, uHoch notes that asylums were slmplý 
considered a subdivision of the penal systerri as late as 1944 (3). As ', \Ic(tilloch 
shows, c\-cn if interest iii colonial psychiatty began to grow during these years it was 
liardly ex-cr i-natched by investment in mental health institutions and staff in the 
colonies. Nevertlictcss, it is possible to see a ncxv stream of thought in the medical 
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literature and the discussions among doctors about mental health and the colony. In 
order to cstabhsh the context of Fanon's psychological and psychoanalvtic writings, I 
would like to examine some significant features of the discussion: the psycholo ical 91 
characterization of native cultures, the concerns about the mental fitness of the 
colonizer population and how these discussions reflected on the future of the 
Empire. 
One of the most significant features of this emerging way of talking -about 
colonialism was the effort to characterize colonized cultures and the personality types 
of the colonized populations in psychological terms. McCulloch's work discusses the 
concept of 'the z\ frican mind' as an example of such colonial psychiatric evaluations. 
Colonial psychiatry in Africa concluded that Africans did not have the complex inner 
life that the European had or the mental resources and habits with which to harness 
the potential of an inner life for creativity and achievement. This picture of Africans 
as people lacking control, discipline, creativity or intellectual curiositv, although 
painted for the most part without overt political intent fitted neatly into the argument 
for colonial government. Since Africans were infantile and uncontrolled, unable to 
function as rational and productive citizens, thev required the supervision and 
management Europeans could offer. 
In India, psychiatrists found a distinctly Indian pathology at work, but the 
description of this pathology worked towards similar ends as in colonial Africa. 
Owen Berkelev-Hill, an influential British psychiatrist in India, devoted some 
attention to drawing personality profiles of the Hindus and Mushms. He claimed 
"the Hindu has all the disadvantageous traits of the anal-crotic personalitv, such 'as 
irritability, bad temper, unhappiness, hypochondria, miserliness, pettiness, slow- 
rnindedness, a tendencv to bore, a bent for tvrannizing and dictating, and obstinacy" 
(Hartnack 242). Berkeley-Hill concluded that Flindus were thus unsuited to govern 
thernsch-cs since they did not have the psychological capabilities for leadership or 
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judicious management. ' Like the Africans, the Hindus were also judged infantile. If 
the African was a rather excitable and uncontrollable child, the Hindu Indian was a 
sullen and obstinate child. Both were difficult to govern, but neither was suited to 
govern themselves. 
Nevertheless, although descriptions of the colonized populations were part 
g of -an ongoing ethnological pro*ect, the native population was not rcaUy the sub)ect 
of mental care as such. They may have been the subjects of psychiatric studies, but as 
noted above, they were often not deemed civilized enough to in fact require mental 
health care. The colonial asylurn was generally a place for members of the colonizer 
community who could not afford to go home and to a lesser extent for extreme 
native cases. In any case, it is fair to suppose that the colonial specialist's chief 
concern was for the mental health of the colonizers themselves. Those on the spot in 
colonial outposts had long been thought susceptible to certain states of mind or 
nervousness. "Going native", in an earlier stage of colonialism, was a noted variety of 
this. Whether it was a case of 'tropical neurasthenia' in the Philippines, as Warwick 
Anderson writes about, or the 'Inferiority complex' of the European colonizer in 
Madagascar, as Mannoni writes about, there was a real anxiety about the fitness of 
the individual to carry on his, or, more rarelv, her colon-lal dutv. ' 
The psychological profile of the normal European male was the irriplicit ideal 
against which the portraits of the native population were drawn. So what were the 
4 Be rlkelc, ý -H ifli Hhought Nifustu-n Ind, at is were rather more of - thre. ou to colonial au thoriti, 
since he considered them to be much more like the British than the I lindus could ever be. 
Nevcrtheless, he did manage to find a pathological framework to place them in. Harmack 
argucs "with the help of psychoanalytic concept,,, liowevcr, he tried to show that the origin 
of Islam lqy in an itidividual neurosis ... Piel claimed that Ishim could be traced to a neurosis 
of Mohammed, who suffered, arnong other things, froni aii all-pervasive father complex" 
(242). 
Atiderson notes iii lus stud\ ()C tropical neurasthenia iii the American Philippines, that the 
ype of ticrvous colonial breakdown or mental deterioration %vas usuallY male. sub'ect of this tý 
Tlits is an interesting factgtven the gericral tetidency for,, vornen to be diagnosed or to 
'acknowledge mental disease far more readily than men (1354). Indeed, even in colonial India 
and Africa men were more like] %- to be the 'subject of concerns about mental healtli 
brcakdowns M the colony thati , -ometi. The connection,, between colonial psychology and 
gciider inay be a special case in the lustory of madtiess. 
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characteris tics of normal mental health for the colonizer and colonized? In the case 
of the colonial psychiatrists in Africa the normal mail was "emotionalIv balanced, 
reliable and realistic in his expectations, -able to compromise and to control his anger 
(which in any case was not marked), and capable of empathy with the suffering of 
others. His life was ruled by rational choice, and he accepted responsibility for his 
own actions" (McCulloch 97). Berkeley-Hill's ideal, though he was not in 
communication with colleagues in Africa, was very similar. For him, the ideal man 
exhibited "determination, persistence, reliabilitv, thoroughness, and individualism" 
(Hartnack 242). T he breakdown of this European personality in the colonies was 
evidenced by vague tendencies and physical symptoms. Men, in particular, were 
characterized as mentally exhausted, nervous, indolent, sexuallý, indulgent and 
unfocused. In other words, the disintegration of the European personality was 
understood -as a general failure to measure up to a civilized ideal. 
It is possible, and tempting, to read mental colonial breakdown as the 
beginning of a critique of colonialism. Perhaps the European colonizer was 
beginning to realise the ethical implications of colonialism, and to suffer from the 
sense of living an unethical life. But, as Anderson points out "if there is a critique of 
colonialism within colonial psychology in this period, it is a muted one, with the 
specificity of colonial history and politics conveniently erased" (1367). The decline or 
debilitation of the European psyche in the colonies is an issue, but it never becomes 
so much of an issue that the Europeans should rather relinquish colonial control 
than continue the colonial project. Indeed, to some degree particular mental illnesses 
functioned as a badge of civilization. For example, colonial psychiatrists in Africa 
concluded that the colonized population did not suffer from depression. Depression 
,, vas associated, in I ý'uropean thought, with "guilt, religious doubt and artistic 
originalm-, cliaracrcristics often identified as the vcn- foundation of Western 
subjcctivity" (, \Ic(, 'uHoch I 11). If \fricans (lid not exhibit these characteristics of 
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Western individualism or the heightened sensibility of the civilized person they could 
not suffer from depression. 
Anderson puts the matter precisely: "It was a question of hom white malcs 
might civilize the tropics (resident or distanced), and whether that region deserved 
their best efforts-they remained the only possible agents of civilization. Colonial 
optimism always won out over colonial pessimism" (1367). Indeed, in place of the 
old justifications for colonial rule such as moral or physiological superiority the 
Berkeley-Hills of the world could point to the psychological superiority of the 
European. Whatever the justification, the natives remained unsuitable for the 
responsibility of governing themselves. As Anderson shows, even if the European 
colonizer was somewhat the worse for wear he or she was still the one best suited to 
govern. 
In order to illustrate more tangibly how the convergences between 
psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis and colonialism were written about and 
understood I will look closely at one text in particular, Pro3pero alld Calil)all: Ple 
R! ytý/)o/qgy qj-Co1onI--, q1ioii by Octave Nlannoru. Nlannoni's study of colonial relations in 
the French colony of Madagascar was first published in France in 1949, and it 
displays many of the trends outlined above. Although Mannoni had begun analysis 
with Lacan and was later to become an important figure in the Iýcole Freudienne, he 
-was not a ment-al health professional when he wrote the book. He was, in fact, an 
ethnologist with a keen interest in the health of his own psyche and a deep sense of 
pessimism about the future of the French Empire. Mannont was troubled by the 
defective psychology of the colonizers, which he observed over twenty N'cars in 
Madagascar, and sought to make his audicticc aware of the dccpenitig problem. 
The central argut-rient of Nlannoni's work is that colonial socict\- Ili 
Madagascar is built upoti a clasli betwceii two different personality types. This clash 
produces numerous mistuiderstaiiditigs bet-, x-ccri the colonizer and the colotilzed, 
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eventually resulting in the breakdown of meaningful communications. In Proipero and 
Calil)an, Mannom attempts to guide his readers through "the phenomena that occur 
in a colonial situation and the way in which colonials as well as natives react to that 
situation" (22). Accordingly, he examines the Malagasy personality and the 
psychology of the Europe-an colonizer before turning to -, in analysis of human 
relations in colonial settings. 
There are several interesting features of Mannoni's -argument. The first is his 
characterization of the Malagasy personality as a dependent one. He supports this 
6 
argument with anecdotal evidence drawn from the European residents. He goes on 
to argue that the -Malagasy culture produces dependent personalities. In his most 
ethnographic voice, Mannoni describes how the practice of ancestor worship, 
prevalent among the Malagasy, makes it impossible for them to develop into mature, 
independent adults in the Europe-an sense. Unlike the European father, the Malagasy 
father does not figure as an absolute -authority for his children. Instead, he acts as a 
type of mediator between the dead ancestors and his own family. As a result, 
Mannom argues, there is no paternal power for the child to resist and test him or 
herself against. In short, there is an absence of the Oedipus complex to be 
experienced, much less resolved. -Nlannoni concludes that 
"instead of protesting, like 
the European that he is a man like his father, the Malagasy appears to claim that all 
men are children. He projects his own dependence on everyone else" (60). The thing 
that the Malagasy fears most, then, is abandonment. '\Iannoni suggests that if the 
bonds of dependence should ever be broken, the Malagasy will become very hostile. 
I As was the case in many other parts of the Fnipire, colonizers 1), ad a store of classic stories 
that ncatlv dramattzed some essential characteristic of the tiative. In the case of the Malagas\, 
this essential characteristtc was a Iack oCgratitude. Mannotil assures his readers that he has 
experienced this situation too. I le wracs: 
A Malagasy receives from a Furopean some favour -, x-hich he badly needs, but would 
ticver have dreamed ofaskitig for. Aftevvards lie comes of his own accord and asks 
for fqvours he could vcry well do xvithout; lie appears to feel he has some claim 
Upon the I"UrOpe', 111 who did him a kindness. Furthermore, lie sliows no gratltLidc- 
in our sense of the Nvord-for favours lie has received (42). 
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By contrast, Niannot-ii suggests that the Fluropean culture tends towards what 
he calls 'inferiority. This might at first appear to be a rather unexpected claim, but 
Mannom -aimed -, it drawing a portrait of the pathology that lie detected in the 
colonizers and the colonized. He argues that those Europeans who do become 
colonials are not created through their colonial experience. Instead they possess 
disturbing psychological tendencies that become expressed in a colonial setting such 
as a failure to accept reality as it is. He draws on European literature to support his 
argument, identi(ving Prospero and Robinson Crusoe as examples of the European 
colonial type. These men display an inability to accept that the others (whoever the 
others may be) we create in our unconscious do not correspond to the people we 
actually encounter in the world. Instead of accepting this reality, colonial types 
display an incredible and irrational need to control those around them. They are 
desperate, Nlannom claims, to find some paradise where anyone they encounter win 
be entirely governed by them. 
Having outlined his theory of the colonized and colonizer's respective 
personalities, NIannoni turns his attention to the problem of political independence 
in a culture of dependence. He deals quickly with the problem of Malagasy a itation 1 91 
for political independence. This, he suggests, is simply the result of their loss of 
confidence in their European leaders. If the Malagasy genumiely want to move 
towards democratic self government they will have to begin by reviving their own 
tribal forms of government. His advocacy of a return to tradition is somewhat 
curious since he attributes their dependency complexes to their traditional practices. 
However, he is not realk, interested in what will happen to the MabagasN-, Ills main 
concern is the decline of the l,, Liropcan character. 
For INIaluioni, there is nothing inherctitly problematic about the Furopean's 
inferiority complex, indeed he notes that "providing it is resolved in good time, [it] is 
the rnam driving force of western man, and provides him with the ctiergy Nx-lilch sets 
29 
him apart form all other peoples in the world" (127). In fact, he goes so far as to say 
that the Furopeans brought up in the colony are generally less neurotic than their 
metropolitan counterparts. However, he claims that this is the result of living in a 
society where their authority is not cliaHengcd rather than a successful resolution of 
their inferiority complexes. If this situation persists, he wartis his metropolitan 
readers, the psychological burden or unresolved authority issues will prevent the 
white man from reaching his full potential. In gloomy tones he writes, "already we 
can forecast what the main characteristics of this type will be: lack of ori inality and 91 
creativity, a dis6nct taste for feudal types of organization, and a lively desire to avoid 
infection from the complexes of the Northern hemisphere ... far less worthy 
products than ate Europeans" (127). 
In other words, Mannoni is worried that the colonial Europeans will 'go 
native' if they are not provided with the challenges that build character. In the end, 
Mannoni avoids actual pronouncements about or solutions to the future of the 
colony, preferring instead to concentrate on the problem of the European character. 
He emphasises that his book is only about understanding the colonial situation -as it 
exists and demonstrates whv "onlv psychology can explain how and whv a colonial 
situation so easily deteriorates into one of error and illusion" (198). Indeed, for 
Mannom the kind of analysis his book attempts "is precisely the job psychoanalysis 
should perform in the study of such situations" (198). 
It is in this context that Fanon enters the discussion on mental health and 
colonlahsm. In 131ackSkiýi VbileAlasks, Fanon is at pains to dcal with Nlannoni's 
argument, dcvoting an entire chapter to an analysis of "The So-Cafled Dependency 
Complex of the Coloni7ed peoples". I wiH examine some aspects of his response in 
the next section, where I will deal specifically with Fanon's reading of psychoanalytic 
theoiý'. However, Ixfore I go on to consider Fanon's response to psychoanalysis in 
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detail I want to consider 1-ýs deployment of psychiatry, psychology and 
psychoanalysis more generally. 
First, Fanon wrests back the language of psychology and psychoanalysis to 
write about the man of colour's experience of colonialism. F anon was not a 
psvchoan-alvst, and did not undergo any psychoanalytic training or undertake any 
psychoanalytic therapy hanself Nevertheless, he engages with the discourse m order 
to present a different perspcctive on the psychology of colonial relations. Fanon's 
work looks at the links between psychology and politics and illuminates them from a 
different direction than the ethnopsychiatrists or Nlannonis of the world. The 
perspective on the psychology of colonialism offered by, ethriopsychiatrists in 
colonial Africa, Owen Berkeley-Hill and Mannoni, although not overtly presented as 
-arguments for colonialism, serves to confirm if not explain the need for a colonial 
order of things. They paint a picture of infantile, intellectually and morally immature 
native populations whose psychological profiles (neurotic or anal-erotic) make them 
unsuitable to govern their own affairs adequately without guidance from the 
colonizer. Fanon's work, as we shall see, attempts to show that the psychology of 
colonialism is not a question of describing the innate or essential characteristics of 
the nativ, e populatic n. Instead, it is a question of understanding how colonialism has 
created damaging, if not unliveable, psychological conditions. 
Another important strand of Fanon's strategy, which I cannot examine 'in 
detad here given the scope of this chapter, involved his work and practice as a 
psychiatrist. Fanon was vcry interested in socio-ccntric therapies throughout his 
working life. McCulloch, Verg&s, and Bulhan have all written about Fanon'saactupts 
to help his patients recover mental health through group activities in the hospital 
community. He worked to make the staff part ()f the community (rather than 
splitting the social world of the hospital between patients and staff), and increased his 
own unders tan ding of the social and CLAtUral world of his patients. Contrary to the 
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tradition of the colonial psychiatrist, I ýanon did not accept the standard medical 
profiles of the day that deemed his mostly inale, colonized Algerian patients lazy, 
passiVe, depressed or withdrawn. Instead he tried to understand how their experience 
of the colonial world produced such symptoms, and attempted to improve their 
experience of the world inside the institution by designing culturally appropriate 
group activities for them. 
What makes this aspect of Fanon's strategy so remarkable is his willingness to 
follow it through to Its logical ends. Fanon's belief In the interdependent relationship 
between the mental illness of his colonized patients and the demands of colonial 
society led him to evcnt-uall\l resign his post as the Chief of Medicine at Blida- 
joinville. In colonial Algeria, Fanon was not held accountable to the NIMistty of 
Health in France but to the local authority in Algeria. In other words, as a doctor in 
the colonial medical service, he was an agent of the colonial government in Algeria. 
Realizing the incompatibility between his idea that psychiatry involved the 
reconciliation of an individual and his world, and his position as an agent of the 
government that made all political, economic and psychological reconciliation 
unpossible, he gave up his post. In his tesignation lettet to the Resident Minister 11-1 
1956 he made this clear in his own, inimitable style: 
Madness is one of one the means man has of losing his freedom. And I can 
sav, on the basis of what I have been -able to observe from this point of 
vantage, that the degree of alienation of the inhabitants of this countrV, 
appears to me frightening. 
If psychiatry is the medical technique that aims to enable man no longer to be 
a stranger to his environment, I owe it to myself to affirm that the Aral), 
permanently -an -alien in his own countrv, lives in -a state of absolute 
depersonalization 
... 
The social structure e-xisfing in Algeria was hostile to 
any attempt to put the individual back where he belonged (53). 
In fact, Fation obscii-ed that the activities origMally dc\-cl()I)cd for the male, Algert. 1111 
patients were based on iiis o-, A-ti culturally 1ýrcnch ideas of leisure c)r interest. I Ic oilly realized 
later that these patients needed something more culturally appropriate when they did not 
respond to the activities. I le mid lits colleagues devised -in Algerian coffee shop for the 
patients rather than C11COUraging thein to put together a community newspaper (an activity 
the French patients seemed to respond to). 
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Fanon went on practising medicine after his resignation, but it was as a doctor in the 
service of the FLN in Tunis, rather than as a government psychiatrist. 
Fation's workas a psychiatrist has proved to be as contentious a subject for 
his commentators and biographers as his revolutionary and theoretical writings. 
Macey and Verg&s have both reminded readers that Fanon was a conventional 
psychiatrist who used the ffill spectrum of psychiatric treatments to treat his patients, 
rather than -a pioneering, medical hero set apart from the entire medical tradition. 
Socio-ccntric therapy also involves certain problems, as McCulloch and Vcrg&s both 
remind us, and as we shall discuss later in this chapter. Nevertheless, I think it 
important to acknowledge that Fanon's decision to resign his post in Blida had 
consequences not simply for him and his career, but for his family. The decision to 
act on his beliefs about psychiatry and colonialism demanded a level of integrity and 
consistency from him that continues to be admirable from a contemporary point of 
view. 
, Fhe last aspect of Fanon's treatment of the psychology of colonialism that I 
want to look at here is how he makes graphic-ally visible Just what real mental illness 
in the colonies can look like. Bv the time Fanon wrote Vretched ý)flhe Earth, Fanon's 
own experience and understanding of colonialism had deepened. In Algeria he was 
living in the midst of a colonial war. Some critics have -argued that Fanon leaves 
behind his concerns with psychology and psychiatry towards the end of his career, 
but the last chapter of IF'reldged ql'll, )e Eadl) before his conclusion is entirely devoted 
to the subject of "Colonial War and -Mental Disorders". In this chapter Fanon 
presents some cases histories of patients lie has treated during the war. Some of them 
are drawn frorn the colonized population fighting the war of independence, others 
are drawn from the colonizers in charge of bring the colonial rebels to account. 
This chapter makes starkand unpleasant reading. Far from cataloguing a 
scries of generalized bclia\-1ours and attitudes (for example, lazN1, ungrateful, passive 
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natIvcs) Fation describes the mental and physical torment of liVing with colonial 
conflict and being forced to play a part in that conflict. This includes the physical 
symptorns and personal dilemmas that result from, for example, surviving mass 
murder, living in the knowledge that French soldiers have raped and degraded your 
partner, committing terrorist activity, and torturing other human beings. In the 
extremes of colonial conflict, then, we are not in the realm of abstract complexes and 
personalities, but a bloody and destructive encounter between a set of people who 
aim to dominate andanother set of people who will not accept that domination any 
more. There is obviously a difference between the psychology of colonialism 
described by N'tantioni, and that described bý, Fanon in lv"rekbed ý1*lhe Earth. And vet 
violence was beginning to erupt in Madagascar as Nlannoni was writing just as it 
erupted in Fanon's colonial Algeria. Mannoni may have not have seen the potential 
or actual violence of the psychological universe he lived in, but Fanon saw it all too 
clearly, and tried to make his readers understand the full horror of colonial conflict 
with his account of psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalvsis in the colonv. 
Reading Tanon's Psychoanalysis 
How, then, does Fanon make use of psychoanalytic theory itselp. I have 
as strategic, but what are argued that we should read Fanon's use of ps) 
his specific tactics? Perhaps his first, and most important tactic, is the introduction of 
llsociogcný, " into the psychoanalytic method. In the introduction of Black, vkz'n, Vhife 
Alasks he declares "the black man's alienation is not an individual question. Besides 
phylogeny and ontogeny stands soclogeny ... this is a question of a sociodiagnostic" 
(13). Phylogmy refers to the history of the cvoIntion of a racial type, or a pedigree. 
Ontogcny is defined as the history of the development of ItidividLial being. 
Soclogenv, which is one of Fanon's interesting neologisms, could be understood to 
be the history of the development of a society. Fle specifically does not use the word 
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sociology, the study of a society. Instead, he asks us to consider the history of the 
development of a particular societv, specifically the history of the development of the 
racist, colonial society. Understanding the alienation of the black man or putting 
together the psychology of the black man, will mean looking at the way in which a 
racist, colonial society comes to be and produces its effects. Fanon does not criticize 
the absence of a socio-political or socio-economic perspective in psychoanalysis 
itself. He simply insists that for the black man, "an inimediate recognition of social 
and economic realities" (Blatk Skin 13) must come into play. 
Fanon's psychological and psychoanalytic investigations, then, proceed from 
the acknowledgement of certain facts. He insists on the reality of racism and the 
effects of racial ideology 11-1 colonial societies. Until that point, for most of the 
authors writing on mental health in the colon),, racism was not even a topic for 
discussion. In his study of the field, McCulloch points out that even "the term 
colonialism appears so rarely in the literature that it is almost possible to survey it 
without being aware of the context in which it was written ... they had no formal 
interest in the relations between black and white communities and they ignored the 
ways in which colonial contact had reshaped A frican societies" (138). Like Mannoni, 
the suggestion that their own work was racist seemed to be deeply upsetting to them. 
Their scientific contributions to the discussions were intended to be 'above' racism. 
Nlannom was one of the first European commentators to tackle the topic of 
racism, or racialism as he referred to it, in his book. Perhaps predictably, he took 
much the same line as the ethnopsychiatrists. He did not see racialism as one of the 
defining features of colonial society, and did not see its relevance to his anA, sis. It 
was this attitude whicli allowed hini to write, "France is Linqucstionably one of the 
least racialist-minded countries in the xxorld; also colontal policy is officially anti- 
racialist" (110). In fact, though lie devotes one chapter of Prospero alid Cý11V)all to the 
topic of "The Colonial Situatioti and Racialistri" Nlaiinoni is keen to rid himself of 
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the problems of race and racialism. He concludes that "nothing is gained by creaiing 
vague concepts like that of race" (121) and warns that once it is introduced into the 
discussion the conflict between colonizer and colotuzed can never be resolved. He 
obscvves with quiet distaste that the most one can expect of a racialist is that "he will 
hide his racialist convictions" 
In marked contrast to these attitudes then, Fanon insists that racism is -a real 
phenomenon and is absolutely relevant to psychiatric, psycholo ical or 91 
psychoanalytic investigations of the black man's alienation. In direct response to 
Mannom's remark, at best naive and at worst insulting, that France is not a racist 
countn, Fanon insists that it is: 
Once and for all I will state this principle: a given society is racist or it is not. 
Until all the evidence is available -a great number of problems will have to be 
put aside. Statements for example, that the North of France is more racist 
than the south, that racism is the work of underlings and hence in no way 
involves the ruling class, that France is one of the least racist countries in the 
world are the product of men incapable of straight thinking (Black Skin 85) 
Where-as Nlannoiii, and others like him, write about the psychology of colonialism 
without reference to race as a liv, ed reality or racism as such, Fanon places the term 
squarely in the centre of his analysis. For Fanon, there is no question that racism 
exists as a painfully real aspect of the colonized person's life and, consequently, 
produces significant psychological effects. 
Fanon not only places racisin more centrally in the debate, he also insists on 
the structural naturc of that racism. Insofar -as Mannom, unlike many of the 
ethnopsvchiatrists, accepts the existence ot racism in the colony he ascribes it to 
some 'rotten apples in the barrel'. For Mannoni racism is a human flaw, or as 
McCulloch describes it "an aberration of the human spirit which could be overcome 
by appeals to reqson" (138). ' For Fai-ion, racism is not a question of some petty or 
It is intcresting to notc that Mannom believcs Furopean v. -on-icii arc much more likely to 
-nen. Un,,, ur isingly, ll)ivcn thts vle\v, lic also finds that amon oLICCUMb to 'racialism' than i I)rl 119 
the mcn 'racialism' is an attitude practised by the lo,, k-er orders of the colonial hierarchy, but 
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uninformed fellows, not least because of his own experiences with racism at the 
hands of professors in medical school or colleagues. He draws his readers' attention 
to the specific structural atrangenictits and rewards of colonialism for the European 
colonizer. Nlannoni may believe that economic factors do not explain very much 
about colonial relations, but Fanon writes that, for example, the conflict in South 
Africa between working-class whites -and blacks is "fundamentally a result of the 
economic structure of South Africa" (Black- Skin 87). Far from being a psychological 
misunderstanding or a human flaw, apartheid policy aims at "the separation of the 
natives from the Europeans, territorially, economically, and on the political level" 
(Black, Vkin 87) as described by a South African author of the aime. 
Falion settles the question of the relationship between economics and racism 
with bitter clarity: 
If one adds that many Europeans go to the colonties because it is possible for 
them to grow rich quickly there, that with rare exceptions the colonial is a 
merchant, or rather a trafficker, one will have grasped the psychology of the 
man who arouses in the autochthonous population 'the feeling of Inferiority' 
(Black- 3'kin 108). 
One may approach the question of colonialism from a psychological or 
psychoanalytical perspective, but F-anon cautions us that we must not treat the 
psycholo ical problems of colonialism in isolation from social, political and 
economic contexts. In fact, Fanon suggests that structural realities do not sirnply 
inform the -analysis they direct the solutions. He writes "outside my psychoanalytic 
office, I have to incorporate my conclusions into the context of the world .... as a 
ps\, cho, analvst, I should help my patient to becorne conscious of his unconscious and 
abandon his attempts at a hallucinatory whitening, but also to act in the direction of 
change in the social structure" (131a('k Skill 100). 
never by the Finest specimens of Furopean culture. There is something rather disingenuous 
about Matmoni's claims. WhIle the Malagasy remain Iargcly undifferentiated it) his analysis of 
colonial psychology, his attack on the colonizers is fincly tuned to exclude a great man, % 
people From anv Maine for the colonial situation. 
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Fhe last aspect of Fation's soclogcnic method which I will consider here is 
his emphasis on the bodily experience itself, or as he describes it 'the lived- 
experience of the black inan'. The fifth chapter of BlackSklti WI)i/eAlasks, is often 
translated as "The Fact of Blackness". However, as Macey notes, the original French 
"1, 'exp6rience v6cue du Noir" is better understood as "The I, lVcd Experience of the 
Black" (164), or as Gordon further clarifies, the lived-experience of racism ("The 
Black" 77). Indeed, the book is subtitled "The Experiences of a Black Man in a 
White World". Clearly, as Gordon has persuasively demonstrated in his study of 
Fanon's philosophical ideas, this emphasis on the body owes something to Fanon's 
understanding of existcn6al and phenomenological theories. Here, I offer Fanori's 
emphasis on the body sImply as further evidence of his insistence on the material in 
his psychological invcstigations in contrast with the much more abstract and 
detached psychology of colonialism offered by his contemporary European 
commentators. ' Physical bodies or bodily experiences do not figure prominently in 
Nlannoni's book, and to the extent theýT appear in the literature by colonial 
psychiatrists, they ate described in highly medicalized and depcrsonalized tenns. 
In contrast with these bland or sanitized accounts, Fanon lays bare his own 
intention to "convey the misery of the black man" (Blatýk- Skiti 86), which he does in 
very physical terms. In spite of his warning, it is still painful to read Fanon's strange1v 
familiar account of being forced to turn himself, his skin, into in object in order to 
lessen the weight of being black in a white world: "What else could it be for me but 11 - 
an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that spattered rný whole body with black 
blood" (BlackSkin 113). The expcrience of existing in a black body is often made 
" Gordon's I-I'ailon and 1he Lumpean (', 'fi,, -is ollIan offers the best and most comprellensiVe 
explication of the plictionictiological itilluences in Fations vvork, noting not simply liov- lic 
uses those categorics, bUt how, as -\vith psyclioanalysts, he rcrnakcs the categories in his 
discusstons of nicism, colonialism and [he black.. 
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physically painful in a white world. He indicates in another, earlier paragraph that it is 
also disorienting: 
In the train it was no longer a question of being aware of inN, body in the 
third person but in a triple person. In the train I was given i iot one, but Vvo, 
three places. I had already stopped being amused. It was not that I was 
finding febrile coordinates in the world. I existed triply: I occupied space. I 
moved toward the other ... and the evanescent other, 
hostile but not 
opaque, transparent not there, disappeared. Nausea (Black- Skin 112) 
Bhabha has interpreted this passage in a more empowering sense than I am 
presenting it here (Lot-alion o/ Cilllare 50). Rather than emphasizing the painfiil quality 
of Farion's bodily fractures, Bhabha understands them as the fractures that, for 
Lacanian psychoanalysts, mark the process of creating and negotiating identity. T 
would argue instead that, for Fanon, these experiences represent a forceful, brutal 
fracturing of his experience of his body. Fanon demonstrates that being black in a 
colonial society produces psycholo ical effects and affects which Mannom and his 1 91 
colleagues do not even begin to comprehend or take into account. 
Fanon's second central tactic, in Blat-k, Skin Vhile Allasks is to puncture the 
claims of psychoanalysis to be a universal theory. He attempts to prove that any 
universal category intended to describe the human functions as a "mask ov er the 
assimilation of the human itself with European values" (Young, IVIVIe A, ýylholýgies 
122). Against the universals of psychoanalysis, Fanon insists on the specifics of the 
colonial situation that he is seeking to describe and understand. He describes this 
objective neatly at the beginning of the most psychoanalytically-engagcd chapter of 
Blat, k Skin lFbile A lasksl 'The Negro and Psychopathology': "One should investigate 
the extent to which the conclusions of Freud or of Adler can be applied to the effort 
to understand the man of color's view of the world" (141). 
Fanon notes his sense throughout his own readings of psychoanalysis that 
sot-nerlitrig in the theory does tiol quite resonate the life of a black man. He 
writes: "I have been struck by the disparity beoN-een the corresponding schetnas and 
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the reality that the Negro presents" (MvkSkin 150). Anticipating his readers' 
comments that he is, in fact, only dcscribing particular variations on universal themes 
he insists that there is something in the life of the man of colour bcing described 
which allen- 11, )e mhole. 1ramework. This is not merely a question of providing an examplc 
of how, in the particular case of the Black man, the theorv does not work. It is a case 
of showing how the liv, ed experience of the colonized black inan 'stretches' 
psychoanalytic theory slightly. In some instances, then, Fanon dispenses with 
concepts as they apply to the life of the man of colour, in other instances he provides 
refinements and corrections in order to make the concepts applicable to a 
psychology of colonialism. 
One of Fanon's key challenges to psychoanalytic thcory is his gleeful claim 
that the Oedipus complex does not exist in Black familics in the Antilles. He writes, 
"if would be relativ, ely easy for me to show that in the French Antilles 97 pet cent of 
the families cannot produce one Oedipal neurosis. This incapaci", is one on which 
we heartily congratulate ourselves" (Black Skin 152). '" How Fanon arrillIcs at the 
percentage calculation, or why he feels it would be easy for lim''I to demonstrate the 
absence of Oedipal complexes is a matter for speculation. Bulhari, one of Fanon's 
most admi-ring commentators notes, that this statistic is "an example of his tendency 
to make a categorical affirmation even in the absence of precise data to support it" 
(73). Nevertheless, as Bulhan also observes, the rhetorical effect of this denial of 
psychoanalytic theory's cornerstone is powerful. Fanon was well aware when he 
wrote these words that the psychoanalytic community was adamant in its assertion 
that the Oedipus complex occurred universally and across cultures. The point, then, 
is not whether the Oedipus complex occurred or not among the I, rench Antilleans. 
I" Fation goes on to claim that because of the -absence of ( )cdlptis complex Ai Martinique 
there is also , in abscrice of neurotic homosexualitY. Any homosexuality that does exist in 
Martinique lie ascribes to purely economic motivations. See Fuss 32-36 for a discussion of 
the disturbing implications of Fation's analysis. 
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Instead, Fanon alerts us to the fact that the assertions of orthodox psychoanalytic 
theory can and should be challenged. It may be significant that this is the only 
concept he throws away wholesale. In almost every other case, in writing about 
Lacan's mirror state, Adler's theory of recognition orjung's collective unconscious, 
as we shall see below, he refines the concept for his own purposes. Dismissing the 
Oedipus complex at the very beginning then, may be a theoretical flourish, or a signal 
that we are not in the realms of orthodox psychoanalytic theory. 
Fanon mayalso have had genuine reasons to suppose that the Oedipus 
complex was not the central or significant feature of the Martinican's psychic life. His 
rewriting of the family in the psychic life of the colonized suggests an alternative 
explanation. For orthodox psychoanalysis the family is crucial, because it is the 
formation through which the child learns to be what he or she should be and what 
others should be. Indeed, for Lacan the family is the most significant "psychic 
circumstance and object" J, acan quoted in Fanon, Black Skin 141). " Fanon accepts 
the psychoanalysts' view that the family represents the society in microcosm. The 
child learns how the world works from observing members of its family, and 
interacting with those family members. For the European child, Fanon suggests, this 
does not set up any particular conflict. The French family is, in effect, the French 
nation and "as the child emerges from the shadow of his parents, he finds himself 
once more among the same laws, the same principles, the same values" (Black- Skin 
142). Putting aside more detailed discussion of what is and what is not normal, 
Fanon asserts that the normal French child will emerge from his or her childhood 
into normal adulthood. I ýor the colonized Black child, however, we are in a different 
psychological situation. For the Antillean child, emerging from childhood and 
making contact with the white world of the colonizer leads inevitably to conflict and 
III use Fation's citation of Lac-, in, since Fanon's reintcrpremnon of the mirror stage is based 
on his understanding of Lacan's thcorý. 
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psychological abnormality. In other words, Fation suggests that for the Black child 
the crucial psychic circumstance and object is his or her contact with the White 
world. 
In order to elaborate on this explanation, Fanon begins to experiment with 
psychoanalytic concepts such as j acqucs Lacan's mirror stage and Carl jung's 
collective unconscious. For example, Fanon suggests the reason that contact with the 
White world proves so difficult for the colonized child is that until this point the 
child has not realized his or her blackness. In other words, the child has not 
identified with his blackness. Making use of Lacan's mirror stage, Fanon reports on 
how Antillcans experience this phenomenon: "I contend that for the Antillean the 
mirror hallucination is always neutral. When Antilleans tell me they have experienced 
it, I always ask the same qucs tion: 'What color were you? Inv, ariably, they, repIv: 'I had 
no color... (Blaiýk, Skin 162). He offers further evidence of the 'neutral' terms in which 
Antillean children experience and imagine themselves in the form of school essays 
describing their vacations. The black children remembered themselves as running 
through the countryside, with a ros\ý flush on their cheeks from the exertion. Clearlv, 
Fanon argues, the Antillean child does not realise "the fact of his being a Negro" 
(Blat, kSkili 162) whose skin could not display picturesque rosy blushes. 
When the child does realise the 'fact" of his blackness, the result is 
devastating. Here, Fanon makes use of a well-known psychoanalytic concept, Jung's 
collective unconscious. Fanon clearly finds Jung's concepts of collectively held ideas, 
images and needs useful. But here, once again, lie makes his own adjustment. For 
Jung, the collective Linconscious is an instinct shared by and passed on through a 
race. Fation obsei\-cs that we do not lia\-e to make use of. ) Ling's racializcd thinking to 
make use of the concept. Tlic collective unconscious is "pLircly and simply the sLim 
of prejudices, myths, collective attitudes of a gt\-cti group" (131ack Skili 188). .1 ung 
ascribes the fact that these attitudcs and images arc shared to racial instinct, btit 
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Fanon argues instead that it is cultural and therefore, acquired. When the colonized 
child, then, who has absorbed and internalized the prejudices and attitudes towards 
blackness prevalent in colonial culture, is forced to confront the fact that he must 
1dcnti(y or be identified with blackness, his , xorld begins to fracture. What does the 
black child do, Fation asks his readers, having realized that from now on he will have 
to be a black person? 
The problem is compounded, Farion goes on to show, by the fact that "not 
only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man" 
(Bkick Skin 110). Here, in the last chapter of Black Skin V11ile Wasks that deals 
specifically with a set of psychoanalytic concepts, Fanon makes use of Alfred ý\dler's 
theories of inferiority. References to z\dler's more sociocentric and socialist 
psychoanalytic theory are scattered throughout the book, but it is onlý,, in the chapter, 
"The Negro and Recognition" that he comments on specific aspects of Adler's 
theory and modifies them for his purposes. Adler hypothesiZed that those suffering 
from inferiority were driv en to compare themselves with those they encountered, 
rclentlesslý, seeking to understand how they measured up to others. In these 
encounters with others the individual could either feel superior to the Other, or, if he 
did not, he would have to develop an explanation for why he did not appear to 
advantage placed beside the Other. For Antilleans, Fanon argues, this is not a matter 
of individual psychology it describes the entire group. He writes uncqLlWocafly, "it is 
not just this or that Antillean who embodies the neurotic formation, but all 
Antillcans. Antillean society is a neurotic society, a socictý, of 'comparison"' (Blaýk 
Skin 213). 
'I'lils inight seem to be a peculiar theoretical move from Fanon, since he 
appears to be arguing that Martinicans can all be classified under one psychological 
label. I 1()wc\-cr, in the next sentence lie places his own statement in c1tiestion: "The 
Martinican is and is not a neurotic" 213). The ncLiroticism Fanon 
43 
dcscribcs is not to be understood as an innate or inherited characteristic. It is a 
response to the fact that historically the Black man has always been made to feel that 
he is inferior. Faced with this historical rcalitv, the Black mail has reacted with a 
superiority complex always seeking to measure tip well against the others. What 
Adler understands to be an individual phenomenon, Fanon turns into a society-wide 
phenomcnon. 
Indeed, Fanon goes one step further. Adler theoriscs that the individual 
suffering from an inferiority complex compares himself with the Other. Fanon 
argues that for the black man, the comparison is slightly different. He compares 
himself with other black mdiv iduals, in relation to the White man. In other words, 
the significance of the Black man's comparison with Others is not how he measures 
up personally (although he experiences it indiv, idually), it is how he measures up in 
social terms. As Fanon observes repeatedly throughout the book, the psychic 
identifications, comparisons and experiences of the Black man are aR tied to a myth 
of blackness. What he has been attempting to describe is not "a universal 
phenomenon, the criterion of maturity being in fact adaptation to society, " (Black 
Skin 149). Instead, Farion has been trying to illuminate a psychological problem 
entirely specific to the fife of the colonized Black man. Namely, that he must find a 
way to beat "the whole weight of his blackness" (Blatk, Skz'n 150). 
Evalriating Tanon's Psychoanalytic Sttategv 
Fanon's critique of psychological analyses of colonialism and his own 
experiments with psychoanalysis cover a widc-range of issues. His writings represent 
-ilzc psychological discourse an ambitious -tttcmpt to decolol and psychiatric practice, 
but how cffective are thcyý In one sense they were very cffective since Farion's work 
represents if not the end, then -at least the bcginning of the end of ctlinopsychiatn 
and introduces the possibility that mcdicine and psychological discourse can be 
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placed in the setvice of the colonized. However, there are sVgnificant problems with 
Fanon's psychoan-alvtlc studies both in terms of the rewritten psychoanalytic theory 
'and the implications of F-anon's theoretical conclusions. 
McCulloch suggests that psychiatfy has historicaUy had the task of bringing 
the discontented in line with civilization, and admires the impulses of Fanon's radical 
psychiatry that pay in 1 genuine attention to the complai ts of those discontented. 
Nevertheless, he considers Fanon's approach a flawed one because it fads to specify 
a theorv of how colonialism produces mental illness. McCulloch finds the assertion 
that colonialism and mcntal pathologies are linked in all of Fanon's work, but he 
notes that Fanon is never able to come close to turning his belief into a systernatized 
theory. Without a clear description of the process, McCulloch suggests that we are 
left with the rather simplistic idea that decolonization will effect change in and of 
itself although we are not told how, or why. 
Verg&s is even less convinced than McCulloch that Fanon's politicized 
approach to psychiatry works. Indeed, she considers "Fanon's desire to show that 
politics and psychology were inseparably linked limited the dimension of his 
argument" (96). In contrast to Bulhan and McCulloch, she pits Fanon the 
psy, chiatrist, who she argues had to admit professional failure, against Fanon the 
activist, who would not accept the fiadure of colonial revolution. McCulloch 
concludes that Fanon believed in the link between colonialism and mental illness, but 
was not able to theorize it systernaticafly. Verg&s goes one step further however and 
considers it Impossible to theorize these links between an alienating environment and 
the actiology of mental illness. She insists that alienation is a basic part of human 
existence and cannot be eradicated by a dccololuzed practice of psychlatry. She offers 
as her simpte, but effectivc, evidence the continuing presence of mental 111riess in 
Algerian society after the struggle for independence though. While she recognizes 
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and deplores the reality of colonial alienation, she concludes "PSNTcholo ical 91 
-alienation is not the loss of freedom" (96). 12 
Fanon's failure to theorize or prove the specific links between colonialism 
and mental illness suggests a serious problem. If we are to consider Fanon's 
intetven6on in psychological theory and practice a strategic move, in what terms call 
we consider it a success or a useful model for contemporary anti-racist and anti- 
colonial theory? That is, if it works to achieve changes in the short-term as we 
perceive them now, is that sufficient? Is Fanon's strategy to be evaluated in terms of 
his abihtv to throw the colonialist camp into confusion, or his failure to genuinely 
systematize a theory of colonial alienation? In terms of my study here I do not think 
we have to be waylaid by McCulloch and Verges' charges. We are looking for ways in 
which Fanon shows us we can intenTcne in the psychoanalytic and psychological 
discourse on colonialism and racism, we are not in search of a fully worked out 
theorv of mental illness. Indeed, it may be rather unfair to expcct such a theory from 
Fanon, although it does suggest a useful and productive direction for further research 
in the fields of psychoanalysis, psychology and social psychiatry. 
Perhaps a more significant problem, one that various scholars have pointed 
to, is that Fanon's response to the psychology of colonialism remains within the 
bounds of psycholo ical and psychiatric discourses. Anderson, for one, cautions that: 91 
Whatever its political utility, Fanon's work was still building on earlier 
medical framings of colomal nerves and therefore passed over its own 
complicity with the processes it condemned ... Fanon was able to point to a 
convergence of colonialism -and subject formation-an observation that 
makes this essaypossible-but at the same time as he saw colonialism 
producing a symptom, it was framing even his own diagnostic activity (1369). 
In other words, cven if I-anon is ablc to introducc social, political and econoinic 
factors into the psycliological analysis of colonial socicty, lits xvork is still part of a 
12 It is worth considering, however, that Algeria may not be the bcst example of \cr, (,, CS' 
gencral point, since colonial litstory continues to wreak havoc on as ostensibly 
postcolontal present 
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colonial medical discourse. McCulloch has also noted that, contrary to Fanon's 
portrayal of his methods, soclocentric therapies and techniques had long been part of 
the medical establishment. Far from being a revolutionaný, Fanoil was a doctor 
whose work built on already established medical foundations. 
While I think we must be careful not to become distracted by debates about 
how original or revolutionary Fanon's work was, Anderson and McCulloch both 
remind us that escape from the discourse is not reallv possible. Anderson's 
observation that Fallon's colonialisin was "framing even his own diagnostic activity" 
(1369) is intriguing and worth exploring further. However, Young reminds readers of 
postcolonial theory that it is not possible either to remove colonial thought from 
European thought, or to distance oneself from colonial thought inside a European 
tradition. Taking his cue from Fanon himself, Young writes, "it is rather a question 
of repositioning European systems of knowledge so -as to demonstrate the long 
history of their operation as the effect of their colornal other, a reversal encapsulated 
in Fanon's observation: 'Europe is literally the creation of the Third World" (Vhile 
Nb! lhol(ý, uzes 119). Fanon attempts, in his repositioning of psychological and 
psychoanalytic discourses, to make their colonial assumptions and Justifications 
visible, but he cannot render them powerless. 
Despite this there are problematic aspects of psychoanalytic and 
psychological thinking that Fanon seems to take at face value. His understanding of 
sexuality and its relationship to civilization, for example, is at moments utterly and 
disturbingly Freudian. So perhaps understanding what Fanon takes for granted in 
psychological and psychoanalytic discourses is a much more promising line of 
investigation than evaluating how revolutionary his theories were. He either accepts 
psychoanalytic concepts w-hole or dismisses them, and if he accepts them he modifics 
their range or objects of application. He discards the Oedipus complex as it applies 
to coloni7ed societic-s like Martinique, but even here lie does not question Freud's 
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theory. While feminists and scholars of sexuality debate the actual descriptive value 
of psychoanalytic theories Fanon takes many of these mechanisms, and their 
impticationsl as accurate even if poorly contextuall7ed and applied in the case of the 
inhabitants of colonial societies. "' Maurice Stevens suggests that we cannot expect 
Fanon to be critical of psychoanalytic theories in the way that we are today. 
However, it is important to understand how Fanon's blindness to certain aspects of 
psychoanalysis "can suggest how a differently conceptualized psychoanalysis might 
function" (Stevens 213). 
A key example of this blindness in Fanon's work is his acceptance of the 
Freudian schema of SCXU-, LlltNT -and ego formation. In Black Skin Vhile Allasks he states 
"every intellectual gain requires a loss in sexual potenfial" (165) affirrmng Freud's 
notion that cillihzation requires the repression of sexuahtý% As Stevens notes, 
following Doane's reading of Freud and F'anon, this acceptance passes over one of 
the most problematic and imperial moments of classical psychoanalytic theory. For 
Freud there is no doubt civilization is represented by Western notions of maturity, 
self-control and rationality. Those who did not fall into this group, those whose 
sexuality was still subject to chaotic and uncontrolled impulses, were inhabitants of 
'the dark continent', primarily women, children, mentally deficient individuals and 
pnrffltive races. Thus, even though Freud does not argue directly for savage or 
primitive cultures to be dismantled, the "binary opposition between the savage and 
the civilized in their relation to sexuality was a formative element of his thinking" 
(Doane 209). Doane concludes that, in some sense, children, women and inferlor 
races are unpsychoatialyzable sub'ccts. Their sexualitA', free and unticurotic as Freud 
"I Scholars of scxualit 'v 
have been active in itn-cstigating the descriptive accuracv of Freudian 
theories themselves. One of the most tritcrcsting is Brenkman's studv whicli claims orthodox 
psychoanallytic thcorý- does not cven dccribe the subject assumed to be at the heart of the 
theorýý, namely the white, hetcrosexuqI man. Tlie question of -whether psychoanalysis 
represciits worricti accurately has becti widely debated in feminist scholarship, by those -'vhO 
vchcmently repudiate Freud (and Lacati) and those who continue to explore the possibilities 
of psychoanalysts for feminist theory. Nly understandttig of this debate is derived mostly 
from the critical provided by Ro-vdcy and Gros/, 179-198 andjotics 86-101. 
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assumes it to be, marks the limit of his methods. This point certainly bears further 
examination, as we shall see in the remainder of this section. 
One of the most formidable barriers, then, in Fation's use of psychoanalytic 
theon- arises in the form of his treatment of sexuality and gender generallýl, and the 
woman of colour specificall),. Fanon's treatment of gender issues, and women of 
colour in particular, has received a fair amount of attention from feminist scholars. 
With the exception of T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting's book-length study, feminist 
critics have generally concluded that Fanon writes the woman of colour out of the 
colonial scene and consigns the white woman to the role of troubled psychosexual. 
For the most part the feminist critiques of Fanon engage explicitly with his writing 
on psychological discourses. Since feminist theorists have generally been interested in 
j 
., 
this should not seem very surprising. And yet, there is issues of sub'ectivit\ 
something surprising about this interest in Fanon's experiments with psychology and 
psychoanalytic theory, because despite the engagement of French fermnism with 
psychoanalysis women of colour have, until very recently, ignored it. As Gwen 
Bergner notes this neglect is "due largely to the assumed incongruity between 
psychoanalysis and the politics of racial difference" (75). If Fanon can be said to have 
worked through this incongruity in his work, as we have seen, why is the issue of 
gender still a focal point for critique in his work? 
In a chapter of her book Velw1les I waks Doane examines Fanon's rewriting of 
psychoanalysis carefully as she traces the legacy of Freud's characterization of female 
,. uality as 'the dark continent' 
14. in Freud's scheme fe -n int -v 1 -n 'ex I ri ii ts an et blem of 
various figures: castration, lack, inscrutabilitv and, of course, racial otherness. 
According to Doane's reading, Fanon replaces the territory of femininity 11-1 Freudian 
II Doane comments that this term, which is bandtccl about often in ferninist scholarship, is 
actually "quite marginal in the I`rCtidtan corpus. The clark continent quote cannot be found 
in any of the more obvious places one rnight look -it is not In 'Teniininity" or "Feniale 
Sexuafity" nor in Three Fssays on the Theory of Sexuality. Instead it is tucked away almost 
Linnoticeably in "The ( )ticstion of Lay Analy'sils", a gcticnd treatise on psychoarialystis, " (2 1(1). 
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psychoanalysis with black masculinity. Instead of white women, black men occupy 
the position of lack, castration and otherness. This is a powerful rhetorical move, and 
one that places black masculinity into a vulnerable position. Despite his ability to 
rewrite Freud's narrative, Doane's more pressing point is that the position of the 
woman of colour disappears, theorc6callyand materlaUy, in Fanon's analysis. Doane 
suggests "it is in fact the white woman who becomes the pathological linchpM of 
Fanon's analysis" (220). 
As Doane observes it might be easy to imagine the position of women of 
colour as parallel to that of white women. However, following the work of Hazel 
CarbýT, she argues that this formulation just does not leave any room for women of 
colour in Meoty. Here it is worth quoting Doane at length: 
As has been frequently pointed out, the category of women is usually used to 
refer to white women, while the category of blacks often really means black 
men. What is lost in the process is the situation of the black woman. Her 
position becomes quite peculiar and oppressiv ely unique: in terms of 
oppression she is both a black and a woman; in terms of theory she is 
neither. In effect, she occupies a position which is difficult to think within 
current paradigms ... Her identity cannot be oppositional in the traditional 
way (231) 
There may be solutions to this theoretical problem, but the point I want to focus on 
here is that though Fanon can describe how the woman of colour's experience of 
colomal racism differs from the man of colour's experience (especially in regard to 
sexuality) he cannot integrate his sense of the woman of colour's specific position 
into his theory. The woman of colour stands slightly outside his analysis, -as an 
illustradvc but not crucial mattcr. 
It is possible, as Gwen Beqgnet does, to take Doane's conclusions in a stightly 
different direction. While Bergneragrees that Fat-ion writes wornen of colour out of 
his racially revised psychoanalytic thcoty, she argues that black -\%-()mcii's bodies 
remain crucial to his project. Using Gayle Rubin's work on trafficking, Bergner 
argues that cultures depend on the circulation of women's bodies and colonial 
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cultures are by no means exempt frorn this. Having established this, Bergner 
concludes that Fanon's angry comments on women of colour in Bla('k Skill, W'hite 
Alask. s reflect "his own desire to circumscribe black women's sexuality and economic I 
autonoinv in order to ensure the patriarchal authorm, of black men" (81). Bergner 
brings Fanon's gesture up to date with an indictryient of Bhabha's readiness to -accept 
Fanon at his word that Man fi-itictions in his texts as a universal category of mankind, 
as well as his famous assertion that he knows nothing about the woman of colour. 
Bhabha, like Fanon, seems to accept that sexual difference must be subordinated to 
racial difference. Bergner concludes that for many scholars "black women could be 
added to the schema, but more accurately, their exclusion is integral to the present 
formulations, a Nlorrisonian 'ghost in the inachine"' (85). 
Before I go on to discuss the implications of these readings, I would like to 
outhne some of the main objections to crifical work on Fanon by feminist critics 
such as Doane and Bergner. T. Denean Sharpley-Whifing's book, Fraeý, Faiion: 
Con/licls and Feminij-pis is the only book-length analysis of Fanon's thought ftom an 
explicitly feminist perspective. It is also one of the few extended discussions of 
II Fanon's work from a black fermnist perspective. ' It is important, then, to 
understand why Sharpley-Whiting rejects Doane's and Bergner's analyses. Sharpley- 
Whiting is keen to opposc the general impression of Fanon's work as sexist, and to 
recover a sense of his relevance to a fcrrunist theory, -and praxis. She -argues that the 
main charges of nilsogyny against Fanon are base on his use of gender-specific 
language, his condemnation of Mayotte Cap6cia and other women of colour and his 
dcscrip6on of whitc women's pathological scxuahtý. 
In response to the accusation that Fation's Language is gender-specific, 
Sharpley-Whiting notes that much of Falion's work is experiential or personal in 
1ý Iýor perspectives on Fanon from black fetninists ; cc also hooks 81-91 and Sandoval 86- 
106. 
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nature and naturally his text refers to himself and other black men. She also notes 
that white fcminists seem much more willing to excuse or exempt the anti-female 
slant of western philosophers such as Freud, Derrid-a or Lacan than a black male 
writer such as F anon. His hinguage, for example, is nothing more or less than the 
tendency of all male theorists of his generation to write -as though the world was 
primarily a male one. Nevertheless, her reading of anfi-black male bias seems 
especially true of reading,, of Fanoii's theorv bv ferninist writers such as Susan 
Brownmillcr, whose reductive reading of Fanon presented in Sharpley-Whifing's 
book does appear to reinscribe the idea of an aggressive, rape-obsessed black man 
(, Sharpley-Wlý tit ig 14-16). 
However, Sharpley-Whiting's discounts articles that provide perceptive and, 
in parts, positive readings of Fanon by Bergner and Doane. While it is clearly unfair 
to attack some theorists for their everyday chauvinisms and not others, it is not 
useful to close down various ty , pes of critique with a charge of anti-black 
bias. This 
comes dangerously close, as Doane points out, to a situation in which no one is 
aflowed to write about anything they don't experience personally. Doane cautions, 
"such a position threatens to collapse together experience, discourse and ontology bý 
transforming every type of writing into pure autobiography" (247). 
What is most relevant for this thesis is Sharp ley-Whiting's outright rejection 
that Fanon's writing marginalises women of colour. Indeed, she devotes -, in entire 
chapter to a defence of Fation's reading of Mayotte Cap6cias novel, je Suis 
Alarlhiiqllaise as presented in Black Skin If"hile Alasks. Whereas other feminist writers 
find Fanon's discussion of Cap6cta harsh -and unncccssarilv 'udgmental, especiallý 
compared with his sympathy for the character of _)can 
Vencuse in the complemen tarý 
chaptcr about the mail of colour, Sharpley-Whiting, finds Fation entircIN- justificd. She 
observes that Cap6clis cXist because of the racist world they inhabit and if Fanon's 
"hones tv in 131ack Skili, I FIVIe Alask,, - may bc brutal it is not I) rutaltzing" (161). She 
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inakes an excellent point that, although we may dislike Fanon's tone in analysing 
Cap6cia, he may still be correct about the ways in which racist logic forces people of I 
colour to behave. She also draws attention to the context of Cap&cia's novels. She 
observes that Cap6cia achieved considerable commercial success that was clearly less 
a reflection of her literary ability than her "seemingly effortless adeptness at acting as 
a mirror for the French" (156). The French bterary establishment recciVed her books 
well, and approved of her style and plothnes. Fanon's reaction to Cap6cla, then, is in 
part a reaction to what he may have perceived as her pandering to a white, racist 
audience. Sharpley-Whifing suggests that most critics who attack Fanon's reading 
have not read Cap6cia's novels, and do not appreciate the history of their reception. 
Attcmpts, like Bergner's, to turn Cap6cia into an oppressed wornan struggling to find 
a way to secure her economic security through the love of white men seem hollow to 
Sharpley-Whiting. "' Her reading does reMind us to be alert to the context in which 
Fanon was writing. Nevertheless, it is also a fact that the chapter, "The Woman of 
Color and the White Man" actually says very little about the woman of colour. The 
chapter is perhaps better understood as the analysis of how the relationship between 
women of colour -and white men has an effect on men of colour. Even if Fanon's 
brutally honest critique of Cap6cia is justified this still does not explain why the lived- 
eNperience of the woman of colour remains so conspicuously -absent from Fanon's 
theoretical vision. 
In response to the critique that Fanon characterises white women's sexuality 
as pathological Sharpley-Whiting is again distiussix-c. She notes that Fanon's analysis 
is not to bc takcil as a broad dcscription of aH whitc wotncn but as a particular 
description of negrophobic women. She cites a passage of 131aý'k, Vkin, IFIVIe Alasks 
-,,. -here Fanon writes "if there are whites who behave natur-Ay when they meet 
Negroes, they ccrtain1v do not fall xvithin the scope of our examination" (31). In a 
16 l'or another useful reading, of the problcm of Capýcita in F-anon's -, -, -ork see Macev 168-177. 
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racist culture, Sharpley -Whiting affirms, perverse sexualities will be produced and 
among these white female masochism is "but one culturally induced manifestation of 
psychosis" (14). Fuss has suggested that we read Fanon's focus on the imaginary rape 
of the white woman by the black tuan in the context of a racist world where every 
black man was assumed to have designs on white women. Be that as it may, 
Sharpley-Whiting conveniently ignores Fanon's deeply troubling comment that some 
women just seem to ask to be raped. In the interests of defending Fanon from anti- 
black male bias she seems to excuse some of his most puzzling onuissions. 
Sharpley-Whiting is one of the only feminist scholars, however, to consider 
Algerian ferninist critiques of Fation in any, detail. She discusses in particular the 
work of Nlarie-Aim6e Helie-Lucas, founding member of the Network of Women 
Living Under T'Jushin Laws. Helie-Lucas has written about the mythical quality of 
Fanon's female Algerian revolutionaries. She argues that his portrayal of women 
during the colonial war belied the continuing oppression of Algerian women during 
and after colonialism. While Sh-arpley-Whiting recognises the right of scholars such 
as Helie-Lucas to critique Fanon's representation of Muslim women generally and 
Algerian women in particular, she dismisses their critiques, too, declaring "it certainly 
does not serve our interests to inscribe 'myths' onto Fanon's thought at the very 
moment s when we are claiming to unpack his 'myths... (74). -/ In fact, according to 
Sharpley-Whiting the onlv ferninist scholars who do seem to interpret Fanon 
correctIv are radical black feminists such as Linda La Rue, France Be-ale and bell 
hooks. She maintains "an ethics of feminist criticism should allow one to critically 
engage and expose flaws in Fanon's writings and versions of history without 
I- Since this chapter is concerned prtin,. irily with the topic of psychoanalysis, I have not 
discussed in any detail the literature on Fanon's writing about Algerian women. Fanon's style 
and approach to Algerian -, vomen's subicctivity Is quite diffcrent, and invites comp,, Irisoii 
with his writing on Antillean \vomcn. For some \-tcN-, -s of Fation's writing about Algerian 
Nvomen see I lelic-Lucas 25-50 and Nloore-Gilbert "F, ngendering" 125-135. See -also 1,. Izrcg 
326-348 for a critical perspective on scholarship vvritten in the Western academy about 
Nvomen In the Islamic \-, -orld. 
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aggressiv, c inisreadings and textual revisionism" (74). One can only agree with such a 
statement, but it seems debatable whether all her cr1tIc1sms of fernin1st scholars, 
Fluro-Arnerican or Algerian, conform to this standard. 
Taking Direction from Tanon 
Clearly, Fanon's efforts to reposition psychoanalytic methods and psychiatric 
practices pose as many questions as they offer solutions to those writing about 
colonial formations and postcolonial theory today. Even as they critique his efforts, 
scholars like McCulloch, Anderson, Doane and Bergner acknowledge that Fanon's 
work makes it possible to think about the convergences between the psychic and the 
political in colonial socicr, ý. 
One of the first things Fanon's work demonstrates is the importance of 
writing about the convergences between psychiatry, psychology and psychoanalysis 
and colonialism. As one of the few historians writing about colonial psychiatry today, 
McCulloch points out that the history of mental health practice and theory in the 
colonies has been relatively neglected compared with, for example, the history of 
tropical medicine. Anderson and Hartnack both echo his sense that the history of 
mental health practices in the colony is still a relatively unexplored field, even though 
the colonial provenance of medical and health sciences is acknowledged. Yet, as 
Fanon's work demonstrates, it is a richly, informative history for the student of 
colonial discourses. This is not merely a question of accumulating more academic 
knowledge, however useful that may be as an end in itself. Rather, it is a case of 
tapping a vem of knowledge about the products and effects of colontatism that 
Fanon, arnong others, pollitcd to over thirty years ago that remains rich witli nyatcrial 
for colonial discoul-, -, c analysis and postcolonial studles. 
Fation's work challenges us, both in what it demonstrates and what it forgets, 
to treat the relationslilp I)ct\-, -ceii psychology and colonialism as suspect. One of the 
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dangers of using psychological and psychoanalytic concepts to write about 
colonialism is that it seems, as it seemed at its beginnings, to be a progtessive way of 
writing about colonial encounters. Mannoill, the African cthnopsychiitrists and 
Owen Bcrkeley-Hill were all convinced of the ol)'Jectlx-lty and even non-'raciahsm' of 
thcir writings. McCulloch is scrupulously careful in Coloiiial ]ý! ychzalty and Ihe '11fi-ican 
Mind'not to portray the ethnopsychiatrists as distasteful, colonial caricatures, because 
they were not the worst bigots of their time. They were scientists who offered a 
better, more scientific, more objective analysis than the true 'raciahsts'. Psycholo ical J 91 
accounts and explanations for conditions such as colonial nerves were at the cutting 
edge of colonial medicine. Rather than relying on the old ideas of physical 
deterioration the colonial psychiatrists were employing new techniques and theories 
to understand and diagnose their patients. Fanon himself notes in "Racism and 
Culture" that the ways of talking about and thinking about racism are changing all 
the time. He alerts us to the fact that "racism has not managed to harden. It has had 
to renew itself, to adapt itself, to change its appearance. .. Thus the 'emotional 
instability of the Negro, ' the 'subcritical Integration of the Arab, "' (32). Though he Is 
himself a practising psychiatrist, and has an interest in psychoanalytic theory, Fanon 
does not discount the possibility that these scientific Languages can be used to Justifv 
and further colonial ends. His response is to use psychological theories and practices 
himself, as we have seen, to work towards anti-colonial ends. 
Finally, Fanon's work also alerts us to the particular problems of bringing the 
women of colour into psychoanalysis, even a psychoanalysis that has been modified 
for anti-colonial ends. Sharpley-Whiting's review of feminist critiquc of Fanons 
suggests that we should not be too hast-y in labelling Fanon's work as -in ti- feminist. 
Nevertheless, although she critiques the general attitudes and approaches of a range 
of feminist scholars she does not take up the particular critical points that Doane, 
Bcrýgncr or Fuss makes about the subjectivity of the , vornan of colour's in theory. It 
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remains unclear hoxv useful Fanon's strategic use of psychoanalysis is wrifing about 
the women of colour's experiences in colonial society. Indeed, as Nve go on to 
consider other anti-colonial and postcolonial deployments of psychoanalysis we may 
want to consider the possibility that the subjectivity of the woman of colour marks 
the limit of how repositioned psychoanalysis can be. 
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CHAPTER Two: "NONE OF THEM IS TRUE BUT ALL OF THEM ARE 
REALITIES": ASHis NANDY'S PSYCHOANALYTIC READING OF 
COLONIALISM 
I began the previous chapter by noting that we cannot reflect on the uses of 
psvchoanalytic theory in critiques of coloniallsin without touching first oil the work 
of Frantz Fanon. If we can sketch a tradition of psychoanalytically informed writing 
about the colony Ashis Nandy is tl -ic next theorist in this tradition. In some sense, as 
we shall see, Nandy's work echoes the -alms and politics of Edward Said's work, but 
it does so with an explicitly psychological perspectiVe and psychoanalytic language 
that makes Nandy especially relevant to this study. In this chapter, then, I will clarify 
why and how Nandy chooses to investigate colonialism with psychoanalytic theon, 
describe some of the main features of his psycho-historical model and discuss the 
problems his particular deployment of psychoanalysis raises for writing about non- 
Western cultures. 
In Postcoloni(Ilism, Robert Young suggests that Nandy's book Tbe Inlipiate 
Emelýiy was at least as InIportant as Said's On'eiylalism in establishing what the main 
objects of postcolonial criticism should be. With this shm book, Young writes, 
Nandy "established four of the major issues that have become central to the field" 
(Iloskolonialism 341). Despite the iMportance Young accords to Nandy's work, a 
casual glance through some of the main surveys -and readers in the field yields 
surprisingly few references to Nandy's work. He is not cited or excerpted in Williams 
and Chrisman's wide-ranging colonial discourse reader or Ashcroft, Griffiths and 
Tiffin's postcolonial studies reader, and he is not mentioned in critical commentaries 
of postcolonial theory suchas Young's discussion of postcolonial critics In If"'hile 
A! ylholý, aics. Indeed, evell 111 Studies xx-herc Nandy's work is regularly citcd it is not 
considered to be representative of postcolonial thcorý- by some readers. In his book 
(///(/ Idelifiýy, Patrick Hogan notes that although his study draN,, -s on 
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Nandy's analy-sis of the colony frequently colleagues readlng hIs manuscript asked 
hirn why he had not used postcolonial theory to address his subject (24). "' 
The small body of commentary on Nandy's work e-\ists mainly in revicws of 
his triany essays and books, the prefaces to coflected cdltlons of h's work and the 
recently colnpýed reader Dissentino Knowle(ý, oes, Open Futares. - Tbe A11,11liple Selms and 
Slrwý, (ze Deslinalions ql'. Ildds Nan(ly. Although references to Nandy Inevitablv touch on 
his psychoanalytic approach'9, the review articles and the essays in the reader do not 
investigate why Nandy uses Psychoanalytic theory to write about the colony, how he 
uses that theorN, including, for example whose theory he uses and what psychological 
assumptions he works from) and what kinds of problems might result from his 
particular application of those methods. 
In their review articles, critics such as Presler, Pye and Bose write about 
Nandy's work insofar as it answers particular problerns in political science, and are 
therefore relatively unconcerned with how Nandy's work functions as a postcolonial 
critique of the categories history, modernity, science. They are not interested in the 
question of why Nandy sees psychoanalysts as a theoretical instrument for 
postcolontal scholarship. It is also interesting to note that while these critics all have 
problems with the implications of Nandy's psychological method for political 
analysis generally, they do not seem to have any concerns about the psychological 
assumptions he uses to analyze colonialism. ThevaH seem to agree, for example, that 
In fact, as Hogan goes on to explain, the lack of theorv in his manuscript was actually 
attributed to the fact that he had not discussed the work of I lomi Bhabha. In light of the 
sitnilarities that I hope will become apparent betwem Nandy and 13hablias work in m. \ 
discussion here, the reaction of I logan's colleagues reflects the wider trend in postcolonial 
studies not to distinguish carefully enough bet-, veen different psychological and 
p,,, ý-cho,, iii,, ilýýtic,, il,, il)pro, -tches to the theory and study of colonial discourses or indeed to 
recognize similarities between theorists as seemingly different such as Bliablia and Nandy. 
I ýor cxample, Young suggests that it was Nandy who first gave serious thought to the "the 
psychology of resistance" (Po. ilcololliali. u? l 341) Ann Stoler characterises Nandys work, along 
with Fanon, Mannotit and 'Memn-il's, as building "on a Freudim psychoanalytic,; to provide a 
contre-lustoire of coloniqlism" (170). In hcr USCfUI sLuvey of postcolonial studics, Ania 
Loomba simply mentions N-andys work as an example of "the -, -, -lclcspre-, id use of 
psvchoanak-tic vocabularies in this Field" t49). 
59 
ambivalent mother-son relationships and extreme fear and celebration of fernale 
power are significant psychological features of Indian culture that have a bearing on 
any an-alysis of Indian societv, and history. In other words, although they tacitly 
accept the same psychological facts as Nandv, thev ob'ect to applying psychoanalyfic 
methods to social and historical science generally without examining what problems 
-arise specifically with Nandy's deployment of psý, choanalytic methods. 
For the most part the essays in the recent reader do not explore why Nandy 
uses a psychoan-alýTfiC method either, and are in any case generally less critical of 
Nandy's work. Indeed, onlv a third of the collection is actually dev, oted to 
commentary on Nandy (the first third consists of an extended lntcn, iew with Nandy 
and the second third consists of autobiographical essays by Nandy). This reader, 
then, is perhaps intended more as a tribute thati a critical analysis. Some of those 
writers who were asked to contribute to the reader have coRaborated with Nandy on 
other pro)ects and can be said to share rather than dispute his intellectual orientation. 
Commentators such as -Nleera 
Nanda or Sumanta Bannerjee who have taken issue 
with Nandy's representation of women, communalism and the values of traditional 
21, India, are not represented here. It is an unfortunate possibility that these critics are 
simply dismissed by Nandy's advocates as hysterical secularists, a-, one crific 
characterizes them in a recent review of Nandy's work (Nfiller 299). However, the 
absence of these voices means that the collection reads a little too smoothly, without 
reflection on the Irnphcations of N-andy's attempt to destabilize historv, modernity 
science with psychoanalysis. As we shall see later in this chapter Nandy's postcolonial 
interventions produce problems for representing some of those constituents h1s 
Arif I)trltk makes a reference to these critics in his contribution to the reader, noting that 
"I think I appreciate the coricerns, of critics -who view Nandy's -,, -rlttiigs from within a societý 
that is tort) by columuninartan strife" ("Reading Ashis Nandy" 285) 1 lowcvcr, since Dirfik 
does not wish to become involved in the (Icbatc his only response is that Nandy must be 
allowed to brin - -e reading of traditions into the public ýirena. g his alternam 
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work is ineant to make visible. In the following two sections, then, I will begin to 
identify what motlVates and makes Nandy's use of psychoanalysis distinctive. 
Colonialism as a Psychological Landscape: Nandy's Perspective on the Lived 
Experience of Colonialism 
Nandy explicitly avoids identifying his work as a contribution to any 
particular school or movement in contemporary scholarship, and many critics writing 
about his work have accordingly found it difficult to place his work in any tradition. 21 
While I recognize the difficulties involved in Ming to pinpoint Nandy's place in 
postcolonial theory gencraUN,, I think we can at least understand his psychological 
perspective and psychoanaly, tic method more clearlv if we pay attention to how 
Nandy himself references the work of Fanon and defines his project in relation to his 
work. In the previous chapter, I noted that many postcolonial scholars have drawn 
on Fanon's work as a license for their own readings of coloniahsm, whether those 
readings are psychological or emphatically non-psychological. Nandy, however, is not 
one of these scholars. Despite an explicitlypsychological perspective, Nandy's 
references to Fanon often serve to distance his work from Fanon's or at least to 
point to differmt aims. 
Nandv finds Fanon's earlier account of the psychology of colonialism useful. 
In TI)e Inlipiale 11-, nog he acknowledges: "The broad contours of colonialism are now 
known. Thanks to sensitive writers like Octave Mannoni, Frantz Fanon and Albert 
Nfemmi we even know some th ing a bout the interpersonal patterns which constituted 
11 In his discussion of Indian postcoloniql thought, Young is obliged to place Nandv in a 
categorýl of his own as distinct froin Bhabha and Spivak on the one hand, and the Subaltern 
Studies scliolars on the other. Dirlik also positions Nandy's work as somewhere between 
established camps. For Dirtlk Nandys project takes shape between Fanon's revolutionary 
visions and the contemporary postcolonial critic who is so distasteful to Dirlik. In the 
introduction to E. vikdal I lomle D. R. Nagaraj posits the existence of three strearns of thought 
about coloulahsin: "schools that are defined by the idea of total conquest, the ones that are 
organized around the idea of a cultural soul, -and the ones that stress mutual transformation" 
(Xil'i) f le places Fallon, Merilt-iii and Said in the first category, Anancla Cooinaras-, vanly and 
Scvycd I losscin Nasr in the second , ind lie place, -, Nandy, alone, in the lq,, t category. 
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the colonial situation, particularly in Africa" (30). However, Nandy's work is more 
concerned, as Young observes, with the psychology of resistance rather than the 
psychology of oppression. Though, quite ob\-lously, the person who lives under 
colonialism is often also the person who resists colonialism, Nandy is more 
interested in tracing how psychological motivations and condi6ons make successful 
resistance to colonialism possible or impossible than in delineating the psychology of 
the coloni7ed. Indeed, lie says that one of the premises of his method is that it takes 
the possibility of psychological resistance seriously (Infitvale Enelýly vii). However, for 
Nandy the question is not simply the psychology of rcsistance-that is, how to be a 
successful 'rcsister'-but psychology as resistance. In Tradifions, 'ýynwý, q (wd Ulopias, 
Nandy explains whýT' tonlra Fanon, resistance must be something other than violent, 
external action. He writes: 
Fanon admits the internalization of the oppressor. But he calls for an 
exorcism, in which the ghost outside has to be finally confronted in violence, 
for it carries the burden of the ghost within. The outer violence, Fanon 
suggests, is the only means of making a painful break with a part of one's 
own self. If Fanon had more confidence in his culture he would have sensed 
that his vision ties the victim more deeply to the culture of oppression than 
any collaboration can. Cultural acceptance of the major technique of 
oppression in our times, organized violence, cannot but further socialize the 
victims to the basic values of their oppressors (33) 
For Nan&, physical violence is not the most discursively or politicafly meaningful 
way of resisting colonialism since it remains firmly within the terms of the colonial 
encounter as defined by the colonizer. Violence, Nandv suggests, is the recognized 
political response to cotoni-al oppression and is aLreac[v anticipated by colonial 
discourse. He remains deeply committed to the possibility that resistance to 
colonialism can, indeed must, take non-violent forms. Resistance as psychology, 
then, is notan attempt to a\-old confronting the \-lolcticc in colonial societies, Ina to 
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assert the poh6cal viabifitýT of non-violence as a strategy of resistance . 
22 Nandy's 
work, as Young points out, attempts to bring Gandhi's non-violent strategies, 
strangcly absent from Fanon's writings and postcolonial theory generally, back into 
postcolonial theory. 
Nandy locates the resources for a psychology of resistance in the culture of 
the colonized, and this is a second area in which he marks his own work as distinct 
from Fanon's. Where Fation puts relatively little emphasis on the colonized 
population's culture, Nandy's work displays considerable confidence in the strategic 
usefulness of traditional Hindu cultural values, practices and knowledge. A discussion 
of the differences between Nandy -and Fanon's readings of culture, and the 
importance of cultural practices in the anti-colonial struggle would be a thesis in 
itself. But it is worth noting that Nandy is a cultural insider to the culture he writes 
about, while Fanon was not an insider to Algerian or Islamic culture. Furthermore, -as 
we shall see later, though Nandy claims that Fanon does not have enough confidence 
in the cultural resources of the colonized he also fails to note that Fanon, as an 
Antillean, has a young, diasporic rather than -an old, traditional culture to draw on. 
Although Nandy does not advocate -a return to traditions, he does work from the 
premise that Hindu culture pro6des most of the materials any Indian, Hindu or not, 
might require to survive colonization. Accordingh-, he uses psychology and 
psychoanalysis insofar as these languages allow him to present Hindu ways of 
understanding and being in the world. 
" If Nandy's work refuses to treat the subject of physical violence in the same vvay as Fanon, 
this is not because he hicks in awareness of the physical violence colonialism engendcrs. 
Nitidy describes being witucss to violence as a boy -, x-hen lie lived through devastating 
famme in 1942, communal brutalities in Calcutta atid 1,, a,, t Betigal throughout 1946 and 1947 
, in(] the general physical coufusiou and violence of partition in 1947. He recalls that "these 
traumas shaped the mind of the Bengalis ... and the wounds inflicted 
by them remained raw 
throughout my adolescence and young adulthood" ("I I stopped Nvorrying" 117). 
-er, during his adult life Nandy has -, vitnessed the continuing communal violctice that Morem 
is, at least in part, a legacy of divistons, and problems produced by colonial rule and colonial 
thinking, 
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In further contrast to Fanon, Nandy uses this psychological method partly in 
order to open up our understanding of colonialism. Though postcolonial theory has 
paid critical attention to the colonized, Nandv argues "less well known are the 
cultural and psycholo ical pathologies produced by colonization in the colonizing 91 1 
countries" (flifilvale ll, 'nemy 30). In other words, he is interested in the colonlzcr's 
psychological suffering too. His argument that the colonizer also suffers the 
psychological effects of colonialism exposes colonialism as something more than just 
an economic or political arrangement. Nandy articulates his case for -a wider 
psychological investigation in this way: 
As folk wisdom would have it, the onlv sufferers of colonialism are the 
subject communities. Colontalist-ii, according to this view, is the name of a 
political economy which ensures a one-way flow of benefits, the subjects 
being the perpetual losers in a zero-suni game and the rulers the beneficiaries. 
This is a view of the human rrund and history promoted by colonialism itself. 
This view has a vested interest in denying that the colonizers are at least as 
much affected by the ideology of colonialism, that their degradation too can 
sometimes be terrifý, ing (Infiviale Elieiqy 30) 
In other words, to accept that the colonizer is not pathologized by colonialism is to 
accept the colonizer's account of colonialism. For Nandy, to take the view that 
colonialism is a psycholo ical experience that marks both colonizer and colonized is 91 
not to ignore the economic losses of the subject population but to proffer an analysis 
of colonialism that is "relatively less contaminated by the ideology of colonialism" 
(Infimale Enelýyy 30). By exarmning the whole psychological picture of colonialism, 
Nandy tries to disrupt some of the most cherished stories and histories that 
colonialism tells about itself. 
If Fanon considers the psychological health of btack 1-mnds to be at risk in a 
colonial society, Nandv considers colonialism to be a psychological environment 
where the colonized may ultimately emerge as the i-norc psychologically healthy. 
Nandy does not characterize the psvchologv of the colony as pathological or 
normative, orat Icast lic avolds ninking any simpIc judgcmcnts about the 
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psychological responses and resistances colonial culture produces. Instead, he tries to 
develop a more interactive account of the psychological situation that is colonialism. 
In this account, 'Western' describes more than a geographical identity, it becomes a 
Psychological category that Indians also have access to. It is Nandy's contention that 
Indians sun-i'Ved colonialism partly because they had access to the West as well as 
India as psychological landscapes. For the British, obliged to defend the Western 
identity they had helped to create, Nandy argues there were not so many 
2, 
psychological options andy pursues a psycholo ical understanding of colonialism 'N, 91 
in his essays in order to demonstrate that the West lost colonialism's psychological 
battle and its attempt to make up for that loss through aggression and domination 
only made the loss more sustained. 
Psycho-lustorical alternatives to colonial discourses: Nandy's psychoanalytic 
method 
In Tbe bilimale T-. 'ize,, ýYy, Nandy sketches the theory of colonial relations that he 
follows and elaborates on in almost all of his subsequent books. Through a 
combination of psvchoanalysis, biography and cultural commentarv, he attempts to 
expose and thereby disrupt the account that the colonizers would like to give of 
colonialism. Or, more prcciselv, since Nandy recogruses that the colonized often 
-n as the colonizer, he attempts to appear to offer the same accounts of colonialist 
disrupt the account that colonial discourse, as a collection of practices and statements 
larger than any individual author, gives of itself. In this section I will explore further 
what prompts Nandy to articulate his theory of colonial relations through 
psychoanalysis and outlinc the distinct way in which lie makes use of psychoanalytic 
concepts and structures. 
This theme of successful adaptation through cultural syncretism is of course partIv derived 
from Gandhi, and appears In a morc theoretically IILI,, iiiccd form tn Bliablias -\vork. 
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Nandy declares repeatedly that he wants to enable alternative ways of reading 
colonial discourse and its continuing legacy in the postcolonial world. He is 
particularly interested in providing these options for the people who were colonized 
but he recognizes that the former colonizers may need alternatives too. Nandy insists 
that there are different way of thinking about colonialism's effects and productions, 
and that there were always different ways of behaving as a colonial subject (whether 
one was colonized ora colonizer) than out current reading of colonial discourses 
seems to suggest. Nandy's project is not a simple case of showing how the colonized 
deficd the colonizer's expectations, or broke out of the colontal order of things. 
Nandy argues that simple anti-colonialism often functioned -is "an apolo ia for the 91 
colonization of minds" (Intimate Enefiq 6). Ziauddin Sardar suggests that the 
alternatr', Tes N-andy attempts to sketch are "located bevond the West/anti-West 
dichotomv, even bcý, ond the indigenous constructions of modern and traditional 
options, in a different space" (214). In other words, Nandv's aim is to point to 
alternatives to the (obvious) op6on that is always already given by colonial 
discourse. 24 
In T1, )e bilimale Elie)ýiy, Nandy provides one demonstration of how an 
alternative to the colonial option nught work in his discussion of the gender 
economy of Indian men before and after their encounter with colonialism. 
According to Nandy, one mfluential reading, accepted among Indian -and British 
historians, was that the encounter between British men and Indian men had resulted 
in a recovei-ý- of Indian mascutinity. This was evidenced, for example, bv the revival 
of watrior caste traditions. This historical finding was based on the scholarly 
consensus that before their encounter with the West, Indian men were effeminate or 
1-1 1 lere v, -e see In Nandy a rather Foucauldian approach to the whole question of resistance 
to I)o-, -, -cr. As Don Miller notes, Nandy rarely cites Foucault (indeed, Natidys work is 
gencrally free from references to the poststructur-alist theorists that other postcolont,, il 
theorists relý on) but there is always hovering above ]its text the suggestion ofsynipathies 
with the concerns we currently assoclate with I, rcnch cri6cal theory. See Miller 301. 
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had degenerated into effen-nnacy. Nandy's essay challenges this account of Indian 
mascullnity by introducing a consideration of traditional Hindu gender categories 
into the discussion. 
25 
From the Hindu perspective, Nandv suggests, there are more possibilities of 
gendercd behaviour than simply masculine or feminine. Furthermore, in what Nandy 
alleges is the Hindu non-binary scheme of gender, one does not ascribe positiv e 
moral value to one gender and negative moral value to the another, but rather 
distributes different moral values between genders . 
2" Nandy claims that in the British 
gender economy that prevailed during the nineteenth century, femininity was 
demeaned and devalued. He also claims that at that time Indian gender economics 
-attached significant spiritual power to femininity, which made femininity-in- 
masculinity a position of considerable strategic power if only one knew how to 
embody it and perform it. Nandy's analysis suggests that when certain Indian men 
chose to become hyper-masculine this fied them even more firmly to colonial 
discourse, since thev defined their masculinity in terms established by the colonizers. 
Nandy points out that -a creative use of traditional Hindu gender categories could 
have posed the question of masculinitý, in other terins. The prune example of this, 
though it appears somewhat later in the history of colonial India is, of course, 
Mohandas Gandhi, who was able to effect his psychological resistance to colonial 
discourse partly because of his complex gender identifications and behaviour. 
'5 Nandy does not provide a survey of the historical studies of the British-Indian encounter 
arid its consequence for both British and Indiati economics of gender he presumahly \vrites 
against. f lowever, for an excellent overvievc ofsonic of the main historiographical and 
theoretical iSSLICS Ul\-()I\-CCI SCC Sinha 1-32. 
16 It is interesting to note that Naridys discussion of n( m-binary gender is a scheme that lie 
uses to describe the gender positions available to men, but lie do"- not discu'ss -ývhcther 
Indian -\vornen have a similar range of gender positions available to thein. Instead, ferninirim- 
operates as a third (depmonalized) term between male and female that n-icti ýi/ý-o 1-mve access 
to. 
FýIrik Unkson and Nandy both consider Gandhi's complex gcnder behaviour and 
identifications as otic of the reasons Cor his effectivc incthods of colonial rcsist-ance. 
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Many of Nandy's essays point to the alternative ways of being a colonial 
subject that existed whether one was a scientist, filmmaker or cricket enthusiast. 
However, he recognizes that the means of disrupting colonial discourse was never 
restricted to a search for alternative ways of being but had to include the rethinking 
of the categories and uses of Western knowledge. The story that colonialism tells 
about itself is something more complex than a historical account; it is also a 
worldview and a whole system of knowledge. For Nandý,, as for Said, western 
knowledge systems as apparently diverse as econornics, medicine, literature, and 
geography are all part of the account that colonIzIng cultures would like to giVe of 
the relationship between their knowledge and Others' knowledge, and therefore, of 
their right to rule over those Others and lead them into the modern future. Nandy is 
acutely conscious that even if we live in postcolonial times this relationship between 
power and knowledge persists, and the only way to the future, as perceived bxý non- 
Western peoples, still seems to be through the discourses of Western knowlcdge2'. 
As a result of the immediate predicament (such as finding other ways to the future 
than through modern sciences such as international development) as well as the 
legacy of past encounters (such as the encounter between Indian and British 
masculinity), Nandy attempts to demonstrate how western knowledge itself may be 
reworked for non-Western, or as lie sometimes prefers to describe it, non-Modern 
elids. 
As he himself explains it, Nandy is trying to do something more radical with 
the terms of Western humanities disciplines than simply reject them or provide 
alternatives to them. In response to some of his critics Nandý7writes: "A. K. Saran 
once drew my attention to Dostoevskys belief that there were two kinds of people in 
2,1 1 am thinking, for example, of the better licalth care and health cclucation that is presumed 
to be the prcsci-, -c of Western medicine. Or the need, as Said outlined in 0; 7011ý11iI'Pl, for non- 
Wectern humanities scholars to be awarc of the (cspecially theoretical) work of Western 
scholars but the privilege of Westem scholars enjoy of being able to ignore the "vork of their 
non-We. stern counterparts. 
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the world: the anthropologists and those subjected to -anthropological enquiry. My 
difference with the two reviewers is exactly here. They use the categories of the 
anthropologists and I try to blend thern with those used by the subjects" ("Cultures" 
268). Or, more precisely, Nandy does notsimply attempt to blend the subjects' 
categories in with the anthropologists' categories, he sometimes uses the subjects' 
categories to launch a critique of anthropology. In the footnote to his remark about 
ists and tlieLr sub'ects he observes: "I have complicated matters by first anthropolog, I 
vaguely suggesting a normative fraine based on native categories and, then, using the 
fraine to evaluate the exogenous 'universalist' and 'progressivist' categories. The 
second set of evaluations are, I suspect, more disturbing" ("Cultures" 272). The idea 
that non-Western knowledge might be in a position to critique and re-order Western 
knowledge, rather than standing simply as an alternative to Western knowledge is, as 
NandN, intends, a more disruptive possibility than the mere existence of an alternative 
SýTStern of knowledge. 
Nandy proposes to disrupt the legacies of colonial discourse with the 
language and theory of psychoanalysis. A social psýlchologist by training, Nandy 
identifies himself as a "tneta-Freudian" ("Cultures" 273), or in more colourful terms 
as "a devotee of the Viennese shaman" ("Aftcr-Life" 107). More specifically, Nandv I 
might be described as a Freudian ego-psychologist because, like one of his main 
influences, Erik Erikson, he understands the psychic health of the individual to be a 
product of the individual's capacity to adapt to his or her environment successfully. ") 
Nevertheless, in Iýght of what I havc alrcady suggested about Nandys attcmpt to 
disrupt western systenis of knowledge it might seem rather surprising that he relies 
on such a modern Western science as psychoanalysis to structure his project. 
") It is interesting to note that in contrast -ývlth Vanon, whose intellectual influences were 
largely French and German, Nandys influences are mostly American. I Ic IcktioN-, -Ieclgcs an 
i. titellectual clebt to Erikson who wqs one of the fathers of American c(), o psýchology, Rollo 
May, Americas first existential psychologist and Robertlay 1, ifton, the prominent - 
\merlcqn 
pslychiatrist and histormn. 
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One reason why N-andy identifies himself as a (meta-) Freudian is: 
Freud, like Marx, was an internal critic of the modern West. Like Marx again, 
he was wedded to the l, nhghtenment vision of human emancipation and saw 
its inner contradictions. In some of their readings, such critics are useful to 
other Cj-ýTjhzattons trying to make sense of the modern West in indigenous 
terms and looking for a humane world order of knowledges and cultures ... 
I 
have used Freud and Marx to the extent that thev are critical; I have not used 
them to the extent that they arc modernists ("Cultures" 273). 
Nandy is interested in psychoanalysis and Marxism to the degree that they make 
theoretical space for exposing the fractures and failures of western knowledge. ) 
P s, \ Tcho-analysis, in particular, is built on the premise that Western subjectiNilty is 
constituted bv fractures, repressions and conflicts and by the desperate struggle to 
cover over these conflicts in order to present a coherent and unified subject. Nandy 
is interested in these fractures, not so much because of what they suggest about the 
West (although, as noted, he is interested in the colonizers' psychological losses 
tooý') but because they present him with a way into those moments when western 
knowledge might have taken a more ethical, or as Nandy sometimes refers to it, 
humane form. Nandy relies on this critical possibility in psychoanalysts, however 
slight it mav be, to present the encounter between Indian knowledge and Western 
knowledge not so much as the inevitable decline or defeat of Indian knowledge but 
as a complex web of success, failures and stalemates on both the British and Indian 
sides. 
An example of how Nandy narrates these interactions is his account of the 
hves of two Indian scientists in Allernalh)e Siientvs, jagdls Chandra Bose, a physicist 
who made remarkable use of his abilities as a physicist to study plant physiology and 
the self-taught mathematical genius, Srinivasa Ram-anuiall. Although the book 
"I Marxist theorý_, he note,, in a Although Nandy's work does not engage explicitlyNx-Ith 
recent inten, lew that "I xvas deeply influenced by, and deeply aware of, Marx's theorý 
of alienation-some of his psychological sensitivities vvere more obvious to -a psychologist, 
and I would also consider Marx -a major theorist of psychology. independently of his statLIS 
as a thinker in ecotiotnics or politics. Manly of ]its obseivations and interpretations of hurnan 
subjectivity I have resonated to" (Lal 28). 
See, for example, Nandys discussion of Freud's relation to western scictitific norms (S(iiqge 
Fivild 133- 144), and Kiplitig's relatioti to norms of British mascUltnitV (111fiPhIle 64-70) 
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functions as a biographical study of contrasting pers onall ties, it is also a meditation 
on the possible range of encounters between Western science and traditional Indian 
scientific paradigms during colonial rule. Here Nandy is keen to demonstrate that 
even so apparently universal a subject as science has its cultural and psycholo ical 1 91 
-aspects and, accordingly, the encounter between Western science and Indian science 
during colonialism was not a matter of superior science overtaking primitive science 
but of individual scientists' -attctnpts to negotiate their place as scientists and colonial 
citi7ens ii-1 the emerging modern world. Nandy suggests that in this situation "the 
scientist becomes a rrucrocosm where the commumty's adaptive capacities chaUenge 
the creativity of the individual. In the process, sometimes science itself is distorted 
and some scientists arc destroyed" (. 1111enialive Scientes 18). In Bose's case, his 
creativity as a scientist was obstructed by his attempts to secure his role as an 
authoritative Indian scientist in the colonial order of things. In Ramanujun's case, a 
less acute sense of his position as a colonial subject allowed him to keep his 
mathematical imagination and ingenuity alive. 
Nandy's deployment of psychoanalysis is effective not simply because of how 
he Mterprets psychoanalytic theory, but of where he chooses to use psychological 
and psychoanalytic language. A second reason, then, for Nandy's use of 
psychoanalytic insights is that he recognises their marginal standing in political and 
historical accounts of colonialism and he seeks to exploit that quality. In collections 
such as Al 11, )e [--'ý, oe ojTjTJ, )o1o, D, and Traditions, Tyranýiy and ( ilopias, his insistence on 
writing of -a psychological dimension in public politics is unsettling to acadernic 
readers who expect certain types ofarguments to be made when the topic under 
discussion is, for c-,: ample, state potitics, and re)cct attempts to use other týlpes of 
atguments. 
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Writingabout Indira Gandhi as an embodiment of a particular kind of 
politics in India, Nandv 'ustifics his use of -a psychological analysis to assess Gandhi's 
politics: 
Many political analý, -sts feel that any emphasis on an individual necessarily 
detracts from the importance of larger social forces. Yet, the fact remains 
that these so-called larger forces are often only the theoretical constructions 
of the social scientist ... thcv 
do not exist in realitv. Over-emphasis on them 
only relfies social reality and contributes to the exploitation and abuse of 
human beings in the name of social and historical forces which come to 
attain a certain sanctity independent of the reatitv of the persons involved ... 
an individual on the other hand concretizes a specific configuration of social, 
political and historical forces without either rei(ving them or detracting from 
the basic humanness of the main actors involved in policies and decisions. 
No emphasis on hirn can ever be an over-emphasis (LIlge 120) 
Here, the 'inappropriate' use of psychological or psychoanalytical langtiao-c functions 
-as a disruption of the conventions and expectations of western knowledge. In 
political science, for example, the psycholo ical profile of a leader might be of some 91 
interest but it is not an acceptable framework within which to discuss her larger 
political choices or actions. Nandy's work represents a sustained attempt to use 
psychology and psychoanalysis where it is usually deemed inappropriate in order to 
e-xpose our assumptions about the logic and rationality of our established accounts of 
political or historical events. Indeed, as Lal observes, "the 'psychologism' of [his] 
work is sometimes adduced as a reason for not taking it seriously" (25), which only 
points to the lar er tendency in academic writing to reject certain kinds of evidence 91J 
about political and historical phenomena. It is a measure of Nandy's analytical flair 
that even critics who question whether ! its technique ot inserting psychoanalytic 
methods into other disciplines produces more analytical advantages than 
ges still Find the conclusions he reaches compelling. " disadvanta 
Finally, Natidy is interested M psychoanalysis to the degree that it represents 
more ethical ways of representing the colonial past and navigating the legacy of that 
Reviewers of. -, Iý /he (j/ I ýý-),, -holou foun (I Nandys it isights persuasive de,, Pile III s 
p svchologism,,. "ýcc Gombrich and Gupta 252-8, P res I cr 224-234 -at id P% c 235-241. 
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history in the postcolonial present. li, fact, I would -argue that Nandy's understanding 
of Gandhi, for exampIc, is mcdiated through Frikson's account of Gandhi's anti- 
colonial campaign so that psychoanalysts and saýyqoraha converge as powerful ethical 
philosophics in Nandv's work, as thev do in Erikson's. In G6mdhz"s'rf711h, Erikson 
gives an account of Gandhi's life as well -as his participation in the 1918 Ahmedabad 
mill strikes. However, -although the book takes the form of a psychoanalytic studý, 
L'rikson is not simply providing us with an example of how his psycho-historical 
method works. Gandhi'ý Tm/h is -also an attempt to work through certain ethical 
concerns -about violence in conternPorary society. Nandy's writing about Mohandas 
Gandhi, Indira Gandhi, Indian tcrrorists and contemporary manifestations of sali are 
)ust some examples of how his work also attempts to grapple with how we 
experience and resist Violence today. 
Throughout Gand&'s TnIth Erikson remarks on the analogy that he sees 
between Gandhi's philosophy of , -eqyqýraha (literally, ttuth-force) as a method for 
finding the truth that parallels psychoanalysis. He makes the observation that 
psvcho-analvsls, like saýyqgraha, "confronts the inner enemy nonviolently" (244). In 
other words, psychoanalysis-Eke sa(yqgoraha-is committed to working out personal 
and interpersonal conflicts in a peaceful way. Earlier in the book, in a dixectaddress 
to Gandhi, he writes "mv task in this book is to confront the spiritual truth as you 
have formulated and IlVed it with the psycholo ical truth which I have learned and 1 91 
practiced" (Erikson 231), thus drawing Freud's work and Gandhi's work into a harger 
ethical pro)ect that involves, in the broadest terms, a non-violent search for truth". 
In providing a description of the viability and necessity of an ethical practice 
like saly((goniba, then, Erikson is also providing an ethical defence of psychoanalysis. 
lic x-vrttes: 
Frtkson also notes "For all tliesc Mcclualittes call for conscious insight rather thaii for 
moralisttc repression. And it is here, I feel, that VOUr attempts at enlarging human av, -arciless, 
and Freud's, complement cach otlicr" 
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psychoanalysis, not if judged by its physicalistic terminology and theory but if 
understoodas it is practiced and lived according to the rules and the intentions of its 
originator, amounts to a truth method, with all the implications which the word truth 
has in Saýy((ýYraba ... ii, llzot-e 115(w a i)qfpe alialqU; it is a correspondence in method and a 
convergence in human values which may well be of historical, if not evolutionary, 
significance (245) 
I would argue that Nandy's use of psychoanalysis derives part of its power froin 
-sis as a truth-method. ,4 In fact, it might be Erikson's understanding of psychoanalý 1 
rather more accurate to say that Nandy's sense of psychoanalysis as a method for 
revealing other kinds of truths derives from both Erikson's understanding of 
psychoanalysis and Erikson's account of Gandhi's search for truth. Nandy does not 
simply use Erikson's method, he also makes Erikson's reading of Gandhi an element 
of his technique. It is has been sLiggcsted that Nandy's work is Gandhian in spirit, 
and this would seem to be supported by the ethical tenor of his work. ', 5 
Nandy's Psychoanalytic Technique 
Having discussed some of the alms of Nandy's psychoanalytic approach, let 
us look at his particular way of using psycboalialyfic structures and concepts. I have 
suggested that he is strongly influenced by Erikson, and he does make repeated use 
of Erikson's model of psychohistory. Nevertheless, I would argue that Nandy does 
something much more sophisticated with psychoanalysis than the term psychohiston 
14 It is also worth noting, here, that Erikson and Nandy are both concerned to argue for the 
viability of non-violence as a political strategy and that both articulate their position in 
psychoanalytic or psychological language. In Gandbi, ý Truth Erikson retells and comments on 
aii anecdote about Gandhi: 
Gandhiwas asked by a foreign jotirnalist, "How would you meet the atom bornb ... 
With non-6olenccP" He answered, "I Will not go underground, I will not go into 
shelter. I wtll come out in the open and let the pilot see that I have not a trace of evil 
against hini. The pilot -will not see our face,, from his great height, I know. But that 
longing in our liearts-that be Will not come to harm Would reach Lip to him and his 
eyes -, vould be opened. ' Utter Cooltshncssý Maybe-, and yet, perliaps, true for its very 
, ab,,, Lirdit\-. Por Gatidlii's ansv, -cr only dramatizes a basic n0u-\ýIolcnt alternative 
which, While it must admittedly Cind methods in an electronic and nuclear age, 
nevertlieless remains a human alternative, enacted and demonstrated b\, the 
Mahatma , is feasible in In,,, tinicý, and circuinstanccs, (430). 
'5 Young ol)scr-, -cs that Nandy is one of the few scholars writing in India today Who has 
"been prepared to endorse lGandlitsi politics -, -, -itl)otit very substantial rescrvations" 
(111o, i-lcolonl'ýilislýl 35-2). 
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suggests, partly because he seeks to open up new or previously un-asked questions 
about colol al and postcolonial pohtics than those raised by Erikson's studies of 
Gandhi's India or Native American tribes in contemporarv America. " N-andv's 
reading of Indian culture, his particular wav of writing psychoblographies or 
psychohistories, and his use of structural psychoanaly tic elements (such as the 
psychoanalytic understanding of fime) all suggest, once again, that rather than using 
psychohistory to offer a deeper, altcrnafive kind of histoiT he uses it to produce an 
alternative to the modern, colonial discipline that is HistoIT. 37 
N, andy, 's ability to use psychoanalysis and make it sensitiNre to the tradition of 
Hinduism is a meaningful achievement since he manages to use psychoanalytic 
language to write -about Hindu culture without pathologizing it. For example, Nandy 
carefully avoids trying to explain the Indian personality in psychoanalytic terms. " As 
we saw earlier, Nandy does not consider himself to be an anthropologist in the field, 
but one who is in a position to blend anthropological knowledge with the 
anthropological subjects' knowledge. Despite Erikson's attempts to be a tolerant and 
sensitiv c observer of Indian culture he is not able, indeed he does not even attempt, 
to treat cultural traditions or practices -as anything more than interesting background 
material to his interpretative biography of Gandhi. " The psychoanalytic tradition, as 
`6 This is not to say that Erikson was oblivion- to the politics of colonialism or post 
colonialism in his own work. Indeed, fora writerwho is often accused of being politically 
naYve or simplya conservatiVe in the most literal sense of the word Erikson is much more 
alert to the ways in which colonial mentalities operate than ril-any of his psychoanalyst 
contemporaries, or even his predecessors. Fie clearly understands that colonial mentalities 
persist after decolonization has officially taken place and he is one of the few prominent 
psychoanalytic writers of his time to discuss Fanon's work. 
Frikson suggests "Psychoanalysis, then, rn-ay well become operative in curing the historical 
process of some of its built-in impediments and in providing the conscious insights -,, -Iilch 
are unconsclotislý sought in all manner of indirect scIf-revelations. I mean to say here that 
InAll bV Undcrstanding the way he Instoricized may yet overcorne certain stercotypcd ways in 
, \vhtch litstory rcpcits itself-, vays -ývhlch man can no longer afford" (439). Nandy seems 
doubtful that psychoanalysis can cLire history, and instead looks forward cheerfully to its 
dernise. 
I Icrc Nandvs work divcrges signiticantly from, for cxarnpIc, the work of the Indian 
psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakar. Sce Ilakar 441-48. 
Frikson, for example, coiisidcrs the traditional I lindu life-cycle as a factor ill Gaiidlil's 
(Iccisions about hts life, but it appcars to setvc more as authenticating background material to 
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many critics have observed, has been a heavily anthropological one and Erikson's 
attempts to balance that tendency with his own sympathetic obscn-ations of Indian 
culture are significant. Nevertheless, for Nandy the cultural considerations are not 
background, they form a more prominent part of the foreground that complicate 
purcly psychoanalytic explanations. 
One of Nandy's rhetorical devices is to begin his essay 1)), retethng a Hindu 
myth that sets the moral tone for his work. In "The Savage Freud", for example, 
Nandv begins with a tale about a Flindu patidil who uses rcliglous philosophy to 
)ustify robberv and murder to his impressionable son. This tale raises some awkward 
questions about the moral responsibilities of interpretation from the perspective of 
Hindu philosophy-questions that Nandy then uses to discuss the reception and 
development of psychoanalysis in India during the 1920s. Nandy relies on Hindu 
myths not because, as we might expect, they offer straightforward moral categories 
but precisely because they do not. According to Nandy, at least, Hindu mvths have 
traditionally complicated notions of heroes and villains and even more complex 
notions of victory and defeat. Nandy strengthens the arguments of his essays by 
using the resolutions of moral problems he finds in these myths. Far from serving as 
ical det-afls the myths provide a framework within which authenticating anthropolog, 
to evaluate whatever issue Nandy is discussing, such -, is, in the example cited above, 
the ethics of psychoanalýT6C interpretation. 41) 
Despite his different cultural approach to psychoanalytic theory, Nandy 
repeatedly makes use of the biographical format Erikson developed. " We have 
the genuinely personal drarna of Gandhi's life than a potentially viable scheme for 
interpreting Gatidlit's life in and of itself. To be fair to FIrikson lie does acknowledge that 
while others might find it easy to psychoanalyze Gandhi lie does nor. 
"' Myths, and the structures , ind values of myths, figure repeatedly throughout Nandy's -, vork. 
["or some further examples see Natidy's . 
lllernalh, e ScZenco- 26-37, The bilimale Lncm), 21-24 
and Sw1a, e 1-)-eud 84-88. The use of myth in Nandly's -, vork is closely related to his attempt to 
use psychoanalytic tirric to structure his alternative histories, as I discuss below. 
41 The fllellifillv(IýJý 0/ 'Nelfiomiliml are both long biographical studies; in 
csoavs such as The Infilliate I'lielly), Nan& relies on shorter biographical vtgvettes to support 
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already seen that Nandy emphasizes the individual so it is not surprising that 
psychobiography is one of Nandy's prirnaiý, methods of analysis. As Nandy himself 
'acknowledges, one reason he prefers to work with persons rather th-an larger 
collective groups is that he knows how to read individuals. Nevertheless, we arc not 
in the realm of a traditional psychoanalytic case history. Although Nandy finds 
psychoanalysis to be "the most influential theoretical frame for analý, sing the 
conversion of social realities into personality vectors" (Alternalil)eStiences 13), he 
continues it "tends to conceive of these realities in static and narrow terms once it 
goes beyond the immediate interpersonal world of the individual" (13). Nandy's aim 
in the psychoblographv, then, is as much abouta closer understanding of the way in 
wl-ých the society of the individual deals with its colonial conflicts as it is about the 
individual. 
Nevertheless, these psychological portraits are not morality tales either. In 
contrast with a model of biography which "makes sense of our experiences and gives 
meaning to our hvcs ... teaches us 
how to liv, e and how not to hv, e" (Sardar 22 1), 
Nandy's psycho-biographics arc "ground for rmning psychological insights, for 
understanding how the Indian Self survived, or failed to surviVe, the onslaught of 
colonialism, for constructing a poh6cs of awareness-not a theology of deliVerance" 
(Sardar 221). Nandy does not want to create a hagiographic series of portraits of 
heroes of the Independence movement, or sorne other past, golden -age. The subjects 
Nandy chooses are frequently men who have sustained heavy psycholo ical losses, as 91 
we saw in the case of the physicist Bosc. Unlike Erikson's study of Gandhi, which 
sm-es as a kind of handbook for a life of non-violence, Nandy's biographies lay out 
his argument (Including short studies of Kiplitig, CIý . \tidrc%-, -s, Onvell as well as discussions 
of Indiati ',, Libj'ccts); and in collections such is .ý 
I/ Me 11`(ý,, e ()1'P, -), cho1og and The, Vaiw, c I "nv/d 
there are several essays that foctis on btographical subjects (iii the foriner, Indira Gandhi and 
Nathuram Godsc, and In the latter, Radliqb1nod Pal, Girislickander Bose and Satyajit Ray). 
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the psychological topographies of particular colonial conjunctions and require the 
reader to draw his or her own conclusions. 
2 
The last example of Nandy's method that I will discuss here is his use of a 
psychoanalytical sense of time. In this respect Nandy's work reaches far beyond 
psychohistory since, rather than simply using psycho-analytical concepts to 
understand historical events, he attempts to disrupt what seems to be one of history's 
most obvious disciplinary rules: the scholar's view of the past. Psychoanalysis is 
based on an understanding of time in which the past is always part of the present; it 
does not presume discrete separations between what happened yesterday and what 
happened today. The past is never over and put away. The study of history, on the 
other hand, must presume discrete separations between the past and the present in 
order to describe its object scientifically. 
Although, "psychoanalysis and historiography thus have two different ways 
of distributing the space of memory" (de Certeau 4), Nandy uses the psychoanalytical 
sense of time in order to write his alternative histories. By using unorthodox 
chronologies and'uxtaposing mythical insights with historical facts, Nandy suggests 
that he stays much closer to a traditional Hindu way of understanding the past. 43 In 
this way he forces psychoanalysis to work as "a source of defiance of the imperialism 
of history" ("History" 56) rather than as a tool to capture an extra or deeper level of 
42 1ti, s this type ofambiguity that N-andy asserts is antithetical to the discipline of I liston-, 
and thus so necessary for his own non-Modcrn project. Ile writes "because, as an authen tic 
progeny ot seventeenth-century Imrope, Iiistory fears ambiguity. Tlic ultimate metaphor for 
history 
... is sý necdoche: the 
historical past stands for all of the past because it is presuined 
to be the only past" ("I fistoty" 48). Naturally, Nandy does riot even attempt to narrate these 
afllbýgtlitieS OUt of his historical writing and often dehbcrately cultivates them. 
Frikson also sug . that Indi-atis have a different experimcc of time than people living in gg, csts 
the modern West. I Ic observes, "every man's life is a composite of the modern and the 
, irclmic, the lol, lic-, il and the nonrational, the proper and the passionate. 
But Indians, I belic 
live in more centuries at the same time than most other pcoplesý and every Indian, be he ever 
'so well educated atid pragmatic, 11N-cs also ma fernininc space time that is deep inside a 
I IFRI` and in the very center ofa NoW, not so much -, in obset-ver of a continuum of tneqns 
and end,; but a participant ma flux marked by the intensity of confluence" (43) 
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history. " Nandy wants to rermnd historians, both Western and Indian, that there are 
people who have their own sense of history that does not inatch what professional 
historians recognize or acknowledge as history. ' These are people, N-andy suggests, 
who value the poles of binaries such as reincinbering/foqgetting, myth/history and 
past/present differently than the West and that they do not need to be brought into 
the institution of History ("History" 56). 
The Limits of Culture: Problematizing Nandy's Interpretations and Uses of 
Traditional Indian Culture 
We have seen how Nandy's work brings an understanding of Hindu culture 
to bear on psychoanalyfical theories and takes the possibifitýl of psychological 
resistance to coloniabsm seriously. Nevertheless a cetitt-al problem with Nandy's 
work is the way in which he defines, attributes and deploys Hindu cultural concepts. 
MoreoNTer, it is largely because of these problems that Hindu women and Indian 
women generally become a kind of blind spot in his work. Arif Dirlik has suggested 
that one cannot accuse a writer who laments the loss of femininity in Indian men of 
being an anti-ferninist ("Reading Nandy" 285). Nevertheless, Nandy's understanding 
of culture and his psycho-historical methodology both work to restrict the ways in 
which we can read and theorize the lives of Indian women under colonial and 
postcolontal oppression. In this section, then, I will e-.,, atTnne some of the problems 
with Nandy's experiments with psychoanalysis and how Nandys focus on recovering 
and uncovering Hindu cultural resourccs prex-cnts him from understanding how 
theoretical figurations of fetMinInity contrast witli the 11N-ccl reality of women's hvcs. 
This is in marked contrast not only to Frikson's conccptualization of psychollistory as he 
practiced It, but also In contrast to the generally -accepted conventions of psychohiston-. 
Nalicly notcs diat although Gyan Prakash and Dipesh Chakraharty both come close to 
advocating the lund of crittque of history that N-and 'v 
idvocates their arguments turn out to 
be licsitant 
steps towards such a crltl(, ILIC*. ýlt the moment they are pmvcrful pleas 
for 
altermative histories, not iltmiativus lo histon"' ("I fiston" 53). 
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Nandv accepts, for the most part, a Freudian explanation of how an 
individual develops and reacts to the world around him or her. In general, he does 
not raise any "question [aboutl the great developmental constants psychoanalvsis has 
uncovered" (Kakar 444). This Might seem strange, given that, for example, Nandy 
substitutes the mother for the fatlicr -as the significant parent in the Indian's Oedipal 
complex. Nandy's substitution would seem to be a major departure from Freud's 
theory, and indeed if Nandy followed the logic of this substitution to its end his work 
would function as a rewriting of psychoanalýTSJS in the Indian context. However, in 
Nandy's work the fact that the mother is the primary focus of Oedipal ambivalence Is 
used as a straightforward substitution that reflects the reality of Indian childrearing 
practices specifically and the tenor of Indian culture generally. It is in this way that 
Nandy, like Kakar and other Indian psychoanalysts before him, brings the Indian 
cultural miheu to bear on Western psychological schemes without disrupting the 
general theoretical framework of psychoanalysis 46 
From a purely theorefical point of view this Oedipal substitution is already a 
disruption. If the mother is the important parent, rather than the father, this would 
seem to suggest that penis envy, fetishism and other symptoms deriving from 
Oedipal conflict must operate differently, or perhaps are not even meaningful, in an 
Indian context. However, in Nandy's text this difference is not explored and its 
potential to disrupt the structure of psychoanalytic theory is limited. He does point to 
the fact that because of the importance of the mother, authoritarianism has a 
46 , I'lie importance of - the mother, rather tha n the father, in Indian culture is not Nandy's idea 
(-)r even K-ak-ar's. There is a long tradition of writing about Indian men's fascination and 
trustration with their mothers which includes writers who have much less understanding and 
respect for Indian CtIltUrC than Nandy or Kakar. Nandy's contribution is to bring this ý'%-ell- 
established idea into the realm of discussions about Indian politics and histor\' as a means of 
illuminating Indian culture rather than condcriming it. It is interesting, however, to compare 
this with Frikson's account of the Indian mother that suggests, perhaps in a covert move to 
preserve the importance of fathers from a ps 
- 
ý-choaiialytic point of view, that in a large joint 
family the bond bet-, -een child and mother is often more diffuse than in a Western home so 
that the child is not obsessivel bound to the mother, but rather craves for the connection 
she or lie has nevcr been able to secure amidst all the other siblings and cousins (104-7). 
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different character in India than it has in Europe (E(ýge '107), but he does not turn this 
insight on psychoanalysis itself. Nandy uses his understanding of Indian culture as a 
matrifocal one to reinterpret the history of the colonial encounter in India, but he 
does not pursue the logic of his intcrpretations further than the particular historical 
case he addresses. As one commentator remarks, Nandv's "explanations and 
interpretations have, brilliant as they are, an ad hot, quality" (PNIc 240). 
Nevertheless, it is through his sympathetic account of Indian culture that 
Nandy is able to avoid psychoanalysis' usual problems with non-Western cultures. 
Freud's interpretation of other cultures in texts such as Totem and Taboo and 
Ch, ili: Zaliolz and ils Distmilews tA- .11 Mr. 
. 
pically finds non-Western cultures anterior or inferi 
Seshadri-Crooks suggests that this could hardly be otherwise, given that 
"psychoanalysts, in pertaining to non-Western cultures, is always imbricated with 
anthropology (as ethnopsychology), which largely precludes the specificity (and thus 
normativity) of the object of study" ("Prirnitivc" 177). We saw an example of this in 
Mannoni's account of NI-alagasy culture. Mannont's interpretation of the psychology 
of colonial relations in French colonial Madagascar was heavily dependent on his 
ethnographic reading of Malagasy cultural practices such as ancestor worship. While 
some of the French colonizers were found to be suffering from the patholop, of the 
Prospero complex as a result of individual pathology (pathology, Nlannoni adrmts, 
fostered by the colonial environment), the Malagasy were found to be collectively 
mentally deficient as a result of their culture. 
Unfortunatclv, even if Nandy's psychoanalysis enables a more respcctful 
interpretation of Indian culture, it reproduces Mannoni's findings about the 
Fluropealls, 11011-rel"Itioll to Culture. Mannom's theory was problematic not only 
because lie pathologizcd the Nlalagasv, but also because he attributed the NlalagasyS' 
problems to their culture and the Furopearis' problems to individual mental 
aberrations. Nandv, though lie is able to rcco\-cr Flindu culture as a posItIVe force 
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and resource in the psychic lives of Indians, still ties Indian's behaviour to their 
cultural practices and values while the Furopean's psychological motivations float 
more freely or , 
47 
at least do not clearly -appear to be the product of their culture. In 
TI)e 1111imtle [, ne)ýIy, he tefls us that the British produced a discourse of hyper- 
masculiniry in India because they were trying to suppress their own bisexualit - V. 48 
However, he offers no explanation of this statement. What values, practices or 
svrnbols in Fnglish culture contributed to this shift towards hyper-masculinity? It is II 
part of Nandy's pro'ect to demonstrate that Indians, through their capacity to draw 
on a cultural base, are not simply the victims of colonialism that conventional 
historical accounts might suggest and that the English do, in a sense, suffer from 
their inability to produce anything psycholo ically positiv e from their encounter with 1 91 
the Indians. The English, Nandy suggests repeatedly, are the losers in the cultural 
encounter. But is this because they have no culture to draw on themselves in the 
colonial encounter, or because their culture simply doesn't offer them the same, 
flexible range of psychological responses -as Hinduism offers to Indiansý If, as Nandy 
suggests at certain points, the British seek to suppress or express particular values 
and practices where does that come from in their culture? 
In Nandy's account, as in Nlannoni's and indeed, as in Freud's, Western 
people are described in terms identical with psychological sclicmas and non-Western 
470r, indeed, as Mantioni does, Nandv offers indlVidual analyses of British figures to 
account for their behaviour, versus the general cultural expla nation he offers for the Indian 
response to British colonial discourses of masculinity. 
-ts' Nandy is particularly interested in the concept of psychological bisexuahtý-. I Ic claims, for 
example, that bisexuality, or at least a greater tendency towards femininity, in men in the 
West is conti cc ted with crcativity in TI)e Inlil&ile 1"negi), 64-79 and TheSal, q,, )6, /"I-e/1(1237-266. 
One example is Kipling whose characterization as a thinking person rather than an active 
person marks him as psychologically bisexual. This rather simple division of masculine and 
feminine is clearly problematic. As Ntritialini Sinha has dcnion,, tratcd it) her study of the 
interactions Bcngali masculinir 
'v 
and British masculinitY In ninetectith-centun- India, 
the question Is quite a bit more complicated than Nandý's study suggcsts. Sinha's study is a 
response to the more gencralist tenor of Nandy's %-, -()rk in The Inlilwile In her own 
words, her study is , in attcnipt to 11complicate either notions of inodern Wcstern tylasculinitý- 
or traditional Indian conceptions of masculinity is discrete or mutually exclusive categories 
bv a recoý, nitlon of their MURIal implication in imperial politics" (8). 
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people -are explained via reference to their culture. 11-1 other words, these theorists 
seem to suggest that Europeans have no culture which makes them behave as they 
do-thcy are parýly psychological creatures. This notion raises some seemi, ngly 
insurmountable problems about the ethnocentric structure of psychoanalysis. If 
psychoanalysis describes Western subjects, if it functions as an ethnography of 
whiteness, how can it function as a useful theory for understanding non-Western 
subjects? Since the question of psychoanalysis' ethnocentrism is a central question 
for this study I will defer discussion of this problem to the final chapter. In the space 
that the deferral of this question creates, however, I would pose a related question: 
what is it that would constitute 'culture' in this kind of cultural psychology or cultural 
psychoanalysis? How should we understand the culture that Indians, or Malagasy, or 
Martinicans apparently take their ps. ychical cucs from? 
Culture is by necessity a fluid concept. However, a significant problem with 
Nandv's conceptualization of culture is that his work relies too heavily on this 
fluidity. Although Nandy's open and positive definition of culture makes his work 
dynamic, Presler wonders if "it is almost too protean and pluralistic ... can a 
factor 
which is so variable, so subject to 'projection', be a reliable tool for analysing 
politicsýý" (229). 1 want to focus on three potential problems with Nandy's reading of 
Hindu culture here: First, Nandv consistentk, refers to Hindu and Indian culture as 
identical; Second, he sometimes ascribes great importance to cultural factors and at 
other times allows culture to fade into the background of his account; and finallv, like 
Erikson, his view of culture is a highly optimistic one, which alwavs seems to enable 
those who have faith in it. Culture never becomes a locus of oppression for Nandý. 
Nandyxý,, rttes about an 'Indian' waý- of thinking about the world that comes, 
in his account, from specifically Hindu (and perhaps e\-en locallý- Bengah HindU49) 
4" Hindu practices and belicfs vary a grcat dcal dcpending on the region, castc and even 
gendcr of the clevolec. As S cs li idrt- Crooks riotcs, in her cominctit'an- on Bosc, -a Beng-all 
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philosophy. Since Nandy himself refers to these Hinduisin-derived ideas as Indian, it 
seems that he does not consider the different lived practices of Muslirris, Christians, 
Sikhs and other non-Hindu Indians as significant impediments to the idea that these 
non-Hindus might share a Hindu view of the world. It may be, as he observcs of his 
own Christian Bengali familv, that some non-Hindus practice their faiths in ways 
inflected by Hindu philosophies and practices, but it does not seem plausible that 
this provides a basis for fully subsuming Muslim and other rell ions world-views into 91 
a Hindu world-view. On what terms is it possible to assume that, even onl\, in 
psychological terms (whatever that nught imply), Indians all think and behave in a 
'Hindu' manncrý If Nandy only rneans to write about Hindus, then what of the 
significant Muslim, Sikh and Christian minorities in India? Nandy never poses these 
questions, so it is difficult to determine whether he conflates Hindu with Indian 
because he thinks differentiations between faith groups in India are insignificant, or 
because he is writing a partial -account of the colonial encounter. 
Ntorcover, if Nandy's account should be read as specific to the Indian-British 
colonial encounter, how relevant is his psycholo ical method to the analysis of other 91 
colonialisrnsý Fanon did not define his analysis of colonialism or methods of 
resistance in relation to Nlartinican, French or Arabic culture, and for Nandy this is 
one of the major problems with F anon's analysis. In addition, in the case of cultural 
and ethnic groups like former slaves or indentured habourers where people have been 
forcibly, removed and isolated from the cultural miheu they were born into, what is 
their cultureýý What could be their cultural basis for psychological resistanceP In the 
case of indigenous groups, such as the First Nations of Canada and Aboriginal 
groups in \ustrall-a, Nx-liose culture has been sý-stematically destroyed by forcing thern 
I lindu, his focus on the Occlipal mother is utisurprising given that "Bengal, as wc ktio-, -,,, is 
the micleus of goddess , vorship in hidta and produccd the nationalist image of India as 
Mothcr" ("Pritnim-c" 198). Nandy ack-novAedges that he is writing about the spccific 
encountcr bet-\vcen the Fnglish and the Bcngall I lindu at certain points, Init at others lie 
vvrites about the significance oC the goddess in Indian psychic life as a gmeral axionl. 
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through institutions such as residential schools, what could their strategy for 
resistance be based on? Residential schools in Canada not only stripped many First 
Nations in Canada of their languages, but their own cultural, spiritual and 
epistemological perspectives. Still more devastating is the fact that through colonial 
encounters some indigenous populations suffered sharp decline over a relatively 
short span of time, through disease or alcoholism for example. Consequently, the 
cultural knowledge embodied in the groups were dramatically reduced. Nandy's 
larger concerns about colonial discourse and western knowledge systems would seem 
to suggest that he is writing about something more than Just the Indian experience of 
colonialism. However, it is not clear that his stratcgy of cultural resistance would or 
could work in other contexts. 
It is adrmttedly difficult to determine how we could convincingly define and 
locate the importance of culture in our accounts of historical and political 
phenomena. Cultural phenomena are sLmply not susceptible to objective 
specification. Nevertheless, as Presler notes, Nandy vacillates between two different 
understandings of culture that the former defines as weak and strong. Weak culture is 
"a pool of div erse values, meanings, interpretations, and concepts, -any element of 
which can be plucked out, more or less at random, and made to address political 
crises and strains" (230). Against this, Presler defines strong culture as "a finite set of 
categories, rules and values which independently define, place boundaries on and 
control human action" (230). Another way of understanding this distinction might be 
that weak culture is something people use (it is produced through human interaction) 
and strong culture is something that acts on people (it produces human beings of a 
particular cultural type). Preslcr accepts that both definitions, as Nandy uses thern, 
produce insights into Indian history. Ile does not seem to have a preference for one 
definition over the other. I would suggest, however, that culture must be a 
production. It must be something human beings create over time because otherwise 
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the kinds of changes and reinterpretations NandN, 's work describes would not be 
possible. Mandy seems to pay insufficient attention to the production and processes 
of culture, and that is where his conceptualization of culture is least successful. 
Nandy recognizes that culture is not a finite set of values that place 
boundaries on human action, because he emphaticaBy denies that India is a 
traditionalist countrýy and -asserts only that it has a tradition to draw on. Nevertheless, 
this recognition is rarely followed through to its logical conclusion. Culture, for 
Nandy, is a political tool but he does not seem to examine the production or 
reproduction of culture as a politically or socially Unplicatcd process. For example, 
Nandy suggests that sali exists because Indians value conjugal loyalty but he neglects 
to consider how, as ferninist scholars have, inheritance laws might -also have had a 
part in making such a tradition. Moreover, he does not reflect or even acknowledge 
the economy that flows from contemporary salis such as Roop Kanwar's. One 
historian of feminist movements in India notes that after Kanwar died, stalls selling 
food for travellers as well as souvenirs of the event soon sprung up all around the 
site. Moreover, Kanwar's father-in-law and other men in the village established a 
trust named "organization for the defence of the relýgio-ethical ideal of sati" (Kumar 
175) to collect donations from pilgrLms and run the event which reportedly collected 
Rs. 50 lakhs within a month of its inauguration. 
K-lumar obsen, es that although Nandv, among other critics, claimed Indian 
feminists who opposed sali were anti-Indian or unwitting coUaborators with Western 
capitahsm, "not one of these writers addressed themselves to the question of what 
had actuaUy happened, or was happening in Dcorala ... nor did any of them ask 
under what conditions Roop Kanxvar had lived, or under what conditions she had 
died" (174). "' Furthermore, as Kurriar's dcscriptioii of the cconomy that developed 
Nandy has consistently responded that critics of his rcading of, ý, ali do tiot pay enough 
attention to his distinction betwecti , -a/ias an cvctit , md iwfi as an ideological practice. Sce 
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around the sali demonstrates, Indian fclTunlsts were hardly collaborating with 
Western capitalism in opposing the event since the sali itself "revealed the gruesome 
1-naterialism of a society which permitted 'sacrifice' for profit" (175). 
Kumar's account of the Dcotala sali undermines Nandy's provocative 
questions about a contemporary Flindu woman's right to practice her cultural 
traditions. He suggests that since men may choose to sacrifice their bodies for the 
defence of their country in war, women should be allowed to choose to sacrifice their 
bodies for a personally meaningful cause. He notes that in war there is at least profit 
to be made out of a soldier's bodily sacrifice and this is the only thing that makes it 
more acceptable than a widow's safi. He challenges the reader to consider whether 
the only reason that the soldier's sacrifice is more acceptable is sirnply that " it does 
not prove the superstitions of the defeated cultures of Asia and Africa but is a 
respectable instrument of diplomacy and a profession on which the modern world is 
built? " javqýe Frelld 51). Nandys analysis loses some of its rhetorical effect since, at 
least in contemporary forms, there are those who make profit from the self- 
immolation of the Roop Kanwars of the world as statesmen make profit from the 
sacrificc of their nation's soldiers. 
Nandy conceives of culture as -a positiv, e and harmonizing force in people's 
liv, es. This is not to say that Nalidy does not recogulze the 'dark' side of culture, as he 
refers to it, but it occupies a linitted place in his theory. Rather than adding strength 
to the argument that the dark sides of culture are patholo 'es of ttadifion, Nandv 91 
wants to make the case that the manifestations of 'darkness' we see today, such as 
reh9lous fundamentalism and extreme sccul-arlsm, are the real patholo. gles of 
tradition. However persuasive this reading is, Nandv sccms unable to acknoxx, -Icdge or 
confront the problcm of how the culturc hc N-icN,, -s -as adaptive and enabling can also 
Saraoe I "rell, 141 for N-anch-s discussion of specific critiques- t- rom critics including Kumar and 
],, qtll, -a Sarkar. 
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be oppressiVe for people who supposedly subscribe to that culture's beliefs, values 
and practices. His writing about sali is a good example of this. He recognizes that sali 
is part of the dark side of Hindu culture (in fact, it is culturally specific to Hindu 
culture) but he still attempts to recuperate the values that he claims sah . represents. 
There is a general fail-Lire U-1 Nandy's work to engave with how cultural 
practices, particularly those aspects of culture that deriVe from religious belief,,, 
operate in the lives of women, religious minorities, lower caste and working class 
people. Nandy suggests, in essays such as 'Woman and Womanliness' (E(ke 32-46) 
and, more recently, 'Sati in Kali Yuga' (Saiwge Freud 32-52), that in India femininity is 
not as devalued as it is in the West because Indians associate femininity with power, 
particularly spiritual power. Nandy makes a case throughout his work that this sets 
up a different kind of gender dynamic in India and asserts that women in India "do 
not hav, e to fight the same battles as their Western sisters have to fight" (Eýge 42). 
While he recognizes that Indian women have battles of thci_r own to fight, he wants 
to work from the position that femininity and women are not undervalued in India as 
they are in the West. 
Nevertheless, in focusing so completely on an abstract scheme of gender, and 
in particular of femininity, Nandy avoids having to confront what this actually means 
for women. Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, commenting on how the Hindu goddess has 
become a site of conflicted debate in feminist studies, brings us back to the reality of 
women's lives with this remark: 
The symbolic valuation of forms is nol (I qlleclion ýflhe aclual "watelial and 
/)/'s/O1-l'('(l/ (011(lifiolls in w/ji(J) thy lake sl)ape. If we locate the indices of the status 
of N-vornen in the bitter, that is, in fcm-ale sex-ratios, life-expcctancv, hteracy, 
income, sLibjection to violence, cqLialltý- of opportunitý, legal equahtv, then 
the c6deticc shows that societies that have goddesses-and xvotrlen 
Icaders-scorc poorly on these counts (15) 
Sunder Rajan notes that the ex-ideticc contradicts the expectations of inany feminist 
scholars, \,, -ho cxpect, l1kc NqtidN,, that in a culture xvIiere women can be invested 
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with spiritual power, this must represent the agency, or access to -agency, of women 
1n that culture. 
In the 1980s and 1990s ferninists in India weathered a difficult debate about 
the opposition between women's rights and communal rights (sotne6mcs referred to 
as personal' laws). The stakes of the debate, secularism versus communalism, are 
usually presented in terms that ncglcctan analysis of how women specifically are 
affected by secularist or communalist laws and practices. In this sense, -although 
Nandy comes down on the side of some version of communabsm rather than 
secularism, he reproduces the established silence -about women's Irves. As Menon 
puts it, the debate "remains poised on the polarity of state and community, rendering 
invisible the axis upon which it turns, that of gender" (3). 
Sunder Rajan turns to sociological statistics to make her point that women 
are still not enjoying equality with men in India, but Nandy's writing on culture is 
meant to disrupt the discourse that would represent Indian progress in terms of 
statistics on life expectancy rates. This is not to say that statistics are meaningless, 
only that this kind of sociological emphasis forms part of the developmental 
discourse that so disturbs Nandy. Sunder RaJan concludes her article with the 
affirmation that reli 'ous discourse "can only be countered, it seems to me, bv a 91 
clear-cut and visible secular altmiative" (38). The value of Nandy's work ties in his 
attempt to redeploy religious discourse in a way that takes it out of the hands of the 
fundamentalists who purport to represent communitarian values and the Western 
secularists. Nevertheless, As Nlenon notes, this issue turns invisibly on the axis of 
gender and if Nandy cannot bring himself to theorisc this niore rýgorously, he cannot 
hope to convince critics like Sunder Rajan or Menon that there is still something 
enabling left in religious practice for Indian xvoincti. 
Women's fives are also a blind spot in Nandys psychoblographics. Largelý 
influenced by Frikson's studics of great leaders such as Gandhi and Luther, N-, tnd\ 
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writes psycholo ical biographies of inen in Indian colonial history. In these stories gi 111 
women figure most often as mothers, wix, cs or daughters. Since Nandy places a great 
importance on the Indian mother, the women he writes about are strong characters. 
His account of Rammohun Roy's crusade againstsali, for exampIc, is e-.,, plained partly 
in terms of Roy's relationship to his mother -and sister-in-law. Nevertheless, the 
women almost always exercise their agency and power within the confines of their 
family. With a few exceptions" women do not appear in Nandy's account as activists 
on their own terms. One might suppose that Nandy's subjects are inevitably men 
because he writes about the important figures of the independence movement, such 
as Gandhi. Psychohistory would seem to be most effective and illurninating when it 
deals with subjects we are all well acquainted with, and those subjects are generally 
the 'great men of history'. However, Nandy writes about a variety of rminor historical 
characters such -as Radhabinod Pal, a jurist who sat on the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East held after World War 11 and Girindrasekhar Bose, the first 
non-Western psychoanalyst. 
A consideration of the lives of a range of Indian women vital to the 
independence movement including Pandita R-am-abai, Swarnakumari Debi (and her 
daughter Sarala Debi Ghosal) and Sarojini Naidu would complicate Nandy's view of 
culture as different subjects live and practice It. 52 Pandita Ramabal, for example, was 
a woman who spent much of her life ttý-lng to reform education in India. In 
particular, she was interested in educating women. She received her own education 
from her father, an itinerant Brahrnin scholar and when he died she continued to 
wander the coutittv with her brother lecturing to others. Rarnabai was awarded a title 
recognizing her scliolarly proficicticy by the paidils of C alcutta and later appeared 
As has been scen Nandy does write about f ndira Gandhi as a historical actor in the I-arger 
(ýoe I t2-130. -ý, -orld. See Natidý /, 
ý' See Kumar 32-95 for ýn brief but cictalled and tiseful account of women who were 
important to the social reform and independence nim-cnictits during the British Raj it) her 
lil,, tor\- of Indian feminism. Scc also Gre-, v. il 179-229. 
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before the Government of India's con-ityassion on cduc, -Ltl()n. She was a remarkable 
figure if only because of these achievements; however she also married a man who 
cainc from a different caste and religion than she did and after he died she converted 
to Christianity. In her history of ferninist activism in India, Radha Kumar suggests 
that Ramabal converted to Christianity partly because the social reform movement 
could not quite -absorb he. An individual hke Rarnabal is difficult to understand in 
terms of Nandy's account of an enabling, resistant Hindu culture. Ramabai's 
experience of living as a Hindu woman in the colony led her to decide that a 
conversion to Christianity would best help her achieve her educational reforms. 
Women like S-ar-ala Debi Ghosal offer another kind of a challenge to Nandv's 
account. Like many other women social reformers in nincteenth-ccnturý, India, 
Ghosal was involved with educational reform. However, what makes her interesting 
is that in 1895 she took over editorship of Bharali, a )ournal her mother had edited, 
and through it she organized a campaign to rouse voung BenLali men into defending 
themselves and Bengali women against British soldiers. Ghosal was cleternuned to 
defend the honour of Bengalis, and protest against the British characterization of 
Bengalis as "a race of cowards" (Kumar 39). As a result she looked for ways to 
reinvent iný, thical figures into warrior-heroes, and was condemncd by the Hindu 
orthodoxy for her unwomanly activities. Ghosal only organized these campaigns, she 
did not participate in them; but other women like Bhikaiji Cama were more clcarlv 
aligned with revolutionary action. Nandy never addresses himself to the question, 
what did the women do when the men shifted further towards the pole of 
masculinityý Though Ghosal and Cama are hardly representative of the majority of 
f lindu women in the late nincteenth-centurv, it is significant that Ghosal was 
organizing a fight for the lionour of Bengalis. Although she also urged the men to 
defend the honour of their women, she understood the struggle in terms of her 
regionalas Nvell as her gendercd identit. y. We are accustomed to treating slights on the 
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honour of wornen as insults to their inen, but the reverse in also possible and implies 
a more complex ilitcraction of gender roles than a simple polarity of masculinity and 
feti-iminity. 
Nandy's account of the colontal encounter leaves inany questions about the 
psychology of Indian women unanswered. If, as his theory would suggest, they stood 
to lose some amount of cultural power as they ceded the ground of femininity to 
men, how did they fight this psychological loss? His theory relies partly on the idea 
of identification with the aggressor (as do parts of Fanon's argument), but he never 
explores how women might identiI)y with their aggressors differently. Indeed, 
depending on whether the primary aggressor in the colonial situation is the white 
man or the white woman, the Indian women would face entirely different 
psychological conflicts -and require different identifications than Indian men. Nandy 
does not consider the possibility that identification with the aggressor may be a 
psychological defence that is primarily -avaflable to men -and that we might require 
alternative theories for making sense of Indian's women's psychological resistance 
strategies. In soine sense, as we saw in Farion's work, Nandy's theory works only by 
pushing women, in theoretical terms, out of the picture 
These examples show that other kinds of psychobiographies would 
comphcate Nandy's relatively straightfonvard account of the kind of psycholo ical 91 
resistance made possible by inherited cultural traditions and practices. I do not want 
to suggest that Nandy should write psychoblographies about these wornen. Indeed, 
perhaps he does not want to presume to write about women. Indian men need to be 
written about and represented in scholarly discourse just as much as women. 
However, lie does need to bringa considmation of womens lives, experiences and 
work into his account. Nandy docs acknowledge, as I mentioned carfier, that wornen 
h-ave their own 'battles to fight' and stories to tell, but he has suggestions about how, 
these things should be done too, and he rejects \Vcstern ferninist paradigms. Instead, 
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he urges them to focus on issues thatare specific to Indian culture. For example, he 
theorizes that while "in the West that may, inean defying the lirMts of con*ugahty, and 
giving a new clignity to the maternal role of woman; in India it may involve 
transcending the partial identity m1posed by motherhood and winning a new respect 
for conjugality" (1-, (ý, oe 43). But as early as 1882 the activist Jyofiba Phule was already 
arguing for "the formation of a new and equalitarian husband-wife relationship" 
(K-uinar 32). 
In fact, a look at the history of ferninisin in India suggests that Indian women 
activists have been cautious about describing themselves as feminists, or pursuing 
Western feminist ideas since at least the 1920's. Tn discussions among themselves, as 
well -as more public debate, Indian women seem to have declared their preference for 
their own version of woman-oriented activism repeatedly, from Sarojini Naidu in the 
1930s to Madhu Kishwar in the 1980s. In part, this is because much of women's 
activism M India was connected to the Independence movement and so Unproving 
the liv es of women was also always about improving the liv es of Indians. But it is 
-also because Indian -, tctivists recognized and deplored the patronismg and arrogant 
-attitude of Western feminists towards them. In other words, Indian women actiVists 
and theorists have long recognized what Nandy seems to beheve they need to be 
told, and despite the detertnination to maintain their cultural distinctiveness they 
have found it necessalý- to critique religious discourses and rights. 53 
Nandy attempts to bring a genuinely sympathetic understanding of Hindu 
culture into psvchoanalvsls, and to identify how a particular cultural tradition includes 
psychological strategies for rcsisting niclital, physical and intellectual attacks on that 
In fact Nmidys claim goes slightly further than this. I le suggests that in fighting wonien, 
oppression in India "the truly cre', Itl\-c wo"Ic" iti these areas havc rarely been feininists', 
i ght by men who havc prcStInied that the plight ardent or otlicn-vise. The battlc has been fou-, z( 
of Nvoinen in other areas of life, extend to these too" 46 ) Mandy is referring here 
specifically to Western feminist drives to obtain greater participation rom women in certain 
areas of public life. The problem, lie su, (-), gcsts, is different in India becitisc women have 
access to activities the West considers matily, such "as politics. 
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tradi6on. Neverthelcss, his ncglcct of how cultural beliefs arc produced and 1111'edas 
practices means that his notion of culture as a psychological resource remains 
problematic, not simply in terms of how women or minorities define themselves in 
relation to their dominant culture but what culture stands for when we talk about 
groups who seein to be without culture. Moreover, Nandv, like Mannom, still leaves I 
us wondering whether non-Furopeans are bound to be defined in relation to thctr 
culture while Furopeans may be understood as purely psychological creatures. If 
Fanon's work placed relatively little importance on deploying cultural identities and 
tra(litions to struggle against colonialism, Nandy's theories become untenable -, is a 
result of their dominant emphasis on the enabling potential of cultural solutions. The 
theoretical space between Fation and Nandy's vision of this problematic leads us 
naturally to the work of Homi Bhabha. Not only does Bhabha draw on both these 
theorists in his work but he foregrounds questions of the producfion, reproduction 
and authorization of culture in an explicitly psychoanalytic language. 
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CHAPTER THREE: "HOMI BHAE3HA AND THE TRUTH OF 
PSYCHOANALYSIS" 
Homi Bhabha's TI)e Lotafion qfCallare is one of the foundational texts of 
postcolonial theory. Despite its significance, the book has not been considered a 
response to the specific problems of using psychoanalysis for anti-colonial and 
postcolonial ends which critics like F-anon and Nandy have already tried and failed to 
solve. Bhabha's pro'ect obviously relies on psychoanalytic theorv, and yet it is at the 
same time a contribution to postcolonial theory and, as such, emerges from the 
influence of texts like Black Skinl IFIVIe Xlasks and Intimale 11, neply as much as 
D errida's I Fritiq and Dýgýrence or Lacan's Seminars. F anon o ffcred us a way of 
understanding the colonized through a sociolo ically and politically situated 91 
psychoanalytic portrait. Nandy expanded the psychological view of colomialism to 
include the colonizers, and also explored the ways in which the history of the colony 
could be represented more faithfully through a psychoanalytic lens. Bhabha builds on 
top of these projects in order to connect the history of colonialism with the history 
of Western modernity itself. In this chapter, I examine the specifically psychoanalytic 
aspect of Bhabha's work in relation to some of the themes and issues already 
explored in the work of Fanon and Nandy. Reading Bhabha in this context mav 
clarify why he uses psychoanalysis -and how he uses it to solve certain problems in 
writing about the colony and postcolonial critique. Having considered the specifically 
psychoanalytic aspect of Bhabha's work, we can then begin to evaluate the potential 
and the pitfalls of his theoretical solutions more precisely. 
Critical commentarý- on Mablia's work has focused most licavil\- on the 
question of whether or not his version of postcolonial theory can be useful in 
contcmPoraiv political struggles around race, colonialism and imperialism. In 
partlcýilar, his work has been accused of being "incompetent for handling neo- 
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colonialism, and ironically the professed counter-he einonic thrust of 19 
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postcoloni-alism appears irretrievably compromised" (Xie 165) . One reason why 
critics are not disposed to accept Bhabha's solutions is because of his intensiVe use of 
Derridean dcconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis. As a rcsult, his postcolonial 
strate ies seem to depend too heavily II 91 . on 
the critic's role as a deconstructive readcr 
and appear to best effect in the reah -n of texts, psyches and fantasy states rather than 
the 'real' world of colonial or postcolonial brutahvy, 55 Since his strate ies are also 91 
described in a dense written style "thickened by iMprobable juxtapositions and 
innumerable fleeting allusions to the comments of critics, writers and thinkers" 
(Parry, "Signs" 7), Bliablia's work has been rc'ccted as too embedded in the 
Eurocentric language of high thcory to be understandable to anyone except a small 11 11 1 
group of academics. 56 
Objections to the political utility of such textually based subversion as 
deconstruction are certainlý, valid, but there is a tendency among critics to reject 
Bhabh-a's deconstruction and his use of a specifically psychoanalytic language at one 
5454 For some views of the difficulties with using Bhabha's theory for contemporary struggles 
see Dirlik "Postcolonial Aura" 328-356, Parry "Signs" 5-24, Xie 155-166 and Miyoshi 726- 
751. Of these critiques, Parry's is one of the most persuasive since it demonstrates a close 
reading of Bhabha's work and a sensitive understanding of Bhabha's political commitments. 
Unlike Dirhk she is also careful to cautiori readers that the problems she identifies with 
Bhabha's methods should not be confused with the accusation that Bhabha is not 
sufficiently committed to the politics of o1ccolonization. 
55 For discussion of some of the problems involved in applying Bhabha's strategies in the 
real world see Dirhk "Postcolonial Aura" 328-355 and Ahmad 1-20. A related criticism is 
that Bhabha fails to understand how difficult it is to actually live the postcolonial or migrant 
s -151 - experience lic,,, eems to celebrate. For discussions of this ec Easthope 145 and Nicholls 
4-25. Easthope puts his concern in rather strong terms. According to him, Bhabh-a "invites 
us to tn, and live in difference, in a state of pure hybridity, actually in the interstices ... 
I 
invite you to hesitate before trying this, for the experience is not at all unfamiliar, for it is the 
experience of psychosis" (147). 
For critics like Loornba "the slipperiness of his language and construction, it is itself open 
to criticism in work which purports to be I-)olltlcil and interventionist" ("Over-, vorlding" 
308). Of course Bliablia is not the only postcolonial critic to be accused of taking the 
language gaine too scriouslY. Spivak's work his been attacked as often a,; 13hablia's. For 
comi-rientarics on the problems -, 6th Bliablia's written style see Parry "Signs" 5-24 and 
Lootnba "Over-worlding" 305-3 W. Several critics have also raised questions about the way in 
which Bhabha's deconstructrve technique and personal style deliberately and inadvertently 
create misleading representations of his source,, for detailed discussions of some of these 
instance-, see t\loorc-(', Ill)crt Pail, ololiial M-aclzt6,114- t5 1, Perloff 1-7 and Phillips 1-9. 
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fell swoop. Though there are some connections between Bhabha's deconstructive 
approach and his inclination for Lacan's more post- structura I version of 
psychoanalysis these two aspects of his method should not be conflated . 
57. In fact, it 
1-nav be much more useful to consider Bhabha's use of psychoanalysis as a signal that 
his project engages with writers such as Fanon and Nandy, rather than a sign of his 
apparent interest in Western posts tructurahst theories. Bhabha cites Fanon as a 
precedent for this very, reason, but it is a precedent no one except Young seems to 
take as a serious statement of intent. 
One reason for this may be the fact that insofar as Bliablia's work has been 
understood in relation to Fanon's work it has been criticized for his inability, or 
unwillingness, to represent Fanon's work accurately and his over-emphasis on the 
psychoanalyfic aspects of Fanon's work. Many critics may well feel, then, that work 
that apparently misrepresents Fanon cannot be a meaningful response to problems in 
Fanon's theory, and yet this is what Bhabha's work attempts to do. In the first 
chapter we saw that a significant problem with Fanon's model stems from his 
produces spcc'fic, inability to account for the wavs in which an atmosphere of raci I 
sometimes pathological, behaviours. He suggests, for example, that watching films, 
reading comic books or history books in which black people are denigrated triggers 
an existential crisis in the psyches of black people when they realize they are hving in 
a white world. As Nandv observes, Fanon is able to describe the general contours of 
colonialism, but though vve rilay instinctively be persuaded that racist representauotis 
Will lead the raciahzed person to doubt his or her own hurnan worth we must still 
find a more nuanced way to connect the material condition (the colonizer's 
economic or socialabilitY to control representations of the racialized) and the 
57 There are some notable exceptions to the tendency to read Bliablia's deconstruction and 
psychoanalysis as one -and the same problem. For critiques that focus specifically oil the 
ps, Vchoanah-tic content of Bliablia's , vork see Young, 11"hile Alylbolook, i 151-6, Moore-Gilbert, 
Posit, olotmil 140-15 1 and Loornba "0 ve tworl ding" 307. Loomba slinpIly registers her 
discomfort vvith psychoanalysis as a Flurocentric thcoty, , x-hercas Young and Nloorc-Gllbert 
diSCLISS the implications of Bliablia's psychoanalytic model in more detall. 
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psychological event (the colonized becorning mentally and psychically oppressed) 
than Fanon offers us. 
Bhabha uses psychoanalysis precisely to speciýv these links; he offersus 
plausible explanations of cultural processes -and productions in colonial settings. 
Since we will examine how Bhabha does this later in the chapter I will not elaborate 
on his method in any detail here, but a brief illustration may help clarify, the point. 
11hablia discusses colonial n-Amicry at several points in the first half of The LOC-ation q1' 
C1111i, ire. Far from emerging as a natural response to colonial oppression, a case of 
colonial (mis)ldenfifications that more or less hit their mark, MiMicrv, is shown to be 
a colonial production. Nhinicry, in the colonv, is produced bv the colonial demand 
for and fear of well-assimilated native subjects. 
The connections between Bhabha's and Nandy's work have gone generally 
unremarked by critics. This omission is partly a symptom of the relative silence about 
Nandv's work that we examined in the previous chapter. It is an unfortunate 
omission since, as we shall see in this chapter, Bhabha's work develops some of 
Nandy's most productive ideas about psvchoanaINlic time, the critique of Western 
history and psychoanalytic discourse as an internal critique of the authority of 
Western knowledge. 5" Perhaps because Bhabha focuses on some of the same main 
issues as Nandy he is also able to answer a problem in the latter's work. Nandy's 
work suffers frorn insufficient attention to the ways in which culture is produced and 
lived bv Minorities and relies on the notion of culture as embedded in certain 
behaviours, practices and beliefs. Where Fation was not able to detail how a 
particular behaviour or practice mediated between the material conditions -and the 
effects on the coloni7cd psychc, Nandy's work provides a sometimes o\-cr-dctailed 
picture that does riot allow us to transfer his theory outside its particular habitus. 
ý', ' Young also notes that Nancly and Bliablias vvork are thematically connected. See Young, 
Pw-lcololiiali. illl 343. 
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Bhabha, though lie remains sensitive to Nandy's interest in cultural questions, 
is -able to provide an account of how colonial cultures work (in his case, the reference 
point is often, again, the Indian colonv that at the same time independent of a 
particular cultural rcfcrence point. In Bhabha's xvork, init-nicry could as easily- occur in 
an Indian, Affican or Caribbean colonv. The dvnarmcs of Bhabha's account do iml 
depend on our knowledge of a particular colonized culture's gender econorny or 
religious practices even as he insists on the importance of cultural processes in 
establishing (and destabihzitig) colonial authority. Bhabha's colonial subjects, like 
Nandy's, are made through culture, but, unlike Nandy's, they are not fixed to 
cultur. tUy-prescribed ways of being and thinking. 
The links to Nandy are also important because Bh-abha's work continues to 
develop the transition from psychoanalysis as a tool against colonialism and 
psychoanalysis as a tool of postcolonialism, in other Nvords as a tool for writing 
against the eurocentrism of western knowledge begun in Nandy's work. For Fanon, 
psychoanalysis was a way of making certain aspects of colonialism, aspects not 
adequately analysed before, known to the pubhc: the devastating psychic damage of 
racism and the colonializing practices of European medicine. For Nandy, 
psychoanalysis begins to become useful on two levels. One of his tasks is still to 
explore the psychic damage (on both sides) of colonialism, but the other task is to 
use psýlchoanalysis , oint 
into the shadow s'de of modern'ty's account of , as an entrv pi111 
itself. Bhabha's work takes up the second task even more energeticallv, to the point 
where it sometimes appears to ccbpse both F-anon's and Nandy's primarv task. What 
is significant, however, is that niodernlt\- does not depend on or cN-en acknowledge 
the colonial mornent as a foundational moment in its histmy. By rcading 
psychoanalysis into colonial history, Bhabha is able to restore the colonial moment to 
the history of moclcrnitý-- The key to Bhabha's project lies, at least partly, in his 
99 
deployment of psychoanalysis and that is why we must turn now to a more careful 
consideration of how he cites Fanon and Bhabha and 
situates his project in relation to theirs. 
B, babba and Tanon 
Robert Young writes, "if a psychoanalytical model might at first seem 
somewhat unexpected in the colonial context, [Bhabha] has the precedent of no less 
an authority than Fanon for its usc, particularly his Black, Skin, W'Nle Ala. &Y' (VIVIe 
Mytholoflies 153). Indeed, Bhabha signals that Fanon authorizes his project in various 
ways. The first epigraph of TI)e Location ql'Cullure is a quote from 131ack Skin, lVhile 
Masks; the second essay "Interrogating Identity", which establishes the important 
idea of the in-between in Bhabha's work, is framed through a discussion of how 
Fanon theorizes identity; and Fanon's words themselv, es are often called upon to 
prove the particular point Bhabha wants to make. Though crifics have been 
consumed by the question of whether Bhabha reads Fanon correctly or not, I want 
to focus here on how Bhabha makes use of Fanon's texts in order to both develop 
and refute aspects of Fanon's theorics ill his work. If he rejects aspects of Fanon's 
critique, this is onlv because he wants to foreground the larger theoretical stakes at 
issue in Fanon's psychoanalytic portrait of the colonized. 
Bhabha differs from Fanon most strongly in accepting psychoanalytic theorý 
on its own terms. Though Bhabha, like Fanon, brings psychoanalysis back into the 
colony he rejects or at least passes over several problems with classical psychoanalytic 
theory as well as Fation's reworking of psychoanalysis in a colonial setting. Fanon did 
not rcg-ard psychoanalytic concepts -is universal models. His critique was grounded in 
his sensc of psychoanalYsis as a rcglonal, F, urocentric practicc. Otic of Fanoil's ma)or 
dissensions from classical thcory concerns the assumed unix-crsahsm of the Oedipus 
complex. In direct coritnidiction of this article of faith lie Nvrites: 
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It is too often forgotten that neurosis is not a basic element of human reality. Like it 
or not, the Oedipus complex is far from coming into being among Negroes ... it 
would be relatively easy for me to show that in the French Antilles 97 per cent of the 
families cannot produce one Oedipal neurosis. This incapacity is one on which we 
heartilýl congratulate ourselves (B1a(-kS'khi 152). 
I'he imphcations of this statement are not entirely straightforward, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, but his point is clear. The Oedipus complex should not be 
considered a unlvcrs-al process. Bhal)h-, t neither mentions Fanon's discomfort with 
the Oedipal model not integrates it into his own work. Instead, his deployment of 
the Ocdipus complex is relatively straightforward. He writes, "fefishism, as the 
disavowal of difference, is that repeftious scene -around the problem of castration" 
(74). The problem of the threat of castration is taken for granted in its Freudian form 
and transferred to colonial scenes where it operates according to precisely the same 
logic of disavowal Freud described in 1927. 
tinhke Bhabha, Fanon does not even adhere to one particular psychoanalytic 
school of thought. He cites Freud, Adler, Jung, Lacan, Deutsche, and Bonaparte 
alone in Bla(k Skin, WIVIe Masks, feels free to disagree with Lacan, Jung or Adler as it 
suits his theory and his critique remains firmly grounded in an institutional 
understanding and practice of mental health care in -a colonial hospital. It would seem 
surprising that Bliablia subdues this aspect of Fanon's work, especially taken together 
with Bh-abha's assertion that he is recuperating the real value of F-anon's work in 
concentrating on his psychoanalytic investigations. How do Fanon's psychoanalytic 
irivestiptions influence Bhabha when he neither cites Fanon's modific-ations nor 
integratcs thcm into his own worký 
While Bhal: )ha rejects Fanon's specific critique of psychoanalysis he does not 
reject, what is for him, the main idca behind I" anon's portrait ()f how it is to Eve as a 
racializcd and colonized subject. Indeed, he brings Iýanon to our attention not as a 
black nian who has a socio-political borie to pick with psychoanalysis, but -is a mail 
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who has -a profound critique to make of the history of Western humanism and 
modernity. Bhabha insists on seeing Fation's work as more than a localized critique 
of psychoanalysis, or strategy of anti-colonialism. He writes: 
I claim a generality for Fanon's argumcnt because he talks not simply of the 
historicity of the black man, as much as he writes in 'The fact of blackness' 
about the temporality, of modernity within which the figure of the 'human' 
comes to be authorized. It is Fanon's temporality of emergence-his sense of 
the belatedness of the black man-that does not simply make the question of 
ontology inappropriate for black identity; but somehow impossible for the 
very understanding of humanity in the world of moderMty: 'You come too 
late, much too late, there will always be -a world-a white world between )-on 
and me' (237) 
In other words, for Bhabha, it is Fanon who initiates a discussion of how the figure 
of the 'Black man' disrupts availableaccourits of Western modernity simply by 
portraying his struggle to live between the myth and the lived-expcrience of 
blackness. That Fanon chooses to do so through a language of (modified) 
psychoanalysis is not, strictly speaking, the reason that Bh-, Ibha also makes use of 
psychoanalysis. 
The precedent Bhabha acknowledges is not Fanon's use of psychoanalysis, 
but the implications of Fanon's psychoanalytic portrait of the colonized. It is true 
that Bhabha also chooses to make use of psychoalialys1sl since it provides a language 
for describing identities that cannot be made compatible with liberal notions of 
public and priv ate selv es or rational and irrational acts. " But what is more important, 
for Bh-, ibha, is that Fanon's psychoanalytic, or simply psychological, portrait 
demonstrates how the colonial subject's longing to become human is continually 
frustrated by the discourse of modernity itself. Modernity is a discourse that speaks 
of rationality and progress but turns on the notion of not-quite, not-whitc man who 
is the colonial or racialized subject. Black-: Nkili, If"N/cAlask, s performs the 
desire of the colonized to identifN- with the humanistic, enlightenment ideal of 
Man: 'all I wanted was to be a man among other 1-nen ... 
Then in a 
ý" For an ttistructive account of why Bliablia uses psychoaiialysis see Bliablia and Com-aroff 
29-32. 
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catachrestic reversal he shows how, despite the pedago ies of human historV, 91 1 
the performative discourse of the liberal West, its quotidian conversation and 
comments, reveal the cultural supremacy and the racial typology upon which 
the universalism of Man is founded (11hablaa, I-walion 23'7) 
In T/)e Lot'alion ql'Callure Bhabha works out some of the processes by which the 
"performative discourse of the liberal West" authorizes itself and at the same tirne 
cannot completely effect that authorization. 
The idea of the 'black man' has implications for writing the history of 
modernity, and for finding a time in which to represent that history. The black man 
Fanon describes, who exists in between myth and fact, highlights the linked 
problems of historicity and temporality that Bhabha develops throughout The 
Lo(, afioli q1'CillX1,1re. "' Fanon, Bhabha argues, is one of the first critics who refuses to 
play the dialectic game "whereby the black man is part of a transcendental sublation: 
a minor term in a dialectic that will emerge into a more equitable universe" (238), but 
he also refuses to concede the 'belatedness' of the black man "because it is only, the 
opposite of the framing of the white man as umv ersal, normativ e" (237). According 
to Bhabha, it is Fanon who insists that the black man is neither a stage on the way to 
human, nor a supplementary identity to normative Whiteness, and so prompts us to 
look for another time in which to write history. When Bhabha claims that "it is one 
of the original and disturbing qualities of Black Skin, Vbile Allasks that it rarclý 
historici7es the colonial experience" (42) this is not because he ignores Fanon's 
careful attention to the time and place he is living in. Instead, Bhabha wants to draw 
out attention to the fact that Fanon does not have a suitable historical perspective for 
niversal describing the history of the colonial psý chc. The colonized psý che and LT 
Nlan cannot both be represented in the same Instorical time with the master historical 
narratives that are available to Fanon. It is precisely this nex-v kind of historical time 
61, S cc it i par tic ular BI iýibh'a Locall*Oli 139- 1 198-2 t 1; a rid 236-256. 
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that Bhabha attempts to define atid display in his work, and as we shall see Nandy 
provides another crucial element for theorizing Bhabha's new time. 
Bhab, h, i ýind Nandy 
Despite the scarce nurriber of references to Nandy in The Lwalion qfCallure, at 
first glance Bliablia and Nandy appear to have more closely connected theoretical 
pro)ects than Bhabha -and Fanon. In the few places where Bhabha makes reference 
to Nandy they seem to be in agreement. In the article "Bv Bread Alone" Bhabha 
acknowledges the connection himself when he writes, "my point here is close to 
Ashis Nandy's strictures on Western historicism ... The suffering of 'Third World' 
societies, according to Nandy, creates an attitude to its history which shares some of 
the orientations of semlo6cs -and psychoanalysis" (200). In fact, Mandy has repeatedlý 
-argued for a psychoarialyfic understanding of history that he claims is more 
congruent with traditional Indian conceptions and representations of the past 
(Nandy, "History" 44-66). 
Bliablia's second reference to Mandy is also an affirmation of Nandy's 
position. Bhabha writes, "in his essay, 'The Uncolonized mind: postcolonial India 
and the East", Ashis Nandy provides a more descriptive illustration of a postcolonial 
India that is neither modern not anti-modern but non-modern" (252). He goes on to 
quote from Nandy's text and follows this up with -an affirmation of his own project 
"in splitting open those 'welds' of modernity, a postcolonial contramodernity 
becomes visible" (252). Is a certain notion of splitting or doubling so familiar from 
13hablia's work another echo of Nandy's psychoblographical studies of Indian men 
made successful and yet haunted by their encounters with the Westý, 
'I'lils view would seem to be strengthened by the fact that there are moments 
in Bliablia's text wliere even if Nandys narnc is not invoked Ills project appears 
tbrough the lines of lihablia's , vords. For example, In "Flie Postcolonial arid the 
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Postmodetn' an earlier essay m which Bhabha discusses the notion of postcolonial 
contramodernity he suggests that this notion enables him to "attempt to represent a 
certain defeat, or even an impossibiEty, of the 'West' in its authorization of the 'idea' 
of colonization" (175). 'I'Iiis is strikingly ren-anisccnt of Nandy's attcmpts to 
represent another side of the West, as well as his notion that to accept the commonly 
-held view of colonialism as a one-way relationship of suffering and exploitation is to 
accept that colonialism Is only "the name of a political economy which ensures a 
one-way flow of benefits, the subjects being the perpetual losers in a zero-sum game 
and the rulers the beneficiaries. This is a view of the human mind and history 
promoted by, colonialism itself" (Infilvale Elie)ýq 30). Nandv, like Bhabha, is interested 
in producing other kinds of histories th-an those on offer in the West. 
However, Nandy's attempts to break apart the structures of Western 
historicism with his psychoanalyticaland psychological methods are quite different 
from Bhabha's. As we saw in the previous chapter Nandy uses psychological and 
psychoanalytical forms such as psychoblographies to writc his alternativ, e histories of 
colonialism in India. Although Nandy finds psychoanalysis to be "the most 
influential theoretical frame for analysing the conversion of social realities into 
personality vectors" (Allemalive Sciemýes 1' )), he also observes that it "tends to 
conceive of these realities in static and narrow terms once it goes beyond the 
immediate interpersonal world of the individual" (13). Nandy's aim in the 
psychoblography, then, is as much about a closer understanding of the way in which 
the sotiqy of the individual deals with its colonial conflicts as it is about the individual. 
In other words, N-andv tries to use psychoanalysis to read the group as well as the 
individual without pathologizing either. Bhabha's use of psychoanalysis is much more 
1111-11ted to the particular uses of the concept lie chooses to organize his essay around. 
In his work the psychoanalytic concept, intended to describc individual psychical 
phenomena, is used to account for the processes and bchavlours of large groups of 
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people without any reflection on what it might mean to read those concepts into 
group dynamics. 
In fact, this differericc reflects the most insurmountable divide between 
Nandy and Bliablia namely their respective approaches to the question of the 
coloni7cd population's culture. If Nandy is interested in collapsing the structures of 
Western historicism, it is because he believes in the ability of Indians to represent 
their own version of history and their own understanding of the past. As he puts it, if 
his attack on history "involved only the standard etic-emiic differences, many would 
have felt more comfortable. But I have complicated matters by first vaguely 
suggesting a normative frame based on the native categories, and then using the 
frame to evaluate the cxogcnous 'universalist' and 'progressivist' categories" (Nandy, 
"Cultures" 273). Not only are there 'Third world' alternativ es to the receiv ed 
framework of histonT, those alternatives may be used to evaluate the categorý7 of 
history itself As such, Nandy is interested in offering Indian readings and methods 
for writing and representing history. Bhabha's attempt to interv ene in the structures 
of history is not tied to a belief in ail Indian or other cultural alternative. Indeed, as 
the whole chapter dedicated to his work in Young's account of Western 
historiography demonstrates, Bliablia's critique has its place and is launched from 
inside the problcma6cs of Western philosophy. This is not to dismiss Bhabha's 
critique. However, it is clear that Bhal: )ha's intervention in historicism is not a cultural 
restoration, like Nandy's, but something else. 
Nevertheless, questions of cultural authenticitv, cultural survival and cultural 
authority are of some importance to both critics. If, as Young suggests, Nandy's 
work established these eleryients as the primary concerns of postcolonial studies then 
Bliablia's work would seem to be mucli more in line with Nandy thati with l-'anon. 
However, if both critics are interestcd in the d\-namics of cultural survival, here again 
tlicy take quite different positions on the question. Bhabha never comes close to 
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specifying culturally Indian ways of doing or thinking things. Indeed ilt ils the very 
lack of ethnic, or other soclo-cultural, specificity that Bhabha seems to believe is so 
vital to his project and which his critics find so disturbing. For Bhabha, and Young 
suggests that many other secularist Indian critics agree, the recourse to Indian (or any 
other ethnicity) is a kind of pohfical burden (represented as a search for authenticity) 
that must be dislodged. Cultural sun-l,,,, al, in Bhabha's work, seems to refet to the 
creation and negotiation of identities beyond the 'traditional', whereas for Nandv 
cultural suivival depends on the ability to remake 'critical traditional' identities. 
Whfle Nandy takcs the possibibtics of cultural-psychological resistancc 
seriously, he does not, as we saw carher, pay adequate attention to the production of 
culture and its impact on women, lower castes, religious minorities. Bhabha's work 
would seem to answer many of these problems because he assumes and explicitly 
works from the premise that culture must be produced, drawing especl Ily on 
Foucault's theorization of culture. Moreover, in the later essays of The Lotvlion q1' 
011111re Bhabha actively grapples with the problem of how culture comes to be 
authorized, translated and even transformed. Nevertheless, perhaps because he 
concentrates so heavily on the structure of culture he has nothing to say about the 
content, or at least, he refuses to speclýv any cultural content. The consequence of 
this, in Bliablia's thcorNT, seems to be that psychoanalytic processes and conccpts flu 
in the space Nandy fills with 'tradifion-al' Indian culture. Whereas Nandy, as I argued 
in the previous chapter, attributes Indian reactions to some version of traditional 
culture and European reactions to psychoanalytic schcmas and processes, Bhabha 
sceins to attribute cveiýyonc's reac6ons-colonlzcr and colonized-to psych oanalytic 
phenomena. The spccificity that Bh-, ibl-ia refuses to cngqgc with accords 
psychoanalysis inuch greater power to represent hurnan relations than Nandy xvould 
concede. Flo\-, -c\-cr, the processes of cultural production that Bliablia investigates 
illustrate the problcrri with attaching psychological actions to particular cultural forms 
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as Nandý appears to do. The problern of working out the relationship between 
culture and psychoanalvtic theorN, continues to haunt us. 
Bhabha's refusal to deal in specifics also extends to his treatment of gender in 
colonial societies. As we saw m chapter two, gender is a crucial organizing principle 
of colonialism for Nandy despite the problems his work raises for an account of the 
psychology of Indian women living under colomahsm. Andvet for Bhabha, who 
notes the importance of taking gender into account, it forins a relatively nunor part 
of his theoretical excursions. Nevertheless, neither critic considers that his use of 
psychoanalytic theory would seem to exclude adequate representation of women 
gencrallý- and women of colour particularly. Moreover, neither critic considers that 
the material experience of the woman of colour might radically throw the schemes of II 
psychoanalytic theory, such as the mechanism of identification, into question. As we 
will see Iater in this chapter with the work of Anne McClintock such a consideration 
opens many other questions about the critical potential of psychoanalytic theory M 
postcolonial studies. 
Finally, even if Bhabha's choice to represent colonlal phenomena in 
psychoanalytic terms is supported by Nandy's notion that the third world society's 
attitude can be characterized by affinities with psychoanalysis he does not use 
psychoanalysis in the waN, Nandv, does. We saw in chapter two that Nandy's primary 
influences -are Freud and Frikson, and his psychoanalytic understanding is heavily 
marked by a spccific cultural, and evcn geographical, context. N-andy makes 
modifications to psychoanalysis that have an established heritage in Indian 
psychoanalysis, particularly the focus on inothm, rather than fitthcrs. Bhabha's use of 
psychoanalysis is at the same titne morc sophisticated (in that lie fotlows Lacan and 
Derricla's readings of Freud) and less sophisticated (in that lie appears to make no 
alterations to psychoatialysis depending on the context in which he is applying the 
108 
process or concept). Indeed, that despite his interest in the repetition of Western 
tropes that are the same-but -not-quite in the colonies his failure to remark on 
Mandy's change of emphasis in the Oedipus complex equally puzzling". 
Nandy's work and Bhabha's are linked most strongly by the notion that 
psychoanalysis serves -as a means of destabilizing Western historicism and Histoiv. 
Bhabha clearly takes this critique in the direction of Derrida, Lacan and Foucault 
while Nandy pursues a critique that is perhaps more concerned the representation of 
Indian histories than the history of Western modernity. If Nandy is interested in 
arguing that modernity is not the inevitable answer to certain problems in Indian 
culture and socictv, Bhabha is more interested in demonstrating how a history of 
modernity cannot be written without reference to colonies and colonialism. 
Furthermore, if Bhabha's psychoanalytic method does not seem to take its theoretical 
cue from Fanon, it does not seem to take it from Nandy either. It appears instead 
that of Fanon, Nandy and Bhabha, Bhabha makes the most orthodox use of 
psychoanalysis. At least, it appears that he is the least suspicious of psychoanalysis' 
claim to represent colonial society or colonized psyches, or of its potential power as a 
critique of Western philosophy and values. 
Bbabba and Psychoanalysis in the Colony 
In one of the first essays of Tbe Localioli q1'(-. 'u1l1,1re entitled "The Commitment 
to Theory" Bhabha makes an obseivation and poses a question to his readers: 
There is a damaging and self defeating assumption that theory is necessarily the elite 
language of the soclally and culturally privileged ... arc we trapped in a politics of 
g, glc where the representation of social antagonisms atid historical contradictions stru 
can take no other form than a binarism of thcory vs. politicsý (19). 
61 Indeed, it is worth remembering that the Oedipal mother 1,; not Nandys invention but a 
long-standing theme of psychoanah-sis M India as discLi, -,,, -, c(-l in the work of Frikson alld 
Kakar, amoti, (_ý others. 
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TI)e Lotafioli q1'C111111re may be characterized as a relentless attack against 
critique that poses social and historical problems in terms of such binarisms, rather 
than disclosing the conditions that enable the binarism to obtain. In Bhabha's view 
the binary between politics and theory has severe consequences for struggles against 
racism since it allows critical theory to continue its "familiar manoeuvre ... where, 
having opened up the chasm of cultural difference, a mediator or metaphor of 
otherness must be found to contain the effects of the difference" (31). It is one of 
the tasks of The Lwalion q1'(, '1, t11ure to bring cultural difference, rather than cultural 
diversity, to the scene of critique. However, as Bhabha points out, there is an 
important distiction to be made between critical theory as an institution and the body 
of concepts and philosophies that it contains. He makes no apologies, then, for 
making heavy use of some of the most demanding theorefical languages available, 
that of deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis, to carry out his task. 
Bhal: )ha uses psychoanalysis throughout The Location ql'Cull! ire, and he makes 
use of less well known figures such as Victor Smirnoff, Robert Waelder and Wilfrid 
Bion as well as those giants of psvchoatialN, tic theon,, Freud and Lacan. Unlike Fanon 
and Nandy there is no clinical context to Bhabha's deployment of psychoanalysis, or 
to his understanding of it. Bhabha uses psychoanalysis strictly as a theory, and 
emphasizes in particular the Lacanian understanding of the unconscious as structured 
like a language. Perhaps as a consequence one of the most important differences 
between Bhabha's use of psychoanalysis and Fanon's or Nandy's is that he does not 
describe people or their experiences of colonial life with the help of clinical 
categories. Instead, he uses psvchoanaIN-tic concepts to represent colonial plienornetia 
and processes such as stereotypes, immicn- and projections. 
Bliablia reads the stereotý-pe, for example, in terms of Jýrcuds notion of the 
fetish as a waý- of managing information about the world that one has but does not 
want to acknowledge. In the essaý- the conccl-)t of fetishism appears to answer the 
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particular problems Bh-abha has identified in the available accounts of stereotypes. 
He opens his account of the stereotype, for example, by noting "an important feature 
of colonial discourse is its dependence on the concept of 'fixity' in the ideological 
construction of otherness" (66). The problem with earlier studies of the persistence 
of colonial stereotypes (such as the dishonest Asian, the licentious African, the lazy 
Arab), Bhabha contends, is that they engage with the problem of these images as 
positive or negative, accurate or false, complex or simple, rather than as instances of 
a productive, effective and ambivalent discourse. 
In an attempt to read the stereotype in these other terms, Bhabha offers the 
fetish as a useful model: 
Fetishism, as the disavowal of difference, is that repetitious scene around the 
problem of castration. The recognition of sexual difference ... is 
disavowed 
bv the fixation on the object that masks that difference and restores an 
original presence ... 
fetishism is always a 'play' or vacillation between the 
archaic affirmation of wholeness/ similarity-in F'reud's terms: 'All men have 
penises'; in ours 'All men have the same skin /race/ culture'-and the anxiety 
associated with lack and difference-again, for Freud 'Some do not have 
penises'; for us 'Some do not have the same skin/race/ culture (74) 
By reading the stereoty e in these terms Bhabha is able to account for sorne curious 'P 
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features of stereotyping generally without making his account a simple question of 
moral or political Judgment. This fetish model of the stereotype explains, for 
example, whý, such a range of stereotypes exists, in which the native is demeaned (the 
dishonest Asian) but also nostalgically loved (the faithful zjyal)). It also explains why 
[lie same stereotypical figures persist in a variety of historical and economic 
conditions. The stereotype is not, in any sense, an index of realitv, but a regime of 
truth on 'race' that tries to fix racial identity in order to manage anxieties about racial 
difference. The stereotype "11-npcdes the circulation and articulation of the sipilfier of 
cracc' as any0iing other than Its fixity as racism" (75), or as Fanon puts it more 
mournfully "I was expected to beha\-c like a black mati-or at least like a niggcr ... I 
was told to sW- within bounds, to go back where I belongcd" (Bla('k Skiii 114). 
III 
The turn to psychoanalytic figures, such -as the fetish, allows Bhablia to 
establish how the fixity colonial discourse alms -at is constantly undercut by colonial 
productions. In "Of NIM-11cry and Man" he makes use of Lacan's theories of 
identification to investigate the wcll-known colonial phenomenon of the colonized 
subject who appears as a mimic of the colonizer, or to borrow Macaulay's infamous 
words ... a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, 
opinions, in morals and in intellect... (quoted in Location 87). The mimic is often read, 
like the stereotype, as an index of some original authcrificity, whether that 
authenticity belongs to the colonizer or the colonized. In place of such an 
understanding Bhabha draws our attention to Lacan's formulation of mirmcr), which 
emphasizes that there is no thing that is covered or disguised in order to produce the 
mimicrv, instead the sub ect becomes identical with his or her environment. In 
Lacan's words "numicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might 
be called an itself that is behind. The effect of min-ticry, is camouflage ... It is not a 
question of harmonizing with the background, but against a mottled background, of 
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becoming mottled" (quoted in 1-ot-alion 85). Nevertheless, this process is built 
around an ambivalence because even if immicry proves to be a subtle strategy for 
regulating and refashioning the native subjects it can never be total, and the excess 
that Mimicry produces puts the whole meaning of colonialism's declared authority 
and mission into question. 
A closer look at one of Bhabha's examples will allow us to understand his 
comments about colonial miýmicry more clearlý,. He reads Charles Grant's 
'Observations on the state of socictý, aniong the Asiatic subjects of Great Britain' -as a 
document that is riddled with the contradictions of mimicty. In this text, written in 
1792, Grant outlines his vision of Cliristian mission education in fridia. He presents 
(, 2 Sincc Bliablia refics so heavily on the particular \-, -ords lie citcs from othcr sources I havc 
choscii to use his in-lext cititions wlicti referring to thesc %x-riters, rather than citing the 
origitiql source. 
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the need for FInglish language instruction through Christian institutions so that the 
native can be inade into a suitably colonial subject, one with ... a sense of personal 
ident1tv as we know it... as Grant writes (quoted In Localion 87). Nevertheless, Grant 
recognises that such a development in the native's moral identity nught lead the 
colonial subjects to demand freedom from the British -and since that cannot be 
allowed Grant proposes another way in which Christian schools can work on the 
colonial scene. According to Bhabht, Grant proposes that the Christian educational 
program should make use of local caste practices in order to prevent the colonial 
subjects from forming political alliances that nnght destabilize colonialism itself. in 
this way, as Bhabha notes, Grant produces a bitter knowledge of "Christianity as a 
form of social control which conflicts with the enunciatory assumptions that 
authorize his discourse" (87). In other words, through the demand for a colonial 
inimic the moral authority of Christianity is itself called into question by its readiness 
to become party to an oppressive moral regime. 63 
Nlirnicrý, - and stercotN, -pes are just two examples of psychoanalytic concepts 
Bhabha uses that work to complicate our understanding of colonial history. "Sly 
CJVdJt)T 11 
investigates colonial writing in terms of mechanisms of projection and 
paranoia; "Signs Taken for Wonders" brings some of the ideas of colonial fetishism 
and mimicry to bear on the icon of the English book as The symbol of colonial order; 
and "Articulating the Archaic" elaborates on the psychoanalytic notions of itaitation 
and identification to theorize how cultural identity is transformed in the presence of 
cultural difference. Throughout the essays in the first half of the book Bhabha's use 
of psychoanalysis demonstrates and einphasizcs that colonial discourse is not a 
question of truth and hes, malluy and fantasy but a curious combination and crossing 
of both modes of un derstaii ding that make nonsense of the distinction betvveen 
6', It is interesting to comp,, irc this with a non-psycho-analytic reading of the -, vay in which 
libcral cliscour,; c its mvii terms. Scu, for ex, "liple, Melita 59-86. 
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those modes. Psychoanalysts, particularIv Freud's theory' of disavowal and Lacan's 
theories of identification, prove to be the concepts that can best articulate these 
elements together. 
In the last five essays of Tbe Loeýafioli qI'C1,1111,1re Bhabha puts psychoanalysis to 
a slightly different use as he attempts to build and enact an argument about how the 
'time' of the colonial and the migrant in modernity should be represented. Bhabha's 
discussion of time, as already mentioned, has something in common with Nandy's 
discussion but it is more carefully and deliberately elaborated than Nandy's passing 
observation that the non-modern's understanding of time is like the psychoanalytic 
sense of time. Instead of being content to point to other ways of understanding time, 
to be content with relativizing the notion of time, Bhabha wants to trigger "another 
figie of writing that will be able to inscribe the ambivalent and chiasmatic 
intersections of time and place that constitute the problematic 'modern' experience 
of the Western nation" (141). Throughout the essays that follow he displays several 
different ways of understanding this new fime, and the implications it has for 
representing both colonial history and the postcolonial present. 
Bhabha makes it clear from the start of his discussion about time that he is 
not interested in the problematic of nationalism as such, but it is "the historical 
ccrtaintv and settled nature of that term against which I am attempting to write of the 
Western nation" (140). In particular, Bhabha is interested in examining how the 
Western nation is represented as a progressive temporal process, and how the 
ti-Agration of people out of the colonies and their presence in the Western nation is 
posed as a 'problem' within that ternporal process. The "many as one" (142) or the 
notion of coliesive, social collectivities is central to the progressivist representation of 
the nation's time, and as we have alreadv seen, Bhabha questions the demand for 
11gendcr, class, or race as social totalities that are cxprcssive of unitary collective 
experiences" (142). 1n otherwords, probing the x-ays in N-vhich cultural difference 
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interrupts this temporal process is another way of insisting on the need for a more 
complex understanding of the subject's constitution and political -agency. 
Bhabha's psychoanalytic understanding of time has some contentious 
implications for his understanding of agencýT in the colony and our representation of 
acts of rebellion, insurgence and resistance, since he uses it to destabilize our notions 
of rational, intentional actions happening in linear time. Reading a moment in the 
1857 rebellion, in which a e-hapali is mysteriously passed from one village to another 
without any attached message or explanation, Bhabha asks "what kind of agency is 
constituted in the circulation of the chapati? " (200). How we choose to understand 
the meaning of the ehapali (indeed, whether we treat it as an actual happening or 
simply a myth) is not important, writes Bhabha. Instead, we must try to understand 
the time and the speed in which the t'hapali spreads from village to village, as well as 
how the story of the Jwpali spreads among the English and is recirculated in their 
-accounts of the panic and fear that formed part of the 1857 rebellion. One way in 
which Bhabha unpacks this idea is through the psychoanalyst Wilfrid Bion's 
discussion of panic in times of war. Bion proposes that in a group psychosis fear and 
panic become interchangeable so that any given subject in the group has the feeling 
"that he can never catch up with a course of events to which he is alwavs, at any 
given moment, already coninutted" (quoted in Lo(, afion 206). Moreover, according to 
Bion, the event that provokes anger and fear "always falls outside the functions of the 
group" (quoted in lin-ation 206). 
The 'outside' of the group -in-pamc is not to be understood in terms of a 
distinct, separate ,, pace outside, 
but as "constitutive of meaning and agency" (205). 
Bhal: )h, a proposes, for example, that this 'outside' can be understood as the 
experience of the undccidability of the chapati's meaning. In the historian's 
representation of the circulation of the cliap. -itt, the impossibilitý- of fixing the 
meaning of the Jwpali splits tip and dmibles the sLibJect. The panic of the natives 
115 
(who arc themselves passing on the , hapali without clearly fixing its meaning) is one 
part of the event, and the fantastical fears of the colonizer's receiving reports of this 
'rnc-, tnlnglcss' event is another. The panic itself breaks down the possibility of a clear 
distinction between and inside -and outside of discourse; the experience of the J, )apali 
as something between a sign and symbol is a "contingent, borderline experience 
in-between colonizer and colonized. This is a space of cultural and interPretativ, e 
undecidability produced in the 'present' of the colonial moment" (206). 
All this, evcntually, brings us back to the relationship between a 
psychoanalytic understanding of time -and history itsclf. Still writing about the 
borderhne experience, Bhabh-a notes: 
Lacan calls this kind of inside/ out/ outside /in space a moment of exlilvilfý. a 
traumatic moment of the 'not- there'(N, Iorrison) or the indeterminate or the 
unknowable around which the symbolic discourses of human histonr come to 
be constituted. In that sense, then, the extimate moment would be the 
'repetition' of rumour in the seriality of the historical event (1857), the 'speed' 
of panic at the site of rebel politics, or indeed, the temporality of 
psychoanalysis in the writing of history (207). 
By inserting psychoanalytic time into the representation and writing of historNT 
Bhabha is ablc to disclose such e-xtimate moments not only in one single historical 
episode as the circulation of the tl)apali, but In the accounts we have developed of 
modernity itself. Through readings of, for example, Foucault on the birth of 
modcrnitv, and jameson on the 'present' of late capitalism Bh-, ibha demonstrates why 
a more complex understanding of modcrtuty is necessary for contemporary struggles 
against racism. 
Though Bliablia acknowledges Foucault as one of the theorists who has 
shaped his interest in the question of modernity he locates a significant problem in 
Foucault's sflence about colonialism and modcrnltý-. Foucault docs, in Bhabha's 
estimation, manage to xvritc histories without linear causalitý- or whole, all-powcrftll 
subjects, but since lie cannot admit "tlic colonlal Inotnent as an enunciative prescra 
in the historical and epistcrnological condition of Wcstern modernity, Foucault can 
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sav little about the transferct-itial relation between the West and its colonial 
history" 
(196). So while Foucault is able to produce an -account of how Man comes to 
be a 
universal, or dchistoricized, Man he does so at the expense of explaining 
how those 
'others' "women, natjjTCS, the colonized, the indentured and clislaved-who at the 
same time but in other spaces were becoming the peoples without a 
history" (197) 
make the emergence of Man possible. 
Foucault relegates the question of colonialism to another space rather than 
accounting for it in the time of rnodernitý,,. For Bhabha, this absence of the colonial 
time from Foucault's account of modernity is important because it has an echo in the 
way migrants and refugees are figured as a problem in modern, civil socierv. In "How 
Newness Enters the World" Bhabha discloses how an inability to accommodate the 
time of the postcolonial into the -account of the present leads to the ii-npossibihty, 
once again, of accepting migrants and other racialized subjects as historically 
represent-able subjects or as political agents. 
Reading Frederic j ameson's account of the challenges of polifical activism in 
the postmodern world, Bhabha draws attention to Jameson's insistence on the 
category of class as Jameson understands it. Bhabha objects to _Jameson's argument 
that political activism based on race should be "inediated by the primary analytic 
category of class [so that] these communal identities are transformed into agencies 
'capable of interpcllating themselves and dictating the terms of their own specular 
'12, 
(222). For Bhabha, this insistence that migrants and other racialized groups Im, )CS 11 
should enter into political agency through the appropriate space of a cohesive class 
constitution is -a dernand for interpellation that blocks the disruption in modernitys 
time other forms of agency suggest (like, for example, the scei-Mingly intentionless 
circulation of the tl)apafias resistat-icc). L-iflike Jameson, Bliablia does not assume that 
the social group in question must exhibit the characteristic,,; of a class, or indced 
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"have the 'organicist' history and conceptualiq of the discourse of 'class'? " (229) to I 
be effective. 
The effeCtjjTjtAl of this new kInd of pohtical group, based on an experience of 
trugration, racism or something else, II is put into plaý partly through a different 
understanding of time. This is where a psychoanalytic understanding of time 
becomes important to Bhabha's project again because it: 
invests the utterance of the 'present'-its displaced times, its affective 
intcnsities-xvith cultural and political value. Placed in the scenario of the 
unconscious, the 'present' is neither the rmi-netic sign of historical 
contemporancity (the Immediacy of experience), not is it the visible terminus 
of the historical past (the teleology of tradition) (215) 
Tn other words, psvchoan-, ilvsls is able to provide a way of understanding the present 
that has not decided in advance what the outcome will he (teleology) or tiý, to 
contain it to the single, real moment in which things occur. The cultural and political 
value of this kind of present is partly that it continuously allows the future to remain 
undecided. One can understand this best through the psychoanalytic concept of 
nachirdqlicl3keil, a term that describes the process whereby the sub'ect makes sense of Zýl Ii 
things they could not grasp at the moment they were experienced, but made sense of I 
retroactively. As a result of this the past is never fixed. It is placed in a continuous, if 
irregular, loop with the present, and hence always allows for the creation of different 
futures or outcomes. It is not simply the ca se, then, that jameson's demand for class 
forces migrants or postcolonial subjects to enter into the time of modernity on other 
terms; it is also the case that those subjects have a (psychoanalyfic) time that has 
already disrupted the time of modernity. 
lhe colicluding essay in TI)e livall'on ()fCalillre, "Race, 'time' -and the revision 
of modernity" clarifies the significance of Bliabha's problerriatization of the 
postcololilal and the postmodern one last timc. Through his investigation of fetish- 
stcrcotypes, patiic-agctic\- -and the tit-nc of tlic colonial and the migrant in modcrnity 
Bliablia makes clear that we see "racism, not sm-ipty as a hangover fron-i archaic 
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conceptions of aristocracv, but as part of the historical tradition of civic and liberal 
humanism that create ideological matrices or national aspiration, together with their 
64 
concepts of 'a people' and its imagincd community" (250). In such a postmodcrn 
'present' Bhabha wants to emphasi7e that the alm of postcolonial critique is no 
longer to "set up new Symbols of identity, new 'positiv e Limages' that fuel an 
unreflective 'Identity politics"' (247) but to push the critique of modernity already 
available in the history of colonialism still further. This is why his use of 
psychoanalysis does not attempt to provide a postmodern, 'raced' or relativ, ized 
psychoanalysis but a use of psychoanalytic language to disclose and disrupt the 
historical and contemporaneous accounts of modernity. To put it more poignantlý, 
in words Bhabha borrows from a character in Toni Nlorrison's Belolvd, he asks us 
... What is to be done in a world where even when you were a solution you were a 
problem.. (255). The answer is not to accept the location of the postcolonial as a 
problem, but as "an enactment of the limits of the 'idea' of progress, the marginal 
displacement of the ethics of modernity" (255). 
Problems with Bhabha's Psychoanalytic Readings 
In T1, )e Lotalion o'(, ' re psychoanalytic theory . ,/. 
is called upon to perform 
several critical functions. Psychoanalytic texts provide the evidence of Bhabha's 
argument in various ways, psychoanalytic concepts provide a language for describing 
the cultural phenomena and processes at work in the colony and psychoanalytic 
conccptualiZations of time -are used for dcconstructing and reconstructing Western 
histories of modernit-y. In this section I want to examine whether and to what extent 
64 It ,,, -worth observing that Bliablia's articulation of the probIctil of racism ill tllc 
contemporary -,, -orld (the world of 1991 when 11hablia's essay was first pUblishcd) as 
inextricably 
6ound 
up -ývitli modernit-, %'s f, 'ItlLirc to absorb alld acknovAedge its colonial 
litstorv, has noxv been cchoed b\- mativ other scholars \x-riting abOLIt race and vactsm thOLIgh 
it is not an established axiom of postcolonial studies. 
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psychoanalysis fulfils all the critical functions Bhabha assigns to it, and what Bhabha 
neglects in his enthuslasin to put psychoanalvsls to work for postcolontal studies. 
A brief look at how Bhabha cites psychoanalysis sets the scene for a 
discussion of problems in Bhabh-a's methodology. Benita PaM- has obsen-ed that 
Bhabha's text is heavy with "innumerable fleeting allusions to the comments of 
ctifics, writers and thinkers" ("Signs" 7). While this aspect of his writing is a mark of I 
Bh-, ibh-, t's deconstructive style, such allusions and references are sometimes used to 
supply the evidence of Bhabh,, i's -argument. For example, in "Sly CiVifity" Bhabha 
writes "The other's aggressivity from without, that justifies the subject of authority, 
makes that very sub*cct a frontier station of joint occupation, as the psvcho-analyst 
Robert Waelder has written" (100). Robert Waclder was a prominent figure in 
Arnerican psychoanalyfic circles, having begun his career with weekly meetings at 
Freud's home -and eventually taking a period of analysis under Anna Freud. 
Nevertheless, most students and scholars working in postcolonial theorý, do not 
know Waeldcr's work, -and the idea Bhabha cites is from an article on paranoia 
published in 195 1. Since most readers of postcolonial are not hkcly to be familiar 
with Waelder's work it is not entirely clear what the citation is meant to add to our 
understanding of the essay's main theme: namelv, discourses of civility as they exist 
in the conflicted culture of colonialism. Bhabha's use of Waelder's work is incidental, 
and the sentence or paragraph construction suggests that the words "a frontier 
station of occupation" siMply provide us with a compethng linage that ilhistrates 
Bh-abha's point. 
Psychoanalytic texts, then, are a powerful reference point for Bhabha, though 
they do not necessarily translate as such for his postcolonial theory readers. This is 
partly because his maders may not share his convictions about the uses of theor) 
, and psychoanalytic theory specifically. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that gencrafly - 
Bliablii's citations are framed in such a that it is actuallv difficult to determine 
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what it is he means to tell us through the citation. Waelder's words serv, e, more or 
less, as an illustration. Let us look at two more examples. In his discussion of colonial 
stercoq, pes Bhabha writes "For if 'skin' in racist discourse is the visibihty of 
darkness, and a prime signifter of the bodv and its social and cultural correlates, tlicti 
we are bound to remember what Karl Abrahams says in his serrimal work on the 
scopic drlVc" (82). In this citation the connection between the discourse on dark and 
white skin in the colony and Abrahams' theorization of the scopic drive is by no 
means inevitable. Bhabh-a provides the assertion that "we are bound to remember" 
Abrahams work when we theorize why the visual symbohcs of skin mattered m the 
colony. 
The last example we will look at here comes from the essay "Signs Taken for 
Wonders". 6' Discussing the hybridity that accrues to the colonizer's artefacts in the 
colony Bhabha writes, "this partializing process of hybridity is best described as a 
metonymy of presence. It shares Sigmund Frcud's valuable insight into the strategy 
of disavowal as the persistence of the narcissistic dcmand in the acknowledgement of 
difference" (115). The m-, dn issue under discussion in this essay is the emblematic 
'English book', and the way in which the Indian discovery and reception of the 
English book constructs and displaces colonial authority. We are well justified in 
asking, then, what does it mean to say that this process 'shares' an insight with 
Freud's writing about disavowal? To share is a peculiar choice of verb, since it 
prevents us from deciding conclusively whether Freud's point is the ori in-al 91 
'ý' These are not isolated examples of the way 13hablia makes use of psychoanalytic text, "'. In 
"Artictilatin, g the Archaic" as part of his discussion of the terrible silences that recur in 
novels set in the colony, Bhabha concludes with some word,,; frorn Abrahams again. He 
, \vrites, are put in mind of a child, ' the psychoanalyst Karl Abrahams writes, '-who 
catches a flyand having pulled offa leg, lets it go again. ' Thc existence of the disabled native 
is required for the next lie atid the next mid the next and the next-'The I'lorror! The 
f lorror! ' Nfarlovv, You will remember, had to lie is lie moved from the heart of darkness to 
the Bel"lan boudoir. " (138). Like the example of Wacldcr considered above the citatioti of 
Abrahains essentially adds nothing, bUt the accumulative impression is that psychoanalytic 
literature provides Bh-ablia with all the proofs, analogous or otherwise, that he needs to 
explain the processes of colonial cultLirc. 
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description of a scene that occurred earlier in English colonies, or whether there is 
simply a clever, though essentially insignificant, analogy between the phenomena 
Freud describes and the phenomena Bhabha describes. Indeed, these "innumerable 
fleeting allusions" to psychoanalý, sis foreshadow a larger problern in Bliabha's 
deployment of psychoanalvsis, namely, determining the meaning of the 
psychoanalytiC analogy that he consistently draws to our attention. We shall have 
reason to return to this issue later in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, if Bhabha sometimes uses psychoanalysis allusiv ely he also 
giv, cs it two explicit critical tasks. The first of these is to explain the cultural processes 
that produce well-known colonial phenomena such as stereotyping, mni-ncry and 
hvbrjd1ty. Let us examine more closely, then, how he uses the particular concept of 
fetishism. In this study I have a limited scope and so I restrict my discussion to one 
example. However, fetishism is the obvious example, not onlv because it best I 
illustrates some problems with Bhabha's psychoanalytic perspective, but also because 
of its connection with the racializing discourses of anthropology, ethnology and 
comparativ, e rell ious studies. The idea of fetishism, as we shafl see, is an exemplary 91 1 
symbol of Western discourses on race and cultural authority. 
What is most striking about Bhabha's use of the fetish is that he -appears to 
use it as a purely psychoanalytic term. This is a curious narrowing of the concept for 
a scholar so committed to the articulation of multiple historical and social resonances 
. 
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in other contexts As both Robert Young and Anne McClintock remind us fetish is 
actually a terti-i with a longand \-, tried history. "- As early as 1760 the French 
philosopher Charles de Brosse used the term fetishism to describe primitive religions. 
61ý Robert Young defends this tiarro\ving) by suggesting that the fact that Bliablia uses such a 
racialized concept as the fctish to talk about colonial discourse brings the Idea full circle. 
That is, his use of the racialized concept for work committcd to the deconstruction of racist 
thought 'ustifics, his use of the tool (1F'N1e, V)11)o1(), 4es 144). 
McClintock in particular provide,; an ItIStrUCtIVC aCCOLIut Of the history of the fetish in its 
pre-and post-psychoanalytic forms (181-189). McClintock's work derives in laqgc part from 
the , vork of Willimn Pictx, NvInch cxplorcs figm-ations of the fetish that are not I-)IiIIILIS- 
oriented. 
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'Primitive religions' refers, in this context, to those who worshipped inanllntte 
objects believing them to be imbued with spirits or magical properties. About one 
hundred y, ears later Karl Nlarx took up the term "commodity fefish" to refer to the 
magical qualities that appcar to inhere in commodities in industrial economics. Freud 
was one of the last significant theorists to take up the term in 1905 to define a sexual 
condition in which an unlikely object is invested with erotic qualities and must be 
present for sexual relations to take place. McClintock reminds us that all of these 
conceptualizations arc predicated on the idea of the 'pri-mitive' worshipping and 
celebrating an inappropriate object thereby "displacing what the modern imagination 
could not incorporate onto the invented domain of the primitive" (182). 
F, ven in -a strictly psychoanalytic form the fetish is a potentially troubling 
concept. z"thoLigh Bhabha takes Freud at his word about how the fetish works, and 
uses it to explain colonial stereoty es, he does not comment on the terms in which ,p 
Freud sets up this theory. In one of his earliest accounts of fetishism Freud writes 
that the fetish itself, an ob'ect "very inappropriate for sexual purpose, " is "with some 
justice likened to the fetishes in which savages believe their gods are embodied" (66). 
Such comparisons with the 'savage' or the 'primitive' to illustrate aberrant and, an 
equally damning shortcoming in the age of evolutionary theory, archaic behaviours 
are not uncommon in Freud's texts. The term fetish, in both its non-psychoanalytic 
and psychoanalytic forms, bears traces of a racializing discourse that Bhabha does 
not remark on. He puts fetishism back into the colony, but he does not question the 
logic of fetishism itself. 
Problems Nx-Ith the psychoanalytic fc6sh also extend to questions of gender 
and sexuatity, and particularly to questions of female agency. Thc fetish is an object 
that stands in for the mothcr's absent pciiis. Freud proposcs the male child believes 
that, like him, all men and women have pciuscs. The child assumes that cvcrý-one 
looks the way lie does and when he f-inds that this is not the case F'reud al'gLICS that 
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he becomes deeply anxious about the possibility that his own penis could be subject 
to removal. Freud observes "probably no male human being is spared the fright of 
castration at the sight of fcinalc genitaha" (354). This being the case, he proposes that 
the fetish "saves the fe6shist from becoming a homosexual, by endowing women 
with the characteristic which makes them tolerable as sexual objects" (354). In other 
words, if the little boy did not develop a fetish, he might become a homosexual. In a 
Freudian context, then, fetishism does not make room for the possibility of a female 
fetishist, or indeed for the possibilitý- that homosexuality is a viable resolution of 
problems of sexual identification. To theorize otherwise would place the idea of the 
castration complex and phallic symbolism in general in doubt. Bhabha's use of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis does not solve these problems since, Lacan's model appears 
to reinscribe some of the most problematic aspects of the classical theory. 
While Bhabha expressed discomfort with the gendered fetish model in the 
earliest version of "The Other Question" he did not attempt to displace or 
deconstruct it. As McChntock writes, "Bhabha ... footnotes his unease that 'the 
body in this text is male... (183) but nevertheless "defers 'the question of women's 
relation to castration -and access to the symbolic; until he has worked out 'its 
irnplications for colonial discourse"' (415). It is interesting to note that Bhabh-a's 
footnote has disappeared from the version of the essaNý thatappears in The Lot, ýilion q1' 
C-1,111ilre though his use of the fetish model still remains to be modified m terms of 
gender. NIcCItntock clauns "Bhal)h,, t does not concern himself with the possibibq 
that returning the footnoted femate to the bodv of the text might radicallv, throw into 
question the Lacanian theory of phallic fetishism and the scene of castration itself" 
(183). The fetish as it is theorized in psychoanalysis suits Bhabha's piu-pose 
sufficiently to defer the need for a closer investigation of its geridered and racialized 
tern-is. Like N-andv, Bhabha does not consider how wonicia of colour might ldcntlfýv 
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in relation to the colonizer differently than rrien, or how the mcchariism of 
(ruls)Identification he describes mightactually be unavailable to wornen. 
In fact, the problern of the fetish is one feminist scholars continue to struggle 
with, since there has been no consensus on the issue of whether it is even desirable 
to recuperate the psychoanalytic theory of fetishism. From his initial discussion of 
fetishism in 1905 to his Iater, extended discussion in1927 Freud insists it is an 
exclusively masculine problem. Indeed, it is the exemplary problem of masculinity 
since it "rests upon, but also serves to anchor, some of the most controversial 
axioms of psychoanalysis: female castration, male castration anxiety, the Oedipus 
complex and phallocentrism, as well as oculoccntrism, the primacy of the visual" 
(Schor 114). Scholars such as Sarah b, ofman, Emily Apter and Naomi Schor have 
made significant attempts to re-read Freud and the psychoanalytic legacy of 
fetishism, but Schor suggests that a more nuanced historical articulation of 
psychoanalytic fetishism with its -NLlarxist counterpart may provide the most effectiv, c 
way of reading our way out of the gender problems with fetish theory. " 
McClintock is one such scholar who attempts to solve the gender and race 
problems embedded in the fetish by placing it back into a historical context, thereby 
creating a version of the fetish that can be useful specifically for writing postcolofual 
studies. Drawing on the work of Wilham Pletz, she prompts her readers to remember 
that the insistent phallic imagery and organization of the psychoanalytic fetish is not 
the only possible way of making sense of fetishes. The idea of fetishism existed and 
continued for four centuries before its organizing principle was narrowed down to 
(, ' Schor suggests that b', ofman's re-reading of Freud only works by ernpLý-ing psychoanalytic 
fetishism of Its specific CXplanatory power. Since Koft-nan uses deconstructivc theory to re- 
rcad Freud, her work comeý closest to Bliablia's in celebrating and focusing on the 
undccidabihty of the fetish. Indeed, as Schor notes "dcconstruction ... can be said to be the 
supreme contemporary philosophical form of fetishism, in that it promotes the fetishist's, 
undccidability and inad logic to the stanis of a powerful strategy for undoing Western 
metaphysics" (114). Bliablia's interest in fetishism, like Kofman's, may simply be an interest 
in undecidabilitY generally. I le makes veiýv little use of psychomialyttc concepts that do not 
rclate to the problem of undecidable ktiovvledge. 
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the phallus. The term was originally used by the Portuguese to condemn the magical 
practices of its non-Catholic population and as a term to control fernale sexuality. 69 
When the Portuguese began trading with people on the West coast of Africa the 
term developed a colonial meaning in reference to the various 'mysterious' objects 
valued by West Africans. Pletz suggests that in this Portuguese-West African 
encounter two different value systems met -and the question of trading and 
inter-acting on unequal terms became a mutual dilemma. How do you trade or behave 
with people who value different things than you do, or indeed are indifferent to the 
things you value mostP Fetishes were the objects onto which various unresolvable 
questions of value could be projected, and thereby managed. Fetishes were 
meaningless objects to the European that could be traded to the 'primitives' as 
objects of value. McClintock, discussing Pietz's work, notes that the idea of -a highly- 
valued but valueless fetish bccamea central trope of Enlightenment thought, as the 
recurring paradigm for what the Enlightenment was not" (187). 
Such -an account of the fefish has some important advantages for the 
postcolonial scholar. Most obviously, it restores questions of race, class and cultural 
value to the theory of fetishism. As such the fetish becomes an object with multiple 
points of origin or emergence. That is' the emergence of a fetish cannot be reduced 
to one type of theoretical explanation. As -, McChntock suggests "fetishes can be seen 
as the displacement onto -, in object (or person) of contradictions that the mdividual 
cannot resolve at a personal level. These contradictions may originate as social 
contradictions but are hved with profound intensity in the imagination and the flesh" 
(184). The contradiction in question, as Bhabh-, i's work suggests, can be a question of 
race as casih- as It call be a question of scxuallrv or gender. Sil Is -icc her explanatioti 
69 McChntock points out that M the beginnitig the fetish "associated \-, -ttli an of 
illicit female agency over matural and bodily author ty, unfike the Freudian inscription of - 
felishisin as issociated xvith feinalc lack" (186). Fetishism, then, is not sclf-cv1dently 
organized qrOund male authority atid the disavowal of femalc sexualitv on its oWn terins. 
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not restricted to a binal-V, (penis/no penis, dark skin/white skin), McClintock is able 
to offer an explanation of various objects and symbols that emerged during the age 
of Imperialism including "the fetishisms, for example, of national culture: the flags, 
wagons, maps and costumes and triummeries of national spectacle" (192). Most 
importantly, given Fanon, Nandv and Bh,, ibha's difficulties, McClintock is able to 
account for some of the ways Furopean women acted as fetishists of race and 
imperialism, and how women of colour were able to make use of such fetishes in 
their fight against racism and colonialism. 
Fi allv, Bhtl: )ha g" es psychoanalysis in 
. 
IV 
, 
i. the task of solving certain problems in 
Western historiography. Like Nandy, Bh-abha makes use of psychoanalytic 
conceptualiz-ations of time in order to present what are, in his view, more productive 
accounts of events in colonial history than conventional historiographical methods 
are able to provide. One example of this, as we saw in the previous section, is 
Bhabha's use of the notion of deferred action or iiacblrýglichkeil. If Western history is 
written on such foundational conccpts as the hricar progression of th-ne, the past as a 
discrete object from the Present or the future and the rational, intentional actions of 
subjects in time then Bhabha proposes that psYchoanalysis can expose the lies of 
western history. 
However, the western history that Bfiabha opposes with his version of 
psychoanalysis is somewhat selective. Not only -are there few references to 
contemporary historians, there -are relatively few references to philosophers of 
history. ''The histon- that Bliabha comments on and rewrites in his essavs comes 
partly from historical accounts, such as F. Long's 1774 1 11*S/og qI'lawaiCa, The 
Missionag Reois/erfrorn 1818 or Kave and Nlallcsons 1888 1 bs/og ()1'11)e Illdian A1111illy. 
These -accounts of the colonv written bv colonizcrs ccrtalnIN- invite scrutilly and 
Thc notable cxCeptions to this includc Bliablia's rcfereticcs to histortans of India such as 
R, amijit Guha and C. A. Bavl\-, and philasophcný of history such as Nhchcl I, oucakilt ind 
Michel cle Cerce-au. 
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commentary, not only in terms of how they represent the colonized but in terms of 
the theory of history that underpins them. Nevertheless, I would argue that historians 
writing about the colony today have already addressed many of the same issues 
Bhabha writes about and philosophers of history have certamilv debated some of the 
issues Bhabha discusses. To attack Western histories as they are represented in such 
sources, rather than in the wav histories of colonialism are written today is misleading 
and tends to underniine the value of psychoanalysis as a viable solution to the 
problems Bhabha identifies. 
One important example that Nandy and Bhabha both critique is the notion 
of time as Western history understands and represents it. Yet Western historiography 
has long debated the question of the past as something that is neither absolutely of 
the past nor absolutely of the present. 71 Indeed, this is a fundamental question aný 
historian needs to address to orient their work appropriately in terms of ethics, 
method and philosophy of history. Foucault's whole notion of genealogy is 
predicated on the precisely the notion that historians should only write histories of 
the present since to write histories of the past (based on either the notion of progress 
or regress) would be to assume we have progressed to a present that is either 
desirable, inevitable or both. To write history, in the Foucauldian sense, is to 
defamýharize the present we live in-a notion surprisingly close to Nandy's reasons 
for using psychoanalytic time. Still earlier examples of innovations in representing the 
time of history would include the work of Fernand Braudel, whose classic study The 
A lediterranean Vorld and MeA lediten-anean IF'orld in 115e A Thill , ge ()ý 
ý 11 published in 
France in 1949 represented three kinds of historical time in the same work, and the 
work of the Anna/i-School generally whose work was published as early as 1929. 
-1 For some useful gencral cItscussions of the history of histortography and the historiati's 
conceptualization of tin-ic , cc, - or cxqmple, Berkhoffer 106-137 and f lamilton 5-50. 
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Fhe ques6on of history's objectivity and status as a rational sciencc has also 
been discussed by historians since at least 1973 when Hayden White, in his now 
classic study of the great nineteenth-century historians, Alelahh-loiy: Tbe 111', 1-/0/7'('(// 
Ima. oilialioli in NilleleeiiM-Cen1my problernatized the supposed objectivity of western 
historv, as written by historians such as de ToqueviEe, Burkhardt -and Croce. Historv, 
White -argues, is a form that the canonical nineteenth-centurv historians wrote in I 
ironical, comical, satirical or tragic modes and the emplotmcnts that are unplied 11-1 
each of these modes have rhetorical and ideological consequences for the histories 
they represent. 
Bhabh, a does teference one of the most impottant philosophers of histoiý, in 
postcolonial studies: Michel Foucault. Indeed, he acknowledges himself to be very 
much influenced by Foucault's account of modernity and the history of universal 
Man. One reason he turns to psychoanalysis however is because of Foucault's failure 
to account for and include the colonial scene in his genealogies of the modern 
Western subject. Once again, however, though Bhabha uses psychoanalysis to argue 
that colonialism is an inextricable aspect of Western modern1t T, scholars such as Ann 
Stoler and Frederick Cooper have explored the same problem through historical 
studies (Stoler and Cooper 1-58). Stoler finds the same problematic disconnection 
between modernity and the colony in Foucault's work but her 1995 account of child- 
rearing practices in the Dutch East Incbes, Ratw and The T-. dilcalion oj'Oesire, estabfishes, 
through empirical historical research, that the colonial pro)ect was at the same time 
part of the discourse on bourgeois civihty. -ý Stoler's work was published a year later 
than Tbe livalioli and drew on lectures by Foucault that were, at that time, 
only availablc in Frctich. Nevertheless, the point is that while Bliablia's amlyses of 
Ior di, -- t36. -cussion of the historiographical issues this raises see in Parttcular Stolcr 9') 
The tlicoretical frarnework of Race alld I& I "'elm"llioll o/ Oc. o-e dra,, vs on I "OLICatllt", (. ()IIC(IC Cie 
France 1977 lectures. 
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problems in Western history -are convincing psycho-analysiS does not provide the 
cnicial methodology for unpacking these issues. 
To -assert that psychoanalysis is not crucial to Bhabha's critique of Western 
history is not to suggest that there can be no critical or productiv, c rela tionship 
between psychoanalysts and histoný. 74 It is simply to draw attention to the fact that 
psychoanalysis does not necessarily provide the corrective framework to western 
history that Bhabh-a suggests it could be because the history he presents to us is a 
somewhat skewed one. Moreover, as we have seen in this section, given Bhabha's 
generafly uncritical use of psychoanalysis, postcolonial studies needs to reflect on the 
hlstorýy of psychoanalysis as a western knowledge system before we can begin to 
write colonial history in the image of psychoanalysis. 
Questions From Bbabba 
Bhabha's use of psychoanalysis presents subsequent postcolonial theory and 
studies with some problems, and poses some questions for further discussion. By 
passing over the problems other scholars of race and colonialism have with 
psychoanalytic theory and effacing some of the dissenting questions voiced by Fanon 
and Nandv, Bhabha is able to leave psychoanalvtic theorv itself largely intact. In fact, 
in Bhabha's text "the colonial situation often seems to provide new materials to 
illustrate and 'authome' psychoanalytic theory" (Nloore-Gilbert, PoSkolonial 146). In 
other words, he does not simpl), leave the theory intact; he appears to find further 
evidence of its 'truthfulness' in its ability to represent colonial discourse. Young and 
Moore-Gilbcrt both note that in several places the psychoanalytic interpretation 
Bhabha offers does not appear to be specific to colonialismatall. Instead, 
There is, iii fact, a thirty-ycqr-old relationship bct%-vcen history and psychoalialysts'. For 
some instructive commentaries on the possibilities of the cticoutitcr betwccii these 
disciplincs scc, for exampIc, de Ccrtcau 3-34, La Caprq 222-25 1, Dcrricla 227-266. 
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coloniahsin su-nply appears to be aliothcr set of casc-studies that fflustrate the 
structures and concepts of psych oanalysis. 
Young points out that Bhabha secrns unclear "Whether the structures of 
colonial discourse are 'analogous' to those articulated by Freud or whether, as is 
sometimes implied, thev actual1v involved the psychic categories as described by 
Freud" (IVI)ile Atylholýgies 154). It seems urgent, if postcolonial studies Is to make use 
of psychoanalysis, to attend to this question more carefully. In other words, we need 
to pose the question Bhabha never poses: why a Western theory of selfhood would 
provide a language for describing and interpreting colonialism? The modifications 
and critiques that Fanon and Nandy offer seem to suggest that there is no analogy, 
but both seem to accept that psychoanalysis accurately describes European psyches. 
Nevertheless, fermnist critiques of psychoanalysis would seem to suggest that 
Western women can only be described in these terms after some careful theoretical 
re-reading and theorizing. In the casc of fetishism, as we have seen, ferninist 
psychoanalysis has yet to work out how to translate the concept into the experiences 
of women. The question of psychoanalysis' descriptive accuracy is therefore also a 
question for postcoloni-al studies. What precisely is the nature of the convergences 
between psychoanalysis and colonial discourse? In the light of an answer to this 
question, what relationship can there be bet-, vecn psNIchoanaIvsiS and postcolonial 
studiesP 
Young and I\Ioore-Gilbcrt both suggest that one of the most significant 
problems with 13habli-a's psychoanalytic models lies in the fact that he does not 
attcrid to the material, cultural and historical contexts of psychoanalysis and I have 
discussed sonic examples of these omissions in Bliablia's work. However, 
postcolonial studies havc yet to dc\-clop in aily cletail what attending to the colitc--, ýts 
of psychoanalysis this might nican. The solution here, as with suggestions for 
clc\-cloping his textual approach, is to urge Bliablia generally to be more specific and 
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more attentive to the detAs of differential colonial contexts. Does this rnean nan-Ang 
the caste, gender, sexual or racial positions of colonial subjects? We have already seen 
from the example of Nandy's work that this does not solve the problem of 
psychoanalysis in the colony. Does it, then, mean working through how cultural or 
racial difference would disrupt given psychoanalytic structures or does it mean 
locating Bhabha's use of the theory more precisely? Should we envision a version of 
psychoanalytic theory transformed by postcolonial critique or simply some evidence 
that Bhabha has considered the contexts of psychoanalytic thought? 
It is certainly important to situate psychoanalysis in its historical and cultural 
contexts. I agree that Bhabha's use of psychoanalysis is largely uncritical leaving his 
readers with the irnpression that psychoanalysis is a useful but hargely neutral and 
ahistorical theory. Nluch of the compelling work being done by psychoanalyticallý - 
influenced scholars like McClintock has demonstrated what careful attention to the 
history of psychoanalytic thought can produce. In McClintock's case her work has 
produced a serious critique of the sexism written into psychoanalysis together with a 
new model of psychoanalysis sensitive to the IiNes -and experiences of women, 
especially those who lived and worked through the practices of colonialism. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that this cannot by itself -answer the question of 
psychoanalysis' SLIltqblhty for colonial discoursc analysis and postcolonial theorý,. 
Such an approach continucs to assume that the Eurocentric, racist, sexist and 
homophobia tones of psychoanalysis can be removed from the theory without 
radically altering the theory's explanations. 'rhe proposed solutions suggest that 
attention to contexts and details will produce a modified tool more appropriate to 
the study of colonialism, tion-Western peoples and non-Western nations. But -, x-hat if 
consideration and im-cstigation of the racist, sexist and homophobia currents in 
p -cho, sý analysis disrupts the entire theoretical franieworkP If these currents are not 
incidental aspects of psychoanalysis but-filildamelilal to its logic and practices then the 
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usc of psychoanalytic theory as a tool in postcolonial theorv must be entiretv 
reconsidered. Perhaps we should consider the possibility that far from facilitating 
colonial analysis psychoanalysis should becotric an object of postcolonial critique 
itself. 
Young suggests that the answer might lie in the work of Deleuze and 
Guattarl since, according to him, theY arýgue "that psychoanalvsis works in non- 
European cultures, not because of the universalism of the categories of the mind by 
precisely because of colonial history, which has had the effect of imposing Western 
structures" (Uhile Nýylholoýgies 144). It would seem important, then, to take a closer 
look at the work of Deleuze and Guattari, to see whether we call sketch out some 
answers to this problem and the problem of psychoanalytic methods in colonial 
critique. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANTI-DOTE - DELEUZE AND GUATTARI'S CRITIQUE 
OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 
GtHes Delcuzc and 1`6tix Guattarl are best remembered for Anli-Oediplvs, their 
extraordinary critique of psychoanalysis and capitalism. Using their own blend of 
post-structural thcory and original philosophical coriccpts, Delcuze and Guattari 
provided an -account of how the structure of psychoanalytic thought was connected 
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with the material conditions of imperialism and capitalism as early as 1972 . French 
post-structural theorN, has proven to be very important to postcolonial scholars, but 
despite this Deleuze and Guattarl's work has not, until recently, been used to address 
theoretical issues in postcolonial studies. 
The absence of Dcleuzc and Guattarl from postcolonial theory may siMply 
reflect a general difficulty with the work of Dcleuze and Guattarl, often considered 
stylistically impenetrable and so intensely Lransdisciplinary as to be difficult for any 
mdlvidual reader to understand thoroughly. 6 Nevertheless, though their work makes 
rare references to Fanon and precedes the work of Nandy and Bhabha, Deleuze and 
Guattarl are of particular interest to this thesis because they work out a detailed 
critique of psychoanalysis' theory of desire, identification and sub'ectivitv, which thev 
are able to connect to cultures of colonialism. In the remainder of this section, then, 
I will review some of the ways in which Delcuze and Guattati have already been 
called upon to solve problems in postcolonial theory and explore how we can make 
use of those pro)ccts to further this thesis. 
ýInli Oedzýlis was originally published in 1972, but it 1ývas First made avallable in Enghsh 
translation in 1983. 
f lere, I use the Nvord 'transdisciplinaty' nither than the more familiar itucrdisciphnary in 
order to reflect Gwttari's concerti that a scholar may produce itucrdisciplinary work that 
neither challenges their home dlscipltnarý nicthodologics nor the other discipline,,; in which 
lie or she visits. In other words, interdisciplinarily as it is practised today often nicalls 
using the insights of another disciplitic It seldoin nicatis using the methods of that discipline 
to destabilize the methods of ones original discipline. Instead of interdisciplinarity then, 
Guaturi mins at tratisdiscipfinarity, -which is, , -in attempt to combine and cross 
disciplines in 
order to produce "a genuine nictainctliodology that -, vOUld upset existing p011k-Cr/kn",, -, -ledgC 
formations" (Getiosko 25). 
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The most familiar applications of Dcleuze and Guattari's ideas in 
postcolonial studies are with their notion of minor literatures. Although the notion 
of minor literature was not developed in relation to postcolonial literatures 
specificalINI it is hi hIN, relevant for discussion of some of the most important issues I. II ig ,11 
in postcolonial studies, such as the effccti-veness of idenfitv politics, questions of 
authenticity and minority writers' relationships to canonical traditions. Minor 
literatures focus on minor people, a group I)cleuzc and Guattan define as those who 
are not necessarily in the numerical minority, but constitute a minority in relation to 
the majoritv standards such as being male, white, adult and heterosexual. The minor 
people are those who, as orie critic puts it, -are "seeds or crvstals of becoming whose 
is to tri er uncontrollable movements with the mean or the majoritv" rni 99 
ý 
(S 
-U). A minor literature, such as postcolonial literature, can therefore serve as a 
medium for building these 'Minor' identities, but it can also serve as a means for 
accelerating the collapse of majority standards. 
Deleuze was particularly interested in the texts that explore the opening 
between the minor people, themselves in the process of beconimig, and the individual 
writer struggling with a sense of being a unique instance of those not-yet constituted 
people. An obvious example of this could be a writer from an ex-colony who writes 
from inside the postcolonial metropole. The writer has to give expression to his or 
her own voice in the space between their experience of what it means to be a colonial 
sub*ect and the metropolitan barrage of media that has its own story to tell about 
what colonialism means to it as a colonizing nation. It should be clear why the 
concept of minor literature might illuminate literary analyses of postcolonial writing. 
Nevertlicless, as a N-, -holc, those scliolars \,, -Iio have been intercsted in minor literature 
See in p-, irticLil-, tr, )-, iti-, \Ioli,, tiiied and Hovd. Iýor other cxqniplcs of postcolomal applicatiolls 
of the theory of mlnorltý literature see , Ilso Poti/, ancst 599-611 and Sa-, dincy 13()-t46. 
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have had less to say about the critique of psychoanalysis that informs such literature 
than about the ways in the theory could work in postcolotital contexts. 
79 
Robert Young was one of the first scholars to suggest that Anli-Oedipus might 
provide some theoretical tools for breaking through the discursive paradigms that 
have dominated the field of postcolomal studies since the publication of On*enlalislly. 
In C. 'olonial I)e, 4& Young discusses how Deleuze and Guattari Is concepts of desiring- 
machines and territorialization might focus postcolonial scholars' -attention back on 
capitalism and the material violence of acquiring colonial territories, without forcing 
them to lose -a complex theory of desire. Despite the deeply influential psychoanalytic 
theory of unconscious desire, Deleuze and Guattari insist that it is not possible to 
think desire as something individual, and hence separate from the social field. Young 
suggests this theorization of desire might well be adapted for writing about racial and 
colonial desire. Racism, he suggests, is a form of desire that is produced not by 
individuals, but by and through groups; that is, it is a social product as well as a flow 
of desire that does not simply reduce down to an individual's desires. 
Deleuzc and Guattari, asYoung discusses later, take their conceptualization 
of desire as social much further-as far as they can-to the point where it collapses 
psychoanalysis. Although Young clearly understands and sympathizes with the Anli- 
Oedipl, ls critique of psychoanalysis, he does not seem to see the critique itself as 
significant for postcolonial studies but a question for the politics of psychoanalysis, 
and for the West's history of itself. However, from the perspective of the tradition 
we have been e-xarriining in this dissertation, if psýlchoanahýsls is indeed "an 
ideological reterritorialization" (Young, C'Oloni'ýIl Dcsil-e 17 1) then Deleuze and 
Guattari's -, vork could also prove to be useful for turning psychoanalysis into in 
()I))cct of postcoloni-al critique. 
One of the masons L)clcLi/, e and Guattarl valtic minor literatUres is th"It thev cilact, III 
various v, avs, the kind of (Icstabilixation of psychoanalysts descrtbed in 
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Young anticipated that Alifi-Oedipilswould be useful in "decentting colonial 
analysis away from the East towards a more global surface" (Colonial Desire 167), and 
the recent collaboratiVe work, 1`111phv, bv Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri does 
ilidced leave the categories 'colonial'and 'postcolonial' behind in order to Investigate 
the emergence -and operations of what they designate as the globalized 'Empire' we 
are fiving under now. In L-vlpitv, Hardt and Negri pursue an analytic line of thought 
of their own that, despite obvious importance for the field of postcolonial studies, 
does not engage with the major debates that have characterized postcolonial theory 
over the last twenty years. Although L., Nypire draws enthusiastically and frequently 
from Deleuze and Guattarl, the authors do not even suggest that x'Infi-Oedip1vs can or 
should solve any problems in postcolonial theory. Instead, they are interested in 
using Deleuze and Guattari's insights into the production of the social, what they 
describe as "not only the economic or only the cultural dimension of society but 
rather the social bios itself' (25). Like Young, Hardt and Negri are interested in 
Deleuze and Guattari's ability to theorize the social as something that is neither 
material nor cultural, neither individual nor collectively shared but formed and 
produced by the mtcracfion between the tx-vo. 
While Hardt and Negri concede that postcolonial theory may be a useful tool 
for rereading history, they argue that "it is entirely insufficient for theorizing 
contemporary global power.... Empire is not a weak echo of modern imperiahsms 
but a fundamentally new form of rule" (146). To continue to use postcolonial theory, 
thev argue, is to work under the illusion that the new oppressions work in the same 
wav as the old, colonial oppressions. It is in this sense that they speak of postcolonial 
theorý- as a symptom of passage, from the old colonial regimes to the new regimes of 
Flmpirc. Indeed, it is an interesting feature of their analysis that fundamentalism, 
postiriodernism and postcolonialism all figure as sý mptotris of the passage from 
modern sm-crognity (i. e. the mation-statc that hcgaii its risc in the imictcerith cctitury) 
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to imperial sovercignity (t-e. the Fmpire that is described and analysed in their book). 
Though neither Hardt nor Negri are postcolonial critics, they confidently declare the 
end of postcolonial theoty. 'I'lils declaration raises, yet again, two of the most 
contentious issues in postcolonial theory itself. what is or should be the true object 
of postcolonial theory -and is it theoretically aitnless or empty if it has no practical 
answer to the contemporary global formations. 
I am not convinced that we should be so quick to relinquish the postcolonial 
perspective. To begin with, Hardt and Negri's description of the passage from 
imperial to Empire is not conclusive. At the very least, it is not clear that we can train 
out sights onto the emerging political targets and forget about the old colonialisms- 
they are alive and well and rilyriad in their formations. Moreover, I would argue that 
although some scholars seem to believe that only those fields of study that take 
contemporary situations for their objects of study are usefully polifical, the power of 
postcolonial studies lies in its ability to illuminate both the political content of 
apparently non-political fields such as literature, history, or art and to specify how 
those fields have built their cultural authority and continue to wield it. It is in this 
sense that Said's On'eiitalislv can truly be said to be the founding book of postcolonial 
studies. Hardt and Negri suggest that we write theon, in times when "the economist, 
for example, needs -a basic knowledge of cultural production to understand the 
economy, and likewise the cultutal ctitic needs a basic knowledge of economic 
processes to understand culture" (xvi). While I do not disagree with their assessment 
I think this type of interdisciplitiarý awareness is often intel I -pretcd as a tacit 
acknoxvlcdgcmcnt that ý,, -c do not rcally need litcrature or I- istorY except sa 
handmaid to more overtly political studics. I maintain that literan- and historical 
movements such as postcolotual studies or cultural history arc srdl relevant to the 
problem of old colonlahsi-ri and evcti neN,, - iti-ipcrialisms. 
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Peter Flallward's recent book , Ibsollvlýly lloslt: olomal, as the title suggests, is 
firmly cointrutted to the continuing viabitity of a postcolonial analytic. H-all,,,,, ard does 
not agree with Flardt and Negri that postcolonial theory's moment has passed, but, 
like 'Voung, he wants to explore a new frqmework for postcolonial studies and 
cspccially for reading postcolonial fiterature. In his search for -a new paradigm 
I I-allward draws on an interesting range of sources including Islam, Buddhism, 
Deleuze, Guattari and Alain Badiou. -' He is particularly intcrestcd in what he 
describes as singularity, a concept that could be a useful way of breaking through the 
opposition be"veen cultural and material approaches to writing about postcolonial 
texts that Young alludes to. 
Hallward argues that postcolonial studies is preoccupied with the specific 
which he defines in the following way: "The specific ... implies -a situation, a past, an 
inteffigibility constrained by inherited conditions. The specific Is the space of interests 
in relation to other interests ... the specific relates subject to subject and subject to 
other" (5). In other words, the demand to contextuali7C or historlCl7e psychoanalysis 
is -a specific solution. The singular, bv contrast, "is constituent of itself, cxpressiVe of 
itscif, immediate to itself. That the singular creates the mediurn of its existence means 
it is not specific to external criteria or frames of reference" (3). The singular is a 
much more difficult concept to define and to work with, but perhaps, to use the 
sai-ne example, attending closelv, to the phenomena of colonialism rather than reading 
them through the frame of psychoanalysis might be a singular solution. '" In 
particular, reading texts that detail colonial breakdown in its immediacy might tell us 
`1 In the strictest sense f Lillward's book tikes its Icad from Deleuzian nather thall 
Deletize ind Guatuiri's collaborations. NcvcrtheIc., -, s, as many critics -, -, -Iio vvrite about 
Dclewc and GLuittarl note their collaboranve style makes it difficult to decide vvhcre otic 
critic's Nvork begins and the other critic's v, -ork ends. 
ý111 I Lillward's study itself is a detailed examination of hov, four postcolonial novelists, 
I ýdouard Glissant, Charles Johnson, Moliammed DII) and Sevcro Sirduv alm to \"-rtte 
from the specific tovvards the singular. 
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something new -about colonial societies than using psychoanalysis to read colonlal 
historv has been able to tell us thus far. 
For Young, Hardt, Negri and Flallward, Deleuze and Guattarl's theory is a 
means of answering the question: what is the most productive orientation for 
postcolonial studies? This dissertation is concerned with a related, though much 
more specific part of that question; is psychoanalysis a productive theoretical 
'approach for postcolonial theory? Young suggests that Deleuze and Guattari may 
offer us another way to think about desire, and so relieve us of the need to rely on 
psychoanalytic conceptualizations of identity and desires. Hallward suggests that 
Deleuze and Guattari offer us a way to thinkabout colonial phenomena beyond their 
close historical, material or cultural contexts without returning to universality. 
Though neither one of these critics examine Deleuze and Guattari's psychoanalytic 
critique specifically, they establish that Anli-Oedipus has solutions postcolonial 
scholars have yet to consider in detail. In the remainder of this chapter, then, I will 
look at some of the thematic ways Deleuze and Guattari's critique of psychoanalysis 
connects with the theoretical concerns Fanon, Nandy and Bhabha raise, the main 
problems Dele-Lize and Guattari identify with psychoanalysis and how we niýght make 
use of their critique in postcolonial studies. 
Traditions and Contexts L Guattart 
in the previous three chapters we have looked at the ways in which Fanon, 
Nandy and Bhabha successively experimented with psychoanalysis in order to turn it 
into a critical tool for writing about colonial and postcolonial conditions. With 
Delcuze and Guattarl we have f-Acii out of the chronology-or at least we have to 
turn back from Nandy and Bliablia to. -I nli-Oedipll, ý, originally written in 197-2. With 
this in mind I want to discuss son-ic of the contcxt, -, kfi-O(ý&p//s emerges from and 
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how Deleuze and Guattari pursue similar theoretical interests as those theorists we 
have cx-arnined so far. 
blli-Oedipus is sometimes disnassed "as symptomatic of a ccrtain cultural 
moment in which some of the euphoric spirit of the May [19681 events was 
consciously rekindled" (Fleffernan I 10), and in British academia in particular the 
book was for a long time understood as a thoroughly "time-bound intellectual 
phenomenon" (Heffernan 110). To accept this view, however, would be to neglect a 
consideration of how Guattari and Dcleuze's own long-term individual 
psychotherapeutic and philosophical projects came to meet and produce something 
'ects in their first collaborative text. It is partlý in order to that transcended both pro) 11 
contextualize the routes that brought Deleuze and Guattari's work together that I 
consider their work as separate strands in this section and the following section, 
though I do not wish to imply that one can read Anfi-Oediplis as a simple synthesis of 
these two lines, or even that one can distinctly separate Deleuze's contribution from 
Guattari's contribution. 8' In this section I will highlight some of the features of 
Guattarl's project in relation to Fanon, including Guattari's training in materialist 
psvchiatrv, his focus on the concept of desire and his vision of the limits and 
possibilities of a revolution of desire. In the following section I will highlight some 
aspects of Deleuze's coriccpt-philosopliy and its relation to Nand\, and Bhabha's 
theoretical interests. 
In one very direct way, the work of , -Jn1i-Oedip1,1s brings us back to Fanon 
because an important aim of the book was to argue for a materialist psychiatry that 
takes account of the political and social productions that traverse the psychiatrist or 
psychoanalyst, his or her patients and the institutional environment that theN- both 
'ý' Writing of another collaboration, this time between Dcletize and Clarc Panict, Taiusin 
Lorraine notes "\\'c could talk about Dcleuze and Paruct as subjects of distinct historic,,, and 
give an account of hom, - they came together in the \x-riting of this book. But this \-, -()Lild miss 
what for Delcuze is the crucial point: the book grew along lines that cannot be reduced to 
such a history" (187). 
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inhablt., 12 I think it is fair, as Hallward notes, to say that any accusation that Deleuze 
and Guattari disavow materialist concerns is quite ul-ifounded. Hallward asks: "How 
can we read Deleuxe and Guattarl in terms of an end to the social when then they 
argue for the wlpmdialýly social investment of even the most private desireP Or as 
priv, i1cging representation, when thev do nothing but denounce ltP- (43). Anli- 
Oediplvs, however dense and stylisficaUy unique, creates concepts with which to bring 
psychoanalysts and psychiatry face to face with macro-level and micro-level social 
conflicts. 
Guattarl worked at the interface between mental health issues -and politics 
from a ven- early age. By the time he was twentv, in 1950, he had alreadNT met the 
psychiatrist jean Oury who would found the famous La Borde clinic three years later. 
In the same year -as the clinic opened, Guattarl met Lacan and became deeply 
thcoretiCall T influenced by him. 'ý' By 1962 Guattarl was in training with Lacan, and by 
1969 he was an analyst with the Ecole Freudienne Psychoanalytique. Lacan and Oury 
are both legendary figures in the French psychoanalytical scene, and Guattarl's 
working experience with both men clearly contributed to his ability to produce a 
rigorous, immanent critique of psychoanalysis. 
Guattarl's connection to Oury is interesting from another perspective. Oury 
was a psychiatrist trained under Ftanýois'l'osqueUcs at Saint Alban, the inan who was 
11 one of the most significant influences on the young Fanon" (Nlacey 141). 
Tosquelles was known as 'the red psychiatrist', a inan who had -also combined an 
interest in lcft-Nving pofitics with an interest in psychiatry from a young age. 
Young also finds similarities betv. -cen Fition's -, vork ind Delcuze and Guattari's Nvork. I le 
suggests that all three authors bring a material consideration of sp,, -tcc back to the centre of 
colonial analysis. See Young, (. 01onial Oesllv 166- 174. 
GLIOttari scholar Gary Genosko points out that despite scriOLIS misgivings about Lacall's 
dicorics, Guattart maintained his nicnibership of the ITI) until the end of his career. 
Gcnosko also observes "jGuqttart'sj attacliment was so great during his student years ,, it the 
Sorbontic tliqt his friends mockingly called hill, Tacan. Despite ]ms criticism of Lacan and 
tructimallst method, Guattart remained an Anak-ste membre, lioping, that something v, -ould ss 
art, sc to challenge the technical clitism and reactionary flicorizing" (I 11). 
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Unfortunately for the history of critical psychoanalysis, Oury and Fanon did not 
work at S-aint-Alb-an at the same time. Oury was there from 1947 to 1949, -and Fanon 
spent two years there from 1951 to 1953 -as Tosquefles' houseman. Despite this, 
Fanon aild Guattan's work can be read respectively as individual varlatlons on the 
themes that TosqueUes and OurNll brought to the forefront of French psychiatry in 
the years that followed. Macey notes that Fanon's mentorship under Tosquelles 
brought him in contact with "the most progressiv, e current within French psychiatry" 
(141) not least because it cxposed him to T, acan's work. 84 
F-anon -and Guattari are partly connected, then, by their inheritance of the 
discussions around the politics of the psycbiatric and psychotherapeutic institutions 
initiated bvTosquelles. Macey makes the connection to Guattarl in his biographical 
study of Fanon and indeed uses Guattarl's words to describe what the TosqueUes- 
Oury school of psycho-therapeutic reform Might be said to aim at: "Its main 
characteristic is a determination never to isolate the study of mental illness from its 
social -and institutional context, and, bv the same token, to analvse institutions on the 
basis of interpreting the real, syMbolic and ima effects of socievy upon 
individuals" (150). This definition could as easily be a description of Fanon's attempt 
to reveal psychiatric hospitals' implication in colonialism, as Guattari's attempt to 
rcve-al psvchotherapeutic institutions' implication in capitalism. 
In chapter one we saw how Fanon eventually came to the conclusion that he 
could no longer occupy his position as chief psychiatrist since the colonial mental 
health institution was an instrument of the "absolute depersonalisation" ("Letter" 53) 
of Algcrians. Fation repeatedly draws attention to the doctor's obligation to look at 
the world outsidc his consultnig offtce and to constdcr his or licr paticnts in relation 
to the Nvorld in which they cxperiericed their mental crises. In describing his own 
"4 Geiiosko also offers a brief account of thc theoretical and clMical ItmovqtIons that 
cic\-Clol-)Ccl a ill otlý-)' TOSQJ LICIICS, OWN- and dicir students and colleagues. See Getlosko, 6- 12. 
143 
revolutionary scheme for the psvchotlicrapcutic clinic, transversalitv, Guattari makes 
an almost identical point. He writes: "Psychiatrists who run mental institutions suffer 
from a disjunction between their concern for those in their care and more general 
social problems that shows itsclf in various ways: a, qs1c11ya1ic'fiii11,1re lo unders-land Whal is 
, gohý( ) on oulside 
lbe 1)o, spital xallT (11). For both men mental health and mental health 
instittifions were an inseparable element of any pohtical discussion or, indeed, anv, 
political solution. 
For both Guattan and Fanon, a primary task for transforming society and 
achieving the political al-ms of the rcvolutionary group-whether it is a group of 
patients in a clinic or a group of anti-colonial resistance fighters-is to be able to see 
one's desires clearly. Guattari puts it this way, "the demand for revolution ... is 
directed equally to taking account of desire" (43). Guattari, is we shall see when we 
turn to the . 1l1zli-Oedzpu3-, is concerned with removing the mediating processes that 
stand between our desires and ourselves, and he does not conceive of desire in the 
priVate, phenomenological terms that Fanon sometimes relied on. Guattarl is 
interested in the individual's desires too, but for Guattari, the more vital question is 
"can the group at once pursue its economic and social objectives while -allowing 
individuals to maintain their own access to desireý" (41). He is not interested in the 
individual's desires as much as he is interested in examining the structures and 
practices that seek to interpret any minority group's desires back to them. So, for 
example, where f, anon devises an ingenious rereading of Hegel and Sartre to theorize 
in philosophical and political terms 'what the black man wants', Guattarl tries to limit 
hi's discussion of desire to practices, structures and concepts that will enable 
minorities to theorlzc and rccogtilzc tlicir desirc for thernselvcs. 
Despite the importance of desire to both Fanon and Guattarl's revolutionary 
atti-is, one of the most important differences between them is the way in which they 
conceptualize how the group will learn to genuinely recognize its own desires. Fanon 
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'argues, as we saw earlier, that desire will be recovered when the screen of colonialism 
(or simply institutionalization) is removed ftom before the subject's eyes. He never 
implies that the struggle to remove the screen and recover desire will be easv, but 
neither does he investigate the ways in which desire is captured in mote subtle ways, 
such as our very reliance on psychoanalytic theory. For example, Fanon, in a partly 
plavful gesture, saýls there is no Oedipus complex in the An6fles. Guattari, by 
contrast, estimates that there is Oedipus evervwhere, and that it will not be easv- to 
leave the comforting embrace of the Oedi us. " Fanon picks from psychoanalysis ip 
what he hkes and discards what he has no use for, and in any case he famously 
'stretches' concepts to cover his own -analvsls. Guattarl presumes the need for a more 
thorough, engagement with psychoanalysis. He begins his work from the premise 
that he must be inside psychoanalysis to effect its collapse. He does not simply try to 
shake off Oedipus' company, but tries to outwit Oedipus at his own game. 
As we saw in chapter one, some scholars have suggested that Fanon was not 
able to recognize the extent to which mental health sciences were complicit with 
colonial ideology, a position that marks him off from Guattari who was at times 
willing to be more sweeping in his condemnation of the psychotherapeutic 
institution. It is certainly debatable to what degree we can discuss either Guattari or 
Fanon's work as a rejection, reform or revolution in the field of psychotherapy. 
Guattarl confirms Fation's analysis that psychiatrists or psychoanalNsts cannot do 
their work in isolation from social or political contexts, and even confirms that 
PSýTchotherapeutic institutions are colonial instruments. He goes further than Fanon, 
however, in insisting oil the conliections between the theory of psychoanalysis and 
ý, '5 This is evidenced not ýust by the theoretical positions Guattari takes, as \vc shall see in the 
next section, but in his complex position is , in activist in anti-anti-psychiatrIv campaigns. I fe 
\vrote, of R. D. Latng: "I le has broken down the \valls of the hospital, but one gets the 
impres, sion that lie remains the prisoner of other walls still standing within himself; lie has 
not yet managed to free himself of the worst constraint, the rnost dangerous of all double 
binds, that of ýxhat Robert Castel has called its obsession with 
significant interprctation. its false-bottomed representation and shallow depths" (53). 
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the colonial order of things and refusing to use psychoanalysis as a interpretive frame 
according to its rules. Guattari condernns psychoanalytic theory precisely and 
repeatedlv in these terms: "how AlLisory it is to seek to rediscover sheer, unmixed 
desire by setting off to find knots buried in the unconscious or hidden clues of 
interpretation. There is no ma ical effect wherebý, the transference can disentangle 91 
the real 11`11cro-polifical conflicts that imprison people, no mysterv, no other world 
behind this one. There is nothing to rediscover in the unconscious" (57). So, if 
Fanon tries to reveal the presence of racist myths in the unconscious of the black 
man, Guattari insists that the unconscious itself is an illusory concept whose 
authority we should challenge. 
Tra ditions qn d Con texts 2. Dele uze 
Since it is not possible to do justice to the range and complexity of Deleuze's 
philosophical project in diis chapter, much less a section of this chapter, I present 
here only those aspects of Deleuzc's work, such as his interventions in identity 
politics and his pursuit of non-representational modes of thought, that underline and 
anticipate some of Bhabha's most important contributions to postcolonial theory. 
"6 
Though Deleuze is one of the few French posts tructuralist critics Bhabha does not 
cite, they share some ideas about how identity can and should be used in political 
struggles against oppression. I want to underline, however, that although they share 
certain convictions they do not agree on the value of psychoanalysis as a critical 
language for understanding colonialism. 
116 Todd May defines non-rcl)rcsentatiomalism, or antirepresentationalism -as he refers to it, in 
the following xvay: "the principle that, 'representing others to dicniselves-cither in who 
they are or in wliat they -, vatit-oLight, I,,, inuch -, I,, possible to be avoided"' (13). May's 
c1cfinition is a good starting point t- or our discussioti, even though In,.; study of the moral 
theory of poststructuralism I,,, specifically concerned xvith people's -actions. In this sense, 
psychoanalysis Is -, in exemplary form of representationalist thought because it purports to tell 
people -, x-hat their unconscious dcsircs are and alin at. Nevertheless, M the wider sense, 
Dclcuzc Is arguing against all theories diat represent a person or -I thing to others or to 
theinsclves including, for example, Incrary theory that attempts to represent -, I book rather 
than InImbir it, and understand it on its o'ývti terms. 
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Deleuzc was trained in philosophy under Georges Canguihelm and_) can 
Hyppolite, and taught in philosophy departments until his retirement. He wrote 
several monographs on individual philosophers including studies of Bergson, Hume, 
Kant, Nietzsche and Spinoza before he began his collaboration with Guattari. 
Despite the apparently non -philosophical form of works like Anli-Oedipils and his 
studies of cineina, Deleuze's work was alwaN-s concerned with working out what 
Dorothea Olkowski has called the ruin of representation or, in other words, creating 
philosophical concepts that help us to think in ways we have never thought before. 
One way we might understand Deleuze's work is that he brought an 
alternative to the Platonic tradition of representational thought in Western 
philosophy up to the surface and tried to carry its movement forward. Dcleuzc 
repeatedly represented his own project as anfi-Platonic. Indeed, Nlichael Hardt notes 
that he had a tendency to "exaggerate the centrality -and hegemony of 'State 
87 
philosophy' in the history of western thought" (124). Hardt points out that 
although Deleuze, and Derrida too, aim their projects against the philosopl-Lical 
tradition they in no way abandon philosophy. In Deleuze's case, although he chooses 
to develop the work of minority philosophers such as Spinoza or Duns Scotus, this 
minority tradition, according to Hardt, still "constitutes some of the highest and 
most central moments of Western metaphysics" (124). Whatever one's view of 
Deleuze's philosophical project, one can appreciate immediately what drew Deleuze 
to Guattari; Guattari as a Lacanian anti-psychoanalyst was a perfect complement to 
Dcleuze the philosophical antagonist of representationalist thought. 
Perhaps the most obvious stmilarltýl between Dclcuzc and Bhabha is the 
distinctive, dense st\-Ic in which botli theorists present their work. Deleuze, like 
Bh-abha, tries to develop a politico-philosoplucal discourse that does not sit-npt. \- 
, I- Deleuxc used the term 'staic philosophy' to refer to the tradition M \\'csterii philosophy 
that prt%-tlcges rcprcscntýitional modcs ot' thought. 
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reproduce in words a fully-formed world but puts the reader through the experience 
of the becoming of the critical discourse. In the simplest sense, one might sav that 
Deleuze takes style seriously as an element of his theoretical argument. Eugene 
Holland suggests that it is a hallmark of any postmodcrn theories that it should 
"allegorically display or enact the very objects and processes it describes ... whatever 
meanings it may ernit do not precede language that expresses them ... but rather 
spring from the play of the language itself" ("Anti-Ocd1pus" 291). Nevertheless, 
unlike Bhabha, Deleuze remembers that language is only one of many sign-systems 
and refuses to privilege it. Both Deleuze and Guatt-ari warn against the teridency to 
neglect "ethological, ecological, scmiotic, economic, aesthetic, corporeal, and 
fantasmatic elements and serniotics through the reduction of all sign systems to a 
sen-liology of language" (Olkowski 213). " 
Deleuze's first major philosophical work that was not a stud)7 of another 
philosopher's work was Dýgýrence and Repelition. " An itiv, estigation of differcnce-in- 
itself, the book presented an important reversal that has become almost axiomatic to 
poststructural theories generally. It was in this book that Deleuze argued against the 
accepted notion that identity precedes difference, and insisted that difference and 
multiplicity are in fact the primary categories of ontology and identity, a sccondarý, 
category. It follows from this that repetition is never mere mechanical production 
from the original, but a recrcation-a thing of its own-with difference from itself. 
13habha also depends upon such a model of difference (one he describes in terms of 
cultural difference versus cultural diversity) to establish the terms of his pro'ect in 
Lwafion ý1'C111111ie. "' Like Bhablia Delcuze wants to affirm the positive aspects of 
III Ills discussion of Delcu/c's -, x-ork, I fall-, vard also notcs how differently Dclcti/c and 
Blublia treit the question of language. I I-allward clearly filid'; I)clcLlze"; NVork more 
productivc for postcolonial theory than Bliablia's, siticc -more than any otlicr -, X-ritcr in the 
field, Bliablia scem-, to have trouble remernbering Braithwaitc's simple point-that 'it is not 
language but pcoplc -ývlio rnakc revolutions" (27). 
Oill"ll-clice a//d Repefilioll was origimilly published in French ill 1968. 
Scc Bimbliq Localion 33-39. 
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difference; that it produces ideas, that It divcrsifies and that difference makes the 
, substance of ail idea or an identity rather than negating it. 
It was on the basis of these arguments about difference that Deleuzc resistcd 
the political lure of identity politics. In fact, Delcuze insisted upon his right to speak 
of drugs or hornosexuahty without e\, er having been stoned or having slept with a 
man in order to oppose the 'evidence of experience' to borrow joan Scott's phrase. 
" 
Tbe Lj)týalion y'ClIllure is founded on a similar theoretical commitment. Bhabha also 
insists that the time has come to be released from the polifical burden of speaking 
'as' black, or speaking 'as' a lesbian and he notes that "the representation of 
difference must not be hastily read as the reflection of pre-give ethnic or cultural 
traits set in the fixed tablet of tradition. The social articulation of difference, from the 
minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize 
cultural hybridities" (Localion 2). For Bhabha, as for Deleuze, the rniinority is always in 
the process of becoming, however differently these two critics envisage that process 
of becoming. The minority's identity is always a negotiation and a struggle to secure 
authority but not to be trapped by it. Like Bhabha, Deleuze rejects Nandy's argument 
that traditions may be creatively renewed and redeployed for anti-colomal ends since, 
inevitably, these traditions are the expression of a particular religious perspectiv, e and 
do not function as genuinely democratic forms. Dcleuze recognizes that even as we 
insist on the right to speak we must ask "how can we manage to speak without giving 
orders" Jiuchanan 5). Bhal: )h-, i explores the other side of the same question when he 
ýbodv asks, if we cannot rcINI on am 's access to whole, authentic cultural tradition to 
give them the right to speak, how does cultural authority constitute itself? 
,,, , Fhe gcnder lilstorlanjoan W. Scott has made a powerful argument for the importance of 
clucstioning experience as a catcgory for history, mid especially 
for historic,,, that presume to 
'rescue' minority subjects by providing them -, vith a new voice. She that "N-, -h, -It counts 
as experience is nelther self-evidctit nor straightfonvard, it is always contested, and always 
therefore political" (412). Though Scott ObVIOLISIV -,, -orks froin a dif tci-cii t perspective than 
Dclcu/ýe qtid Guattm, she -wants to turn history into a gcminiely nonfoundational discipline. 
, 
She suggests that this vvill serve -w-omen, gays or people of colour better than any experience- 
based theories c,, in. 
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Nevertheless, Delcuze develops the notions of difference and identity on 
different terms that his contemporaries Derridaand L-acan, and hence on different 
terms than Bh-, Ll)ha. 92 Where Derrida and Lacan focus their critical attention on 
linguistic models and textual methods, Deleu7e is not content to limit his Inalyscs to 
the textual manifestations of difference-in-itself. In his early works, before the 
collaboration with Guattari, Deleuze was already experimenting with the ways his 
understanding of difference might change how we represent and understand bodies, 
such as the body-without-organs, or how it might lead to a new kind of minority 
politics. Anfi-Oedipits itself is, -as I have already noted, an argument for a materialist 
psychiatry that is based, at least in part, on the theory of difference that Dclcuze had 
already worked out. 
At the same time Deleuze is not uninterested in signs, includinLy language. In 
fact, he develops a unique way of reading signs that is especially interesting for this 
study because it brings an unusual intersection of psychiatry and literature into focus. 
Dcleuze, though not -a literary critic, was deeply interested in literature and in 
particular what he called his 'critique et clinique' project. The terms of this pro)ect 
were to read literature as a document of health rather than neuroses, in which writers 
diagnosed -and even composed clinical syndromes before psychiatrists or other 
doctors had recognized them. 93 It is this project that feeds Mto the anfi- 
psychoanalysis critique in llnli-Oediplis because a principal feature of psychoanalysis 
for Deleuze is its utter failure as a symptomatology, that is its failure to read the 
world, or to recognize the signs that, for example, writers read and write about so 
1), For a useful account of Delctize and Guattari's critt(lue of Freud in comparison %-, -lth 
Lacan's critique see I lolland "Anti-Occlipus" 291-307. 
Deleuxe argued that instead of reading 
literature for sigms of neurosis, in the -way that 
I reud reads literature for signs of the syndromes he writes about, xvc should read literature as 
a creative sviTiptomatology that identifies the cluster of sYmptorns that could 
be used as the 
criteria for diagnositig syndromes. For Dcletize the Nx-rttcr is potentially a MUCII better 
diagnostician than the psychiatrist since lie or she is not concerned to fit v. -hat lie or she sees 
into prearranged syniptomatological channels and ol)sct\-cs his or her sLil)jccts on their oN',, n 
terms. 
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insightfi-itly in their creative works. As we shall see, Deleuze came to see 
psychoanalysis as a particularly threatening form of representational thinking and 
sought to break up the supposedlýT natural affiliations between psychoanalysis and 
literature. 
Indeed, in many ways Deleuze's approach brings us back to fiterature. 
Dcleuze was committed to reading literature on its own terms and hterature as 
theory-in-itsclf rather than, as much of the recent postcolonial approach to literature 
has been, reading it as a reflection of its historical or economic contingencies. 
Despite this, as Young and Hallward both point out, Deleuze always insists on 
treating literature as embedded in social relations, and so in no way attempts to write 
about literature as divorced from the terms of its production. It is strange to suggest 
that a philosopher might bring us closer to literature than a literary critic, but perhaps 
at a fime when theory crosses disciplinary lines it is not so uncommon to find that 
another discipline's methods have something to renew our home disc pline. Perhaps, 
as Colombat suggests, philosophy and literature come together in Dcleuze's thought 
because "the concept of representation is alway's the main target of the power of 
demystification in thought, in literature, in philosophy" (202). Delcuze is definitely of 
interest to us because he relies heavily oil readings of literature, privileges difference 
over identity, -and develops a sophisticated theory of writing-as-bccorning, all while 
refusing to privilege the heavily textual terms of deconstruction and psychoanalysis. 
Reading Anti-Ocdipus forPostcolonial Studies 
What does it mean to be anti-0edipus, According to Deleuze and Guattart it 
means to oppose the social, politicaland historical formations, such as capitalism or 
psychoanah-sis, that trap desire into fixed and monotonous forms. They theorize that 
destring-t-nachilics produce and thcsc productions immediatcly unfold into the social 
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field without having to pass through any mediating structures. In their own words 
they declare: 
The schizoanalv6c -argument is simple: desire is a machine, a svnthesis of 
niachines, a iiiachinic-arrangement-desirit-ig-machines. The order of desire 
is the order of production; all production is at once desLring-production and 
social produc6on. We therefore reproach psychoanalysis for having s6fled 
this order of production, for having shunted it into representation (Anfi- 
Oedipas 296) 
, diiii-0edipl, if outlines a practice, what they term a schl7oanalvsls, that reveals 
how 
desire gets trapped in structures like the Oedipus, and how we might release 
oursclv es from our attachment to Oedipus. 94 Tt is in this sense that Foucault's preface 
describes Anti-0edip1j, as a book of ethics, a guide to living in such a way that we do 
not choose or yearn for the enslavement of our own desires. 
Anfi-Oedipus forcgrounds desire as an important factor in any social, historical 
or political analysis, -and we can see immediately from this why Young has suggested 
that Deleuze and Guattari might be a useful theoretical resource for postcolonial 
studies. The desiring-machines that they describe in the book are a crucial concept 
for connecting the social to desire, without having to take any detours through 
"mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation, [or] transformation" (29). 
Nevertheless, they also recognize that in order to make their position more tenable 
the), have to expose the workings of the donunant svstem for interpreting and 
understanding desire in Western society, narnely psychoanalysis. The major aiin of 
the anti-Oedipal critique is to insist that psychoanalysis is not the only language or 
hermeneutic for speaking about desire, and that its representation of desire is a 
1 1cffernan offers the follmvirig distinction betvvecti schizophrenia -is it figures in Alifi- 
Oed1pil,,, and as the mental illness are famillar -with: ... ()tjr' capitalist schizophrenics 
represent the fallure of reVOILItionary destre, its capture and organization into the form of 
illness. What is required is rather the activation of sclitzophrenia as a process" (125). 
1 Ictfernan acknovTledges that despite this the schizophrenic seems to retain a certain 
revoluti(mary character as a result of his or her experience of mental illness. It is also worth 
noting that the schizophrenic, and schizoanalysis generilly are not given any special attention 
in the second volume of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
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patticularly debilitating one-a representation that colludes, in particular, with 
capitalisin. 
Before we look more closely at the anti-Ocd1pal critique it is important to 
note that Deleuze and Guattart do not reject psychoanalysis in absolute terms. 
Although they e-xpose the most reactionary preirnses of Freudian thinking thcý 
recognize that all theories are composed of reactionarv, revolutionarv and reformist 
parts so there is no need to "play 'take it or leave it' under the pretext that theory 
justifies practice" (117). We can understand this in the straightforward sense that 
psychoanalysis may contain some revolutionaty elements and we mav still choose, as 
Nandv does, to use psychoanalysis oiilv insofar as it is critical. On the other hand, it 
is also possible that Delcuze and Guattarl seek to rernind us that we are not able to 
play take it or leave with psychoanalysis. In other words, like R. D. Laing, we may, be 
subject to oedipalization when we least expect it and therefore cannot afford to take 
such -a casual attitude to this deeply influential theory. " For Delcuze and Guattarl, 
there is no question of simply, trying to ignore psychoanalysis. 
Indeed, they go so far as to retain some -aspects of psychoanalysis. Although 
the attack on the Oedipus complex itself appears to demolish a cornerstone of 
psychoanalytic thinking, they are careful to note that "we do not deny that there is 'an 
Oedipal sexualitv, all Oedipal heterosexuaht-v and homosexuality, an Oedipal 
castration ... We deny that these are productions of the unconscious" (74). Rather 
than suggesting that certain relationships, desires and conflicts do not exist they insist 
only that they do not Iiinit therrisch-cs to the interpretations psychoanalysis offers of 
these phenomena. They refuse to take Ocdipal signs for something more significant 
or complex than productions of (Acsiring-i-nachines. "' 
See Guattari 53 for his critique of Lung. 
l, or Dclcuze arid Guattarl K,, ifla -, vas 'a kc\- litcrarv mocid strice his Nvorks create lines of 
thdif out or the Ocdlrm, ý. dicy ýIcl ýIlo-vdcd""c Ills [Ise of Oedipal thellics tlicy 
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Indeed, Dclcuze and Guattari cNen give psychoanalysis credit for recognizing 
some important aspects of their argument though they also charge it with not taking 
those recognitions far enough. Psychoanalysis, they agree, hwhlights how irnportant 
desire, sexual energy without procreative ends and associative chains of unconscious 
thought are. In some sense, -A lifi-Oediplls is even an attempt to return to the basic 
discoveries of psychoanalysis and prise them loose of "the restricted code of 
Oedipus" (47). It is at the sarne time, however, an attempt to reach much further 
than psychoanalysis, since breaking the Oedipal code will finally allow us to live 
"beyond the father's law, beyond law, Ithis] is perhaps the most essential possibility 
brought forth by Freudian psychoanalysis" (s 1 ). 97 
Anfi-Oedipus, then, makes use of psychoanalytic thinking to present its 
argument. The critique of Oedipus owes a great deal to a careful reading of Lacan's 
reworking of the Oedipal complex and Melanie Klelll's theory of partial objects, as 
well as close readings of Freud's texts. Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari accept the 
le itimacy and potential of certain psychoanalytic techniques. For example, they are 91 1 
very interested in free association insofar as it allows subjects to express their desires 
in a form that is not chained to sense or lo ic, but they reject the psychoanalytic 91 
attempt to channel those desires into the pre-approved symbols where, as Holland 
puts it, "every woman is the mother, every aggression a parricide, anything concave 
or hollow a symbol of feminine lack, anything longer than it is wide a phallic symbol" 
(Alifi-Oediplis, 45). 
Deleuzc and Guattari's theoretical engagement with psychoanalysis, c%-en as 
they attempt to explode that theoretical structure, raises a set of questions that we 
sug est that a reading of Kafka's texts, on their ox, -n terms that Oedipal themes are ,, g 
accelerated or cxaggerated so that ti the end they appear divcsted of their aUthorit, I 
In Dcleu/c ind G, Liattan conclude that this rc,, -olLitiotiqr\, possibilltv Is bothy 
rc, -tli/, cd to a much greater degrce outside psychoanalysis than inside psychoanalysis, and they 
cite an , irtlclc enutled "The 
Murder of Father 1'reud" -as co. -iolctice. We might consider the 
con (roversv surrounding .1 
cffrc\, Masson's '/ Y)e , 
Is-i'all// 0/1 '671/b Alld Todd Dufresnes Kzlllli,,, 
. 
/dqs contemporary attempts to 
do the sanic. 
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might want to consider from the perspectiVc of postcoloni-al studies: To what degree 
can we maintain a partial or critical engagement with psychoanalysis? At what point 
have we modified the theory so heavily that we can no longer say we are making use 
of psychoanalysis' On what terms can we really use psychoanalysis for our own 
theoretical ends, and when is it using us? This last question is particularly important 
for postcolonial scholarship, -and I will address it in the final chapter. Deleuze and 
Guattari's critique appears rather damning, but their critique does not preclude a 
certain kind of engagement with psychoanalytic theory. The question, for them and 
for postcolonial studies, is what kind of engagement is theoreticafly productive from 
the perspectiVe of our discipline. In the what remains of this section, then, I will 
discuss how the five main objections that Anfi-Oedipus raises to psychoanalyfic 
thinking including the problem of prohibition--as-destre; the connection between 
psychic repression and social repression; identity as a system of binaries; and the 
social realm as a case for applied psychoanalysis nught help us reconceptualize the 
role of psychoanalysis in postcolonial theory. " 
The first problem Deleuze and Guatt-ari identify, a problem that arches over 
the f6flowing four objections, is that psychoanalysis fund-aincntallv misrecognizes 
and subsequently Misrepresents desire. While this is true in the general sense that 
psychoanalysis poses its theories as a mediating structure between our desires and us, 
it is also true in the particular sense that Deleuzc and Guattari describe below: 
we have a triangulation that implies in its essence a constituent prohibition, 
and that conditions the differentiation between persons: prohibition of incest 
with the mother, prohibition against taking the father's place. But a strange 
,I-, -, -ould like to note, for the reader's clarification, that although I present here four of the 
inah explain them, I do not present Five paralogisms of psycho-, -si-, 11 Delcuzc and Guatt ri 
them in the order or under the'titles that Dcleu/c and Guattan use. 111 hts its partly because I 
wish to emphasize certain aspects of their criti(ILIC -, 111d haVC not CliSCUc, , Cd -, x-hat -would 
tindoubtedlY be, for them, vttal aspects of tiletr comnicntan- (for example, their reading of 
1', ýlcin's theory of partial ob)ects) and partly because the Dcleuze and GUattari stvIe of xvriting 
is ingeniously composed so that elements of the theme return again and again in variations 
without being nacre repetitions. It is impossible to do justice to the subtlery of this writing 
stdc, so I h,. we elected simply to present the objections in a more linear nianner that SL11tS 111ý- 
thunutic interest,,,. 
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sort of reasoning leads one to conclude since it is forbidden, thal reg thiq was 
desired (70). 
In other words, according to the psychoanalytic scheme we only realize Oedipus is 
our desire at the same moment wlicti we reali7e we can never fulfil that desire. Desire 
is the thing that csc-apes us. Nawrafly, giv, en their commitment to non- 
represelitationalist thought Deleuze and Guattarl object to this conceptuallZation of 
desire -as something that only becomes visible, or articulated, at the moment when it 
is displaced because it is located in the theoretical framework as the 'invisible' or 
lacking thing. They object to psychoanalysis' failure to understand that the 
prohibition of a desire is not desire itself-that lack or incompletion is not the 
defining feature of desire. For thern, as evidenced by the concept of desiring 
machines, desire is something that is produced by and between bodies not repressed 
or permitted according to Oedipal laws. 
T hough this first objection is posed -at the mct-a-philosophical level it has 
consequences for postcolonial studies. If psychoanalysis Misrepresents desire, or 
rather conflates its own theorization of what desire is with desire itself, then its value 
as an actual thcory of dcsire is significantly, diminished. Psychoanalysis' Deleuze and 
Guattarl seem to suggest, is nothing more than a discourse about its own 
conceptualization of desire. If this is true, then studying psý, choanalysis as one 
Western theory of desire -among others may wcfl be an irnport-ant task for 
postcolonial studies, but using psychoanalysis as a theory of desire to explam and 
account for the colony seems to be an exercise in proving that the theory works in 
other contexts. Bhabha's work, as Nve saw in the previous chapter, was criticized on 
prectsely these grounds. It xv-ould seem clear, however, that colonial societies were 
social -and political formations that incited, produced and managed different 
economics of desire than those produced in the metropolitan centres. If 
psychoanalysis can only refer all formations of desire back to its Oedipal 
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conceptualiZations, then postcolonial studies needs to develop its own conceptual 
tools for explaining the singularly colonial productions of desire. 
Though Deleuze and Guatt-arl discard the notion that desire can be repressed, 
they do not discard the possibility that the Oedipal prohibition works as a form of 
social repression. In fact, they -argue that Oedipus, though it is not a genuine 
prohibition, functions as a social repression because the Oedipus is a way of thinking 
about desire that has captured us. We believe that Oedipus is the only way to think 
about our desires, and so we allow ourselves to be caught in the Oedipus trap. In 
their own words Deleuze and Guattarl -argue that the Oedipus is: 
the bait, the disfigured image, by means of which repression catches desire in 
the trap. If desire is repressed, this is not because it is desire for the mother 
and for the death of the father ... The danger is elsewhere. 
If desire is 
repressed, it is because every position of desire, no matter how small, is 
capable of calling into question the established order of a society (116). 
They argue that psychoanalysis has an interest in presenting Oedipus itself as the 
repressed desire, since in this way, psychic repression appears primany and social 
repression must appear to follow later, as a secondan, problem. We nuight think, for 
example, of the alternative to Lacan's mirror stage proposed by Fanon. He claims 
that the black child in the closed world of his or her family is psycholo icalIN healthy, 
but that the child's contact with the social forces of the racist world triggers 
problems. 
Deleuze and Guattari insist that it is social repression that depends on 
psychic repression, or, in other words that "psychic repression, is a means in the 
service of social repression" (119). They do not attempt to do -away with the separate 
concept of psychic repression, but they recognize that social repression sometimes 
delegates its work to agents of psychic repression, such as, most obvioush-, the 
family. They argue that it Is vital not simply that desire be repressed but that it takes 
repressiVe forms that the subjects thernselves desire, hence their affirination of 
Wilhcm Reich's proposition that the masses are nevcr simply fooled but have their 
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desires educated, coded and recoded back to them so that desire can go on being 
repressed. Desire is not something to be released from repression, it is something to 
be captured and recaptured býT an ethics, such as Aiiii-Oodipas, that enable us to look 
clearly at those forces that have desire in their hold. 
Repression of desire is, in fact, a ready and familiar trope for explaining the 
psychic and social features of colonial societ-y. We saw a perfect example of this in 
Nandy's work. Nandy proposed that the discourse of hyper-masculinity the British 
introduced to India was a result of thcýr repressed homosexuality, a repression that 
could be resolved in the colonies where British men were more free to express their 
hornophilia, if not their homosexuality. The notion that the colonies were a place 
where the colonizer could resolve his psychic repressionsl either by expressing them 
or sublimating them, is not unique to Nandy; it is almost a clich6 in the histories and 
literatures of colonialisin. But if psychic repression is a theoretical object produced 
bNI psychoanalysis, and it is also an ob*ect that distracts our clear view of the social 
conditions of repression than it is not the most useful concept for postcolonial 
studies. In fact, it may also be preventing us from reading colonial formations of 
desire in their immediacy. Nandy's example is instructive. Though he is able to focus 
our attention on a historical moment where British and Indian desires produced a 
uniquely colonial formation of masculinity he is not able to describe this formation as 
anything inore than a psychic repression with social consequences. Like Bhabha, 
Nandy is able to show us that repression is a mechanism that works in the colonies 
too but he is not able to show us how the social, political, cultural and econormc 
conditions brought psychic desircs into play in order to achieve colonization. 
Delcuze and Guattart's third key objection to Oedipus is that it allows no 
conception of identification that cinnot be collapsed into its doublc-bind terms, a 
problem thit has important coti,; cquenccs for the notion of idctitity. 'I'licy point to 
the v. -arning psychoanalysis threatens us xvith: "Occlipus informs us: if you clon't 
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follow the lines of the diffcrentiation daddy-mommy-me, and the exclusive 
alternatives that delineate them, vou will fall into the black night of the 
undiffierentiated" (78). Identification, and hence identity, must be channelled into the 
terms of the Oedipus or it risks disintegration. This is problematic in itself, but 
Dcleuze and Guattarl remind us that "Oedipus creates both the differentiations that 
it orders and the undifferentiated with which it threatens us" (79). The Oedipus is, 
once again, an effectively captivating theoretical structure precisely because whether 
you successfully resolve your Oedipus complex or not you will still be subjected to 
the structural terms of the complex. Deleuze and Guattari -are interested in Lacan's 
-attempt to elaborate Freud's account of identification, but ultimately they conclude 
that Lacan's concepts of mother- functions and father-functions simply reproduces 
the Oedipal triangle at another, perhaps simply semantic, level (82). In opposition to 
the scheme of identifications Freud and Lacan develop Deleuze and Guattari 
foreground the schizophrenic who is able to maintain several kinds of identifications, 
including mommy and daddy, without becotming especially fixed on those 
identifications. For the schizophrenic, Deleuze and Guattarl insist, identification is 
not the problem Freud suggests it must be. 
This objection goes to the heart of current psychical and cultural approaches 
to reading colonialism, and to the heart of the tradition we have been discussing in 
the previous three chapters. Indeed, Diana Fuss describes identification, in these 
terms, as -a violent colonial metaphor (215-27). F-anon, Nandy -and Bhabha relý, on 
their own interpretations of identification. For Fanon, identification is a question of 
mutual recognition; for Nandy a qucstioii of mcdlatiig between cultural identities he 
deftnes as 'lliclian' and Ttitish', respectivelv, and for lihabha binary mechanisins of 
identification provide the means of explaMing the ambivalence of colonial 
phenomena. Hox, -c\-cr, -as vve have alreadY seen, the binaty framework poses serious 
problems for cach of these , x,, ritcrs, not OIIC of \\'11011-1 1S ', IbIC to ICCOL11-It for women 
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of colour in the colony since they quite literally cannot be included in the binary 
psychoanalytic scheme of identification. This is not an accidental feature of Fation, 
Nandy or Bhabha's analilsts-but a necessary corollary of their psychoanalytic 
methodology. Deleuzc and Guattart's schizophrenic may or may not be a practical 
theorctical alternative to the psychoanalytic scheme, but it does at least foreground 
the possibility of a subjectix, try built on multiple identifications none of which are 
given special priority, whether those identifications are personal, familial, historical or 
imaginary. 99 Though it is may seem merely a practical methodological compromise to 
make use of identification as psychoanalysis describes it, the cost to postcolonial 
studies is a methodology that cannot account for women of colour. If women of 
colour cannot be represented in psychoanalytic terms, if their presence is one that 
always remains to be worked out afterwards, then what is the real value of 
psychoanalysis to postcolonial theoryP 
So far, we have been concerned with objections that are internal to the logic 
of psychoanalytic theorv, but as noted earlier Deleuze and Guattari's critique pursues 
-some of the social, political and historical ramifications of the Oedipus. The final 
objection we will deal with here returns to earlier questions about the relations 
between psychic and social repression. Where psychoanalysis adrnlits that there may 
be factors in play beyond the family, it places those factors after the time of the 
family so that the family remains the most important starting point of any discussion 
of the psyche. As should be clear from the discussion above Delcuze and Guattari do 
not accept on ativ terms that the faintly takes precedence or is a space presctved 
from the social. What is perhaps more interesting for our purposes is that, according 
to Deleuze and Guattarl, the attitude that the social comes afterwards leads to 
')" An illustration of the social and political content of even the most personal desires is the 
Content ot - patient's deluslotis. DelcLize and Guattart Point out that delusions are never 
reducible to mornmy and daddy but take their cue, from the world arotind thern; the 
paratiold delusions of a patient are as likely to be abOtIt the COITIIIIIIIIIStS hStClIllIg III Oll their 
thouLdits as their parents trying to polson them. 
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applications of psychoanalysis to other fields of study such as anthropology, historv 
and classical studies. Instcad, this is a theoretical move that is obviously particularly 
distasteful to them. They insist that one cannot simply apply the framework of 
psychoanalysis to other fields, and, writing as e-arlv as 1968, they observe that such 
kinds of applied psychoanalyses are always on offer. 
Indeed, in some sense, this dissertation is concerned precisely with the 
problem of preventing studies of colonialism and postcolonialism from becoming 
just these types of applied analyses. Though interdisciplinarity is an important aim in 
itself, and postcolonial studies is ail interdisciplinary field, Guattari reminds us that 
interdisciplinarity is often merely a front for the scholarly incursion of one discipline 
by another. In the encounter between psychoanalysis and postcolonial studies, 
psychoanalysis has yet to be transformed. Though historical practice and philosophy, 
for example, have been forced to inake some concessions to postcolonial critique 
psvchoanalvsis, though recognized to be a Euroccntric theory, has not. Subaltern 
studies scholars have attempted to transform the way colonial Indian history is read 
and written, and have even argued for the need to 'provincialize' Europe in history 
(Chakrabarty 20-23). Dcspite the fact that postcolonial studies' encounter with 
psychoanalysis dates as far back as 'Nlannoni and Fanon's writing in the 1940s we 
have yet to make any significant postcolonial incursion into psychoanalytic theory. 
Despitc the weight of these objections, Deleuze and Guattarl recognize that a 
highly significant problem still remains: if psychoanalysis is not an accurate 
representation of desire and econorTues of desire why is it that psychoanalysis 
appears so universal to us? Why does it seem to describe certain aspects of our 
culture so smoothly and faithfullyP Dclcuze and Guattart do not suggest that Frcud's 
account of culture was simply expertlY descriptiVe (rather than morally prescriptive) 
and that is -, x-hy psychoanalysis sonictinics sccms to offcr such poNx, crf-Lil c,, planations 
()f Western culturc. Instead, they describe hmv different types c)f societies, with their 
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own distinctive arrangements and economies of social production have different 
arrangements for capturing, understanding and representing desire to the members 
of those societics ...... In the case of the capitalist society 
Dcleuze and Guattari argue 
psychoanalysis is the perfectly designed form of desire-trap. Psychoanalysis appears 
to explain so powerfully how certain things in our society work because it the kind of 
structure of thought a capitalist society requires. 
Deleuze and Guattari illustrate the incvitabiliq- with which psychoanalysis 
seems to explain our societywith an example that is particularly important for this 
study, namely how psychoanalysis understands and explains the colony. They ask 
why, when anthropological experts adn-At that they do not encounter the precise 
psychoanalytic schemas described by Freud in colonial societies, psychoanalytic 
schernas still appear to occur universally in those societies. Rather than simply 
attributing this to the pseudo-scientific status of psychoanalysis they argue that 
colonization itself is a material condition that produces Oedipalization. Like 
capitalism, colonialism requires and produces the education of desire in its image. 
Deleuze and Guattari take the case of -a young Ndembu man whose maternal 
grandfather was a chief (166). The young 1-nan appears to be suffering from an 
inability to take his place in his society. He does not succeed at anything he tries, he 
suffers from illness, is described as vain and is constantly haunted by the ghost of his 
grandfather. The Ndcmbu are a matrilineal society, but the young man chooses to 
stay with his father and on his father's death his problems intensify. At first glance 
his case seems to be purely Oedipal, but Dcleuze and Guattart warn us that we rush 
At least a third of,, J1ifi-Oe&pi1, i- is devoted to explaining the c otincction between tlypes of 
social-ecotiornic arrangements and their corresponding ways of coding -and rccoding 
desire. I 
give relatively little space to explaining this aspect of their argument only because I want to 
preserve the focus on the critique of psych oanaly tic theory. Nevertheless, it is a central claim 
of the book that we have psychoanalysis because a capitalist society requires this type of 
mechanism for coding and recoding desires. Deletize and Guattari describe three types of 
s- -alu, ., ocict\, not to 
be understood in any cvolutionary or cý ative sense but simply as different 
ways of organizing social and economic productions. These three tYpcs of social assemblages 
are referred to as machines: the priniltive-tert-ttortal machine, the barbartan-despot machine 
atid the civilized-capitalist machnie. 
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to the Oedipal analysis because we are "conditioned to say Oedipus every time 
someone speaks to us of father, mother, grandfather" (168). However, they 
ackilowlcdge out that there seen-is to be some OedipahzaLion at work because the 
Colony: 
becomes Oedipal in part, under the effect of colonization. The colonizer, for 
example, abolishes the chieftainship, or uses it to further his own ends ... 
The colonizer says: your father is your father and nothing else, or your 
maternal grand fath cr-don't mistake them for chiefs ... your family is your family and nothing else; sexual reproduction no longer passes through those 
points, although we rightly need your family to furnish a material that will be 
subjected to a new order of reproduction. Yes, then, an Oedipal framework is 
outlined for the dispossessed primitives: a shantytown Oedipus .... To the degree that there is Oedipahzation, it is due to colonization (168-9). 
In other words, a psychoanalytic account of the young man's problems passes over 
his political and social claims to power as an inkgenous chief. This stems partly from 
his difficulties establishing those claims in the colony because of the British refusal to 
recognize such power structures. But it also steins from the fact that the desires in 
play in this scenario were not "a grotesque hiatus of castration, everything was 
scattered into a thousand break-flows of the cli-ieftamships, lineages, the relations of 
colonization" (168). 
Delcuze and Guatt-ari come to this conclusion on the basis of their readings 
of selected anthropological texts, but it has larger implications for psychoanalysis and 
the study of colonialism generally. Where psychoanalvsis provides a persuasive 
explanation of colonial phenomena we must ask the question: why and how does this 
explanation come to seem persuasive? Critics hostile to psychic approaches have 
long argued that such approaches obscure the political and social factors in play ,, 
but 
here Delcuze and Guattart go further. TheN ask us to ask ourselves why, when. -, vc 
know this is true, we return again and apirl to the thought-structures of 
psychoanalysis. They claun "Ocdipalization is always colonization putsued by other 
rneans, it is the Intcrior colony, and wc shall sec that cven licrc at home, x,, -herc we 
Furopcaiis arc concerned, it is our intimate colonial education" (170). It is tl()t 
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enough, then, to dismiss psychoanalysis -as a Eurocentric theory; if it is "an intimate 
colonial education" then we need to find out how and why Oedipalization functions 
as colonization. Is Deleuze and Guattari's claim merely a Oramatic flourish or a 
profound philosophical statement? Postcolonial studies have an obligation to 
investigate these claims further. 
The Wotnen ofAnti-Oedipus 
Though Ailli-Oedipus gives us several ideas about how to reorient postcolonial 
studies approach to psychoanalysis, we need to be cautious about simply applying 
Dcleuze and Guattari's theory of desire as an alternative to the psychoanalytic 
version we currently deploy. Young has suggested the Anti-Oedipal model could be 
useful because it treats desire as something immanent to the social field, but what are 
some of the n-nptications of their theory of desireý) In this concluding section I want 
to highlight some of the questions feminist scholars have already raised about 
Deleuze and Guattari's model. I draw on the work of fernmist scholars here in part 
because they are the only critics to have addressed the question of how a rulinor 
group, like women or people of colour, makes sense of the demand to 'become 
rumor' when the demand is addressed to them. I also draw on the ferillinist critique 
because it is clear, from the previous three chapters, that even when philosophers 
and theorists claim to be speaking of everyone they -arc only speaking of man. 
Before we discuss the problems with using Deleuze and Guattatt's concepts, 
however, we must address the possibiliryý that Deleuze and Guattart's anti- 
psychoanalytic critique is simply unconvincing. By and large, those who remain 
unconvinced are those witli a greater investment in psychoanalysis itself, whether 
that means practising Freudian analysts or critical p sychoa naly tic thconsts Nx-ho make 
selective, even catachrestic use of psychoanalytic concepts. In a familiar move that 
maliv other critics have inade in relation to anti-psychoanalytic critique. lcrn- Aline 
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Fileger remarks "there is such animus in this frontal attack on psychoanalysis that it 
smacks of classic Freudian denial ... in which the patient protests too much. In fact, 
I think the vLrUlencc of this disavowal indicates that Deleuze -and Guattart are more 
Occlipatist than thcy aver" (221). "" Denial, the resistance to analysis itself, is of 
course always already part of the process of being psychoanalysed. Deleuze and 
Guattarl have alreadv warned us of the 'double-bind' structure of psychoanalysis, 
where one is enfolded in the structure whether or not one resolves the crisis 
adequately. 
Though Fheger, as an adrmtted Freudian, genuinely finds Anfi-Oedipusan 
exaggerated protest, she bases much of her criticism of Delcuze and Guattarl on the 
fact that they were unInformed about recent strains of psychoanalysis, such as 
Lacan's re-reading of Freud. This, as we noted e-arher, is siMply not the case, not only I 
because of Guattari's personal analysis with Lacan and his own work at the La Borde 
chnic at the vanguard of the French psychotherapeutic field, but also because the 
llnfi-Oedlýivs clearly takes issue with Lacan's theoretically sophisticated 
reinterpretation of the old Oedipal structure. Nloreover, Deleuze and Guattarl also 
make use of and critique elements of Klcinian psychoanalysis. However much one 
might disagree with Deleuze -and Guattarl, thcN, are not uninformed about their 
subJect and they do not tackle this theoretical opporient by either trying to downplay 
its irnportancc or ignoring it. We cannot, then, discount their critique on the basis of 
ignorance. 
Flieger also suggests that there is simply rmsrepresci-itation of psychoanalysis 
in. ý, Iwi-Oediplls, since all of psychoanalytic thought is reduced to the triangle of the 
()cdlpus complex. Whether we can reduce psychoanalysis to the Oedipus complex is 
I'" Tti , in Auctvic-, v with jeati- ' 
Jacques Brochier in 1976 Guattari commented "Anli-Oedipil, l- 
-ývas barely noticed. Whqt is quite tLinnY ts that, when the book came out, the 
PsYchoanalytical Socic[y recommended people just to ignore it, and the -, vholc thing would 
blo-ýv over. Which is preciscly -ývhat happencd! " (Guattarl, 49) Perhaps this -ývas the 
psycho,,, im, ilytic institution,, own vcrstoii of dctmil. 
165 
a legitimate question. Deleuze and Guattari certainly assurne that Oedipus is the 
cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory, and therefore the emblem of the 
psychoanalytic thinking that they want to oppose. By way of comparlson, Genosko 
has suggested that in Guattari's work "the straight gate to the critique of 
psychoanalysis was through the transference relation because it is the cornerstone of 
psychoanalytic method" (69). This comment occurs in the context of a discussion of 
Guattari's clinically oriented critique of psychoanalysis and his development of the 
concept of transversality rather than transference. Perhaps, then, we must make a 
distinction between psychoanalytic method and theory as each having its own 
dominant principle. 
On closer inspection, however, Fheger's complaint seems to be that Deleuze 
and Guattari do not recognize the complexity of the Oedipus complex and its already 
social nature rather than actually disputing the centrality of the Oedipus complex. 
Flieger, like Lacan, or indeed Bhabh-. L, reads psychoanalysis as a theory that 
acknowledges and manages much more comple. xity than its crifics would suggest. 
Nevertheless, the continuing problem for Deleuze and Guattari is that 
psychoanalysis insists on channelling this complexity through the Oedipal triangle. 1112 
Flieger may well object to the absurd light in which this channelling appears in Anti- 
pus, but this is not a fault in the argument itself so much as a rhetorical effect that Oedi 
Flieger finds discomforting. 
If we can accept Deleuze and Guattarl's critique of psychoanalvsis then, like 
them, we may be prompted to develop or at least explore alternative thcore0cal 
languages. If we do riot have to speak of desire in psychoanalytic terms we can also 
begin to conceptuali7e desire in nexv ways. However, as I ha\-e already indicated, 
speaking of desire in the terms I)clctizc and Guattari propose is not without its 
The diagram that appears in Fheger's nt-ticle ts a perfect illustration of this-although 
scvcnal terms appear undcr each of the headings, mother, father and child the discussion is 
., rill lit-nitcd to these, thrce terms! See 
Hicger 233. 
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problems. In revisiting the Anli-Oediplls Heffernan writes "schizoanalysis can propose 
no positive political formulations beyond a kind of -avant-garde guerrilla warfare is 
the result of a weakness in Deleuze and Guattart's formulation of desire" (127). ""' He 
goes on to -argue that schizoanalysis call propose no meaningful political action 
because Deleuze and Guattari's critique is only able to historicize desire's forms of 
repression and not desire itself. If the desire Delcuze and Guattari refer us back to 
turns out to be a transcendental substance, something always there and always 
available but never historicizable, how can it be useful to our analyses of colonialism? 
Deleuze insists time after time, however, that desire is not always present in 
the same form or in the same amount but changes depending on what forces are in 
place in the social field. In Olkowski's words: 
Activ c force or desire is not a matter of freeing oneself or being freed from 
an oppressive state, reh ion or family. It is not something always already 91 
there in every body; it is there to a greater or lesser degree depending on the 
history of the forces that have taken hold of that body (and so constitnte it) 
and the struggles between those forces for possession of it (47). 
If Deleuze and Guattarl do not attempt to historicize desire in the course of their 
work, this is simply because they want to insist that desire is not something that can 
be adequately represented by an interpretative framework alone. Nevertheless, their 
refusal is not the same thing as treating desire as a transcendental factor. They 
acknowledge that desire, as a production that occurs in the real-time of the world, is 
affected by andalters in time. Hallward and Olkowksi both insist that -a key 
advantage of Deleuzc and Guattari's work is their refusal to describe anything purely 
in terms of historical contingencies despite their recognition that different conditions 
obtain at different historical moments. 
"", f lardt and Negri also claim that DelcLize and Guattan "discover the prodUCtivity of social 
reproduction (creative production, production of values, social relations, affects, becomings), 
bUt IIIatIagC to articulate it only supcrFicially and ephemerally, as a chaotic, indctermillatc 
horizon marked by the Lingraspable evcni" (28). 
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Moreover, though historicizing desire is not part of the project Deleuze and 
Guattari set for themselves, it is not excluded from or contradicted by the broader 
I. for Foucault's work clearly points implications of their pro'ect. Indeed, their affinity 
to the compatibility of historici7ing desire with locating desire's entanglements in 
systems such as psychoanalysts. In some sense Deleuze and Guattari's project is 
always on the tip of Foucault's tongue and yet never comes to be fully -articulated, 
whether because Foucault could not or did not want to pursue the problem. 
](14 It is 
exactly in this sense that llnli-Oedipls does not snnply urge us to cast off 
psychoanalysis but to work through an understanding of how psychoanalytic 
thinking has taken hold of our bodies over time. If psychoanalysis is a force that 
takes hold of bodies or societies, then one of postcolonial studies' tasks should be to 
investigate how and under what conditions psychoanalytic thought captured colonial 
bodies and societies. 
Rather than attempt any representations of desire, it could be argued that 
Deleuze and Guattari are mote interested in the question of how a minority, group 
can "at once pursue its economic and social objectives while allowing individuals to 
maintain their own access to desireP" (Guattarl 41). How, for example, do 
postcolonial or femimst activists and scholars pursue their goals, without forcing 
postcolonial subjects and women to accept their idea of what a woman or a 
postcolonial subject isý Despite the relevance of Deleuzc and Guattati's question 
feminist scholars have been rather reluctant to make use of Deleuze and Guattati's 
work. T lie theory of nimor identity that follows frorn the Anti-Oedipal theory of 
desire works against certain strong tendencies and traditions in feminist politics and 
scholarship. DclcLize and Guattart conceive of minority politics and identity in terms 
that arc antithetical to idcntity-politics. Does this make their work an InSUrinountable 
1110 Butler, for example, resolves her problem -ýN-ith Dclcuzc's concept of desire precisely by 
Sum-)IC111clitillýy- it With Foucault"; historicizatioll of II- 
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barrier for feminist and postcolonial studies, however instructive their break with 
psychoanalysis Might be? 
Alice Jardine was one of the first ferninist scholars to work through some of 
the iMplications of Aili-0edipus for fclTllnlst activism and scholarship. We have 
-already noted that Deleuzc and Guattarl insist on the process of becorning that the 
rninority group must go through, rather than presunling a pre-given identity based on 
certain shared characteristics. It is in this sense that they famously urge a 'becormng- 
woman' on all human beings in A nfi-Oediplisl including women. They do not assume 
that any individual woman is already 'bccome-woman'. Nevertheless, according to 
jardinc, the logic of their complex reading of gender and sex and their urging on of 
all of us to "become woman" leads us to the point where: "Man is always the subject 
of any becoMMg, even if 'he' is a woman. A woman who is not a 'woman-become' is 
-a -NLtan and a subject to that extent and to that extent only. 
Woman is never a subject 
but a litnit-a borderland of and for Man" Oardine 53). She goes on to ask, "is it not 
possible that the process of 'becoming' woman' is but a variation of -an old allegory 
for the process of women 
becolTnngobsolete? " (53). In other words, the category of 
Woman, -as distinct from real women, becomes a philosophical tropc that men use 
for their own purposes on their way to enlightenment, or liberation just as the savage 
or the primitive functions as a trope in Freudian texts. 
Deleuze and Guattarl's discussions about desire, identity and becoming do 
repeatedly slip into the world and texts of white men. They are keenly interested in 
the insights offered by hterature and yet they remain problematically enchanted by 
writers who can best be described as chauvinist, such as Henrv -Nlifler -and D. H. 
Lawrence. Delcuze and Guattati prt\-llcge discussions of thcse authors in thclr work 
precisely because, for them, "even the most phallocentric and notorious male 
writers-thcv mention 1-,,, iwrcncc and Millcr-have, in flicir writings, 'become 
woman, or reltcd on the process of bccoming-N-vommi" ((; rosz 205). Flox-vever, it is 
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not clear what place there is for women's texts in a world where everyone is urged to 
become-woman, or for postcolonial writing in a world where everyone is urged to 
becolne-postcolonial. The hallmark of brilliant writing in Deleuze and Guattarl's 
estimation seems to be the abihty to enact the rhizomatic multlphclt\, of identity, and 
if women, or postcoloni-al writers, are intent upon carving a space for their 
m. aginahzed identities it would seem that they cannot (yet) achieve btilhance. Once 
again, as Fanon warned against, the woman or the racialized subject appears to be a 
stage on the way to more authentic (white, male) being. 
For Jardine, the only solution to this problem is to assert "it is up to women 
not to disappear from that space of exploration" (59). Feminist scholars, or 
postcolonial scholars, must continue to place questions of race, gender, colonization 
and patriarchy mto every philosophical debate. However, Grosz suggests that if we 
can suspend our)udgment of Delcuze and Guattarl's theory of the beconung-woinan 
we may find that it le-ads us on to something more productive. It may be difficult for 
feminists to accept the loss of the term 'woman' for the pronlisc of what it rnýight 
lead to, just as postcolonial studies struggles to maintain coherent meanings for the 
terms colonial and colonizer. However, giving up the term 'woman' does not 
necessarily imply the disintegration of directed ferninist activ, ism or scholarship. 
Dcleuzc and Guattarl state: "It is of course indispensable for women to conduct a 
molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, 
their own subjectivity ... 
But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a subject. " 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Tbousand Plateaus 276). Fernmist scholarship has alreadý 
struggled for some tit-ric with the question of what it means to use the term 'woinar17 
and at the sanic time try to divest it of its oppressive connotations. Where feminist 
scholarship has failed, lioN-,, c\-cr, is in its iiiabilltv to locate the woman of colour, or 
race gcnerallv, in the category 'woman. To give Lip the perceived coherence of the 
terni ',,,, -om, -tn', then, mav be easier for some fernimsts than for others. 
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Delcuze and Guattarl urge us to encounter difference on its own terms and 
in its multiplicity, not as something that resembles something else but as something 
that we must encounter for the first time. Instead of writing about sex or race, terms 
that arc too thoroughly entrenched in current modes of thinking to permit 
rethinking, theý, urge us to break them up into 'a thousand tiny' races or sexes and 
thereby destabilize the terms that create normality and difference-from-normality. To 
write about the 'becoming-woman', then, is not to write as though women do not 
exist but as though we are not already certain in advance who is a woman and what 
that woman wants. In fact, there is no question of wrifing about women, or on 
behalf of women, there is only writing that creates lines of flight out of the fixity of 
representational thought. We may have a tool to break apart the binary that has 
plagued us in the work of Fanon, Nandy and Bhabha. The question is no longer, 
how do we fit the subjectivity of the women of colour into the psychoanalytic 
scheme (woman of colour versus white woman; woman of colour versus man of 
colour; woman of colour versus woman of colour; or women of colour versus white 
manýý but how to write about sub' 1 in such ternis that do not relapse into the jectiv"tY 
terms of the psychoanalytic. 
The Anti-Oedipal critique proposes some radical philosophical and political 
solutions to problems of critique and representation, and as such, notions of 
becoming-woman or desiring-machines may in fact ultimately prove unworkable. 
The value of the encounter between Deleu7e and Guattarl and postcolonial studies 
discussed in this chapter may be as httlc as this: after their critique we cannot Nvritc as 
though the problems we face with psychoanalytic triethodologics are the result of 
insufficient historical contextualization or gender specification. Instead, we must 
bcgin to unpack the meaning of Delcuze and Guattari's provocative claim that 
"Oedipalization is always colonization pursucd by othcr mcans" (170). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESHAPING POSTCOLONIAL RELATIONS WITH 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 
In the previous f(--)ur chapters we have been concerned only with the potential 
and problems of the work of IndIv1dual theorists as particular instances of the 
conflicted relations beoveen psychoanalysis and postcolonial studies. In this last 
chapter, then, I want to discuss some of the larger Implications of each of these 
instances. First, I want to clariýv how Fanon, Nandy and Bhabha's adaptations of 
psychoanalysis demonstrate some of the uses of psychoanalytic theoiýT for colonial 
critique. Following this I want to explain how these particular partial engagements 
with psychoanalysis fall to resolve certain problems with psychoanalysis as a colonial 
and colonizing discourse and finally, to sketch out what kind of relationship betwecn 
postcolonial studies and psychoanalytic theory might foreground these concerns 
more clearly and productively. 
The postcolonial debt to Tanon, Nandy and Bbabba 
We began with F-anon, not onlv because lie is the most w-eH known 
proponent of a colonial psychoanalytic, but also because his work has been cited as a 
precedent for many subsequent psychoanalytic studies of colonlafism. Black Skin, 
IVIVIe Masks did establish certain important considerations for any critique of 
coloniahsm that makes use of psychoanalysis. First, Fanon demonstrates in various 
ways that one can write about the man of colour in terms of psychoanalysis without 
pathologl7ing hirn. Writing in response to a traclition of representing natives, 
primitives and others as the pathological exemplar, Fanon finds other ways to use 
psychoanalytic theory. In 131ack Skili. If "hilt, Alask, ý lie presents "a psychoanalytic 
intcrpretation of the lived cxl)crlciicc of the black man" (157) that attcnipts to 
understand through i-cferctice to politics and niaterial conditions how the black man 
c-ýpcricnces his -, vorld. 'I'liougli he sometimcs cxlill)lt,, a rather natural desperation to 
172 
redeem the black subJect ftom misunderstanding, he is mostly uninterested in 
explaining why the black man behaves as he does (the mode that colonial 
psychiatrists often chose to represent colonved or otherwise marginalized subjects); 
instead lie is interested in explaining in psychoanalytic terms how the black man 
experiences his life in the wake of the Negro myth that degrades, devalues and makes 
fearful the black man in society. Though we did not consider Fanon's chnical 
writings in any detail it, the first chapter, it is also worth observing that Fanon 
repeated this same procedure in his clinical discussion of his Arab patients. In 
Fanon's case histories the medical profile of the lazv, dishonest Arab was displaced 
by a portrait of the Arab patient depersonalized by colonial practice inside and 
outside the mental health institution. 
It might be argued that A/I-annoni, and not Fanon, is the first person to use 
psychoanalysis as a political tool for writing against colonialism. I reject this 
argument because whether one reads Mannoni as explicitly anti-colonial or 
benevolently paternalist, his interest is primarily with the soul of the European 
colonizer rather than the trauma of the colonized. Christopher Lane has recently 
argued that we should reconsider Mannoni's position in light of his later renunciation 
of the Prospero complex, and he outlines his reading of this most persuasively (127- 
150). However, Fanon writes in the knowledge that psychoanalvsis, psvchiatiT and 
psychology are material practices that -are made and remade in the context of a racist 
world and a colonial power. Nfannoni cannot acknowledge, much less -articulate the 
effect of racisin in the colony. Fation insists that the political matters when one 
discusses the psyche of the man of colour at least, even if it does not matter when 
one discusses the psyclics of others. 
If Fanon does not pursue the kind of colonial analYsts of knowledge that 
Nandy and Said do, he rccognizes that colonial power shapes colonial knowledge, 
and that psychoanalysis, or the more scientifically established field of psychiatrN', 
17 ') 
participates actively in that construction. But, more to the point, he was willing to use 
his understanding and -acceptance of this to turn psychoanalysis into a political 
instrument. Fanon is prepared to identify precisely how psychoanalvsis and 
psychiatry contribute to the colonl7ation of whole peoples. In a quite unfashionable, 
and even simple, manoeuvre, he specifies in texts such as T1')e VrelJ)ed qfll)e h. arth 
how specific political situations produce a range of mental health disorders, 
distortions and disabilities. While this is bvnc, means systematic in Fanon's work-a 
reflection, perhaps, of the fact that he Is engaged in a tactical rnove-1t means that he 
can make use of psychoanalysis and his position as a psychiatrist as polifical tools. 
Fanon reminds us that however much Freud, Adler or Lacan suggest 
other-wisc the psychoanalysis of the person of colour cannot be attempted from a 
purely individual angle-not because the man of colour is not a fully individualized, 
or psycholo ically complex whole, but because his world is materially and psychically 91 
influenced by the colonized-coloni7er relationship. This problem of whether the 
person of colour is the only person who must/can be described in terms of their 
social/cultural background is one we shall return to -again, as it echoes and repeats in 
various forms through Nandy, Bhabha, Deleuze and Guattari. Nevertheless, the 
significant point is that the psychic cannot be separated off from the social at -any 
point. 105 
Finally, Fanon's work rcrMnds us that the woman of colour does not have 
the analogous experience of colonialism to the man of colour. In the analysis of the 
colonial society Fanon presents, the woman of colour is a kind of theoretical 
problem that lie cannot, like Freud before him and Bhabha after him, solve. 
1115 For example, it might be irgued that the little Antillean's childhood is a period ill which 
his psYchic world is not disturbed by the racist -ý, -orld lie v, -III grow up to Inhabit. Fallon, hkc 
othcr -\,, -riters influenced by psvchoatialysis, scems to suggest that the childhood of the 
Antillean child is also a harmonious existence before entry into the 1,, xvv of racism. t IoNx, c\-cr, 
to sce tile 11011-events of this childhood time Is to miss the point of I'anons account-this 
time appears undisturbed ind harmonious because the child is being educated in the image 
of colontal desire to see himself precisely as a little 1rerichman. 
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Nevertheless he recognizes that consensual sexual relationships between men of 
colour and white women are viewed differently than relationships between women of 
colour -and white men in the colonial world. He is so intent on exploding the myth of 
the black man who rapes that he neglects to discuss the reality of the white inan who 
rapes (a lived-experience of far too many women of colour for Fanon to be unaware 
of it), but he recognizes that, in any case, there is a difference in the way the man of 
colour and the woman of colour live their sexual lives in the colony. He also 
recognizes that the black man faces (Efferent challenges in relation to white men and 
white women-the difference that sex and gender make to power relations. After 
reading Fanon it is not possible to pretend that the woman of colour can simply be 
tagged on -as an analogous afterthought in psychoanalyses of colonialism. 
Nandv's work begins from some of the same concerns as Fanon's, and like 
Fanon's work his work demonstrates that psychoanalysis can be bent to different 
purposes. First, Nandy is also interested in representing the man of colour, in this 
case the Indian man, in psychoanalytic terms that do not pathologize him. He 
achieves this, in part, by focusing on the male Indian subject, thus displacing the 
European subject as the normative psychological model. Nandy demonstrates 
through his studies of colonial men, in his case the scientists, jurists and political 
figures rather than the 'everyman' of Fanon's analyses, that the Indian subject has 
access to a psychological integrity that the European subject may sometimes lack, 
-and even fad to have a means to obtain. Though it may appear that Nandv siMpIv 
turns the tables of psNIchoanaIN-sis-pathologizil-ig the European subject-in fact his 
work is more nuanced than this since he is able to represent Indlan subjects who also 
fail to resolve their internal conflicts constructively. There is no suggestion that the 
Indian subject xvill always hold the upper hand rnoratly or psycholo 'cally, but J 19, 
Nandy's work c1carly shows that there can be something more than escape from 
pathologizatton for the man of colour as subject. 
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The psychologically whole picture of the Indian subject that Nandy is able to 
sketch in his work is due in large part to his emphasis on culture. His work reminds 
us that culture is an important factor in any psychoanalytic investigation of 
colonialism for several reasons. For Fanon, the difference of the black subject from 
the notmative white subject of psychoanalysis was because the specific pathology of 
living as a colonized and racialiZed subject had not been accounted for-even 
theorized-by the Freuds or L-acans of the world. For Nandy it is because the 
psychology of the colonized, as well as the colonizer, needs to be understood in 
terms that have less to do with pathology as such and more to do with interpersonal 
and intrapersonal adaptations to the surroundmg envLronment. Thcse adaptations are 
productive or obstructive, as Nandy reads thern, depending on the cultural resources 
of the adaptee. Culture, in the form of traditions, texts, practices and everyday 
behaviours is the psychological resistance that Nandy offers as an -alternative to 
Fanon's revolution-an, - solutions, not because he discounts Violence absolutel-v but 
because violence itself is what the colonizer expects and proffers as the answer to the 
problem of colonial oppression. Where Fanon depends on linking psychoanalysis to 
the political and material contexts of its practice to make it an effective anti-colonial 
instrument, Nandy depends on linking psychoanalysis to the cultural resources of the 
colonized people to make it -, in effective anfi-coloni-al hermeneutic. 
Indeed, despite the political value of reading colonial relations in this way, 
Nandy is more interested in an analysis of colonial knowledge than Fanon and so his 
work reminds us that psychoanalysis itself has a critical potential as a form of 
knowledge that though Hiside the boundaries of Westem knowledge is relatively 
m,, trgin-, tllzcd. It is this potential that has been exploited in more recent postcolonial 
'appEcations of psychoanalytic theory and so perhaps seems so familiar to us ilow, 
but it Is something that originates with Naticly and not with Fation. For Nandy, 
psychology, psychoanalysis and psychiatry as marginal, one might even say 
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untrustworthy, sciences are useful allies for the postcolonlal scholar since they 
represent points at which one can look into Western knowledge and find its useful 
fractures. For Nandy, psychoanalysis is valuable insofar as it participates in the non- 
modern's view of time. Hindus, Nandv argues, have an understanding of time that 
does not proceed in a linear, non-reversible direction. Instead, as in psychoanalysis, 
the past is always part of the present and the present can be remade through the past. 
Nandy goes so far as to suggest that non-modern knowledgcs have the capacity to re- 
evaluate modern categories, and it is in this sense that heefnpjoýTSpsychoanalysis as a 
means of re-evalua6tig history. 
Nandv, like Fanon, begins by adapting the content of psychoanalysis, by 
reworking Hindu content into an array of psychological responses and positions, but 
he ends by making use of psychoanalysis as a structure that has analogies with the 
non-Nlodern. For Bhabh-a, there is not even a suggestion that psychoanalysis needs 
to be culturally re-worked or that psychoanalysis is something that has affinities with 
the way of thinking or being of the colorUzed. Unlike Fanon and Mandy, Bhabha 
does not base his project on a reworking of the content of psychoanalysis as such. 
Instead, he moves away from speciý-in an existential or PS Tchological subject, and 9j 
focuses on psychoanalyfic processes. This is an ingenious solution to the question of 
psychoanalysis' universalism since it moves the use and discussion of psychoanalysis 
to an entirely different level. Rather than sttugghng with the question of the man of 
colour as a subject, a question that both Fanon and Nandy devote sorne energy 
towards resolving, Bhabha questions the terms of an anti-colonialism that insists on 
identity politics. He wants to insist that we are not obhged to speak ()f culture, or 
more simply of 'difference, ' every tanc speak of the colonlzcd person, or the 
person of colour. 
t'tilike Fation and NandY, Bliablia xvants to try and thcortzc the person of 
colour not as someone inevitably produccd by his racial, CI-Ilturat or colonial identity. 
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Indeed, Bhabha's work appears to advance the relationship between psychoanalysis 
and colonial critique considerably, since he is able to discuss the colony in 
psychoanalytic terms without pathologizing the person of colour and without tying 
the man of colour to his cultural origins, religious affiliations or experiences of his 
brown skin. If we think of Fanon's workas a response to the ethnopsychiatrists' will 
to describe people of colour in terms of their culture, and Nandy's work as an 
attempt to define the person of colour's culture as his psychological advantage then it 
is Bhabha who is able, finallý,, to speak about the colony in psychoanalytic terms 
without reference to people of colour's entanglements with psychoanalytic theories 
as such. 
Bhabha introduces a new possibility for psychoanalysis -as an method of 
reading the colony, by treating it as -a useful framework, perhaps the pre-eminent 
framework for understanding how colonizers and colonized alike manage the 
relationship between the knowledge we have and the reality we experience. Bhabha, 
like Nandy, works from the premise that psychoanalysis is something one can use to 
enter into the spaces where Western knowledge and rationality fracture and reveal 
the ambivalence of Western authority. In particular, Bhabha makes use of 
psychoanalysis as a theonT that can manage the uncertaintýT of knowing and 
knowledge generally and where Nandy uses this to undermine Western disciplines 
(, international development, political science, history), Bhabha uses it to explain 
particular colonial phenomenon like stereotypes-figutcs of knowledge that appear, 
disappear and reappear with consistency even though everyone tacitly admits that 
theý, do not capture the 'truth' of the situation. For Bhabh-a, unlike Fation or even 
Nandv, the aim of postcolonial critique is not to uncover the 'truth' behind colonial 
representations, it is to understand ho-,, - colonizers attempted to secure their 
authorlry through their representations of the colonized and how their efforts 
falled to function perfcctly. 
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Psychoanalysis After Tanon, Nandy and Bbabha 
Having briefly revisited how Fation, Nandy and Bhablia turn psychoanalysis 
to constructive critical uses, I walit to took at the problems that proceed from these 
varied adaptations of psychoanalysis. In order to make my argument clearer I have 
divided these writers' treatment of psychoanalysis into two categories: those that deal 
primarily with content (-, vho can psychoanalysis describe, what kinds of cultural, 
social, political contexts should be brought to bear on psychoanalysis); and those that 
deal primarily with the structures pf psychoanalytic thought (what kinds of processes 
does psychoanalysts theorize, how can we make use of psvchoanalvt1c insights, how 
can we translate psychoanalyfic concepts into gencral philosophical insights). Though 
these categories inevitably blur, particularly, for example, in the work of a critic like I 
Nandy, they provide us with a reasonable means of separating out different ways of 
usMg psychoanalysis and thdrattenclant problems. 
Fanon and N-andy attempt to adapt psychoanalysis by chan i its range of I ging 1 
application and altering its content. In the work of both critics psychoanalysis 
becomes useful, for the most part, insofar as it can be used to understand the 
concerns of the man of colour liv, ing under colonialism. f ýor Fanon, this means 
splicing psychoanalysis, oriented primarily towards the individual, with the inatcrial, 
political, cultural and mythical contexts of the colonized black man's life. For NandN-, 
adapting psychoanalysis means intenveaving Hindu cultural discourses and practices 
with psychoanalytic method to produce a psychoanalysis that helps us understand the 
psychological choices available to the colonized Indian and, to a lesser degree, the 
colonizers of I ndia. In each case the change of content enil)lcs the critic to write 
about a diffcrent subject than psYchoanalysis appcars to have in rnind. But this 
alteration of content raiscs ccrtain problems for our use of psycho-anah-sis. Nandvs is 
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a ps, ý choanalytic theory adapted for Hindu Indian men and Farion's is a theory for 
colonized Black men. If these are only pockets of micro-analyscs, what is their value? 
Micro-analyses are in themselves important projects but they do not lend 
thcmselves towards a broader theorcticalaim than the representation of a particular 
constituency. Moreover, that constituency is frequently defined in terms of 
characteristics or practices that excludes some of the people the writer supposedly 
writes on behalf of. In theory Fanon and Nandy write analyses of the colony, but, as 
we have seen, though Nandy and Fanon arc both conscious that the woman of 
colour has a different experience of colonialism neither one is able to fully account 
for her in their analyses either in terms of her lived-experience (of culture, polifics or 
socio-cconoMic constraints) or in theoretical terms as -a subject with her own set of 
psychological identificafions, misrccognitions or fetishes. However much is gained by 
opening up psychoanalysis to write about a new subject-the man of colour-the 
theoretical gesture is contained by its inabihry to speak of the woman of colour. Of 
course, it could be suggested that we simply need a broad range and number of 
micro-analyses in order to give each subject position its attention (the working class 
man of colour, for example, who is not central to either Nandy or Fation's critiques). 
But while this may produce several interesting psychoanalyses, (and there are no 
guarantees of the success of such a theoretical gesture), it does not provide us with a 
way of understanding social, political and cultural relations in the colony except as 
sets of binaries that we define according to the categories that seem self-evident to us 
such as man/ woman or black /white. 
If it scems that Fanon's and Nandys work is too small a sarriple on which to 
base this conclusion, it is worth considering the problem as feminist scholars have 
-id Fanon's adaptations arc broadly addrcssed it. In theorctical tcrtiis, Nandys al 
comparable with feminist adaptations, whether those adaptations rely most licax-dy 
on reading psychoanalysts against the grain, dcveloping tcanitiology for casc- 
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specific neuroses andpSNTchoses, or using orthodox psychoanalytic terms to write 
about womcn's specific experiences of marginalizafion -and oppression. Feminist 
applicafions of psychoanalysis have been criticized repeatedly for their failure to 
consider the lived experience of the woman of colour, or even to acknowledge the 
implication of Freud and Lacan's thought in western colonizing discourse. 
Until very recently, questions of race and women who have a lived- 
experience of ethnic or cultural difference have simply not bccn considered 
important in psychoanalytic feminism. Though feminist critics sympathetic to 
psychoanalysis, such as Jacqueline Rose, have identified psychoanalysis as valuable 
prcciscly because "it gives an account of patriarchal culture as a ttans-historical and 
cross-cultural force. It therefore conforms to a feminist demand for a theory which 
can explain women's subordination across specific cultures and different historical 
moments" (90) critics such as Spivak, Abel and Jones have challenged this reading of 
psychoanalysis. Abel, for example, comments "by insisting that the Father's Law is 
necessarV and tantamount to culture, however, the official Lacanian account 
prohibits alternative conceptualizations of culture and renders variations within 
patriarchal social forms (and thus in the degree and kind of women's subordination) 
either inconsequential or invisible" (185). The failure to acknowledge and account for 
the particular lived experience of the woman of colour is exacerbated, as Seshadri- 
Crooks is only the most recent critic to point out, by the fact that " what feminists 
have largely ignored in their discussion of Freudian theory arc the cultural and racial 
particularities of the metaphor of the 'dark contincnt' in not raising the question of 
racial difference with regard to irrational and mysterious 'others' (Africans and 
Orientals) in theories of subject formation, feminism botli reproduces and rcifics 
FreLid's insouciance regarding (g)ctidcr) difference" ( "Priirmitive" 175). 
Nevertheless, it is possible rliat this gap in the critical I)orizon of 
psycboanalytic feminists is not i1cccssarily evidence of,, iny particular hostility to the 
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woman of colour, but a potential problem with psychoanalysis itself. 1-, ', -,, en when 
ferninist theorists have attempted to correct this gap in more recent readings of 
psychoanalysis, the result has been mixed. Feminist critics such as Mary-Ann Doane 
and 
_)can 
Walton have activcly attempted to give a more central place to the issue of 
race in feminist psychoanalysis. Walton is motivated by the sense that 
"psychoanalvtic feminist theory participates in what can only be a self-defeating 
process of disavowal insofar as it deploys psychoanalysis as -a means of rewriting 
fernalc subjectivity yet remains silent about race" (242). Nevertheless, their analyses 
have difficulty positioning the wornan of colour as a subject within psychoanalytic 
schemas. Walton's sensitive and excellent eNamination of the question of race among 
1920's feminist psychoanalysts is able to put the topic of race into the discussion, but 
it remains a discussion about the white woman's subj cct- formation. Once again, this 
is not a criticism of Walton's analysis but a symptom of psychoanalysis itself. 
Looking at the case material of white women analysands seen by Horney, Deutsch 
and others, Walton shows how the white patients negotiated their place in the world 
and in power in relation to black men as well as white men. She is able to put black 
men and white women into the same analysis (,, vhcre white men are figured as an 
invisible centre of power), but women of colour are still absent from the discussion. 
Admittedly, the ob'ect of Walton's analvsis, or Doane's, is not to put women j 
of colour into the picture as such, but to "expose and address the ways in which 
whiteness has come to post as deeply constitutive of feinale subjectivitv, even in the 
most groulidbrcaking work of fcmltiists to date" (246). For Walton, the question of 
the analysand's race as such is not the central issue. Instead, she is interested ill how 
any analysand colnes to Lindcrstand his or her subjectivitý- as raced, because, 
iii ism have not given enough consideration according to her, psvc1ioanaIN-sis and femini 
to the question of race. For Doane, the point is not to stretch psychoanalysis to 
cover the black,, voman, but to delincate cx,, ictl\- how the theoretical positioii 
182 
occupied by the woman of colour disappears in texts written bv both men of colour 
and white women. In both cases, the woman of colour cannot become vi, ible. 
Introducing the topic of race into psychoanalysis, then, is no guarantee that the 
woman of colour gains a space of representation as subject. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that despite our best attempts to adapt or 
attend to context, we have not yet been able to turn psychoanalysis into a descriptive 
theoretical tool for producing a meaningful analysis of more than a particular target 
group. Indeed, it remains in question whether all constituencies can be represented 
through psychoanalysis. In particular, as Fanon, Nandy, BhLbha, Deleuze and 
Guattart all demonstrate, it seems (almost) impossible to say anything about a 
particular subjectivity-the woman of colour. And, in fact, this leads us to a question 
we are forced to pose, which is, can the woman of colour be represented in 
psychoanalysis at all? Spivak has cautioned us that the question is not whether the 
subaltern can speak, clearly she can and she does, but whether we can hear her 
through the terms the discourse has already established about the nature of 
subjectivity. It is worth noting that though Spivak is often accused of erasing the 
woman of colour as subject, she is nevertheless one of the few critics who always 
man-ages to write about the texts, lives and actions of women of colour. 
Even the most recent theoretical interventions into psychoanalysis by 
scholars focused on the woman of colour conclude that there is no space for the 
woman of colour as analysand. There is, however, -a space for the woman of colour 
as analyst, and though recuperating the notion of the woman of colour as 
psychoanalytic subject is not possible, perhaps not even desirable, we can place her at 
the centre of a riew kind of analysis of colonial subjectivity. How does she come to 
figure as a limit of subjcctn'ttyý As Jardine indicates, it is tip to women not to 
disappear from the space of theoretical exploration. Presence M that space may not 
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always mean claiming the space of representation, instead it may mean claiming the 
right to critique the terms on which representation is based. 
This question proveSparticularly relevant for postcolonial studies because 
since the cultural-linguistic turn, a key aspect of its scholarly focus has been the 
problem of subjectivity, especially in relation to race. An interest in the constitution 
of subject-positions is the reason we ostensibly turn to psychoanalysis and yet no 
manoeuvre can put the woman of colour as subject into play in psychoanalytic terms. 
It seems clear to me that if psychoanalysis is to continue to figure in postcolonial 
studies, but it cannot saV anything about the woman of colout, we have to rethink 
the terms on which we engage with psychoanalysis. As will become clear later in this 
chapter, I am not arguing for an abandonment or excision of psychoanalysis but it 
seems extraordinary that after all this time we still have to say loudly and clearlN, 
psychoanalysis is a flawed theory of subjecti vity and can therefore no longer serve as 
a guiding theory in postcolomal studies. 
Though it may seem contradictory, I want to emphasize that I do not reject 
psychoanalysis on the grounds that it can never be made politically useful. Ferminist 
critics have suggested that psvchoanalysis has no politics of its own to offer, but 
psychoanalysis is politically versatile enough to prove useful to anti-colonial projects. 
Indeed, I recognize that used in a verý- tactical way, as we have seen Fanon and 
Nandy do, it can prove useful in the short term and I do not disrm'ss the importance 
of short-term tactics for postcolonial studies. However, it seems to me that the short- 
term uses of psychoanalysis may be nearly exhausted, and if we do not now begin to 
examine everything Fanon, Nandvand Bhablia put to one side we risk reproducing 
the racializing and colonizing logic of psyclioanalysis every time xvc make use of it. 
By altering content we gain short-term tactical advatitagc and xvc even set tremors 
into the structure that might eventually collapse the edifice. But we cannot shift the 
i Cst-ablislic". tcrrns of subjectivity psyclioanalysis 
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If alterations to the content of psychoanalysis are simply exhausted as a 
theoretical solution the possibility of salvaging something of the structures of 
ps\lchoanalyfic theory is held out by Bhabha's work, and to a lesser degree, by 
NandNT'S. Instead of even attempting to alter psychoanalvsis, is it possible to simply 
make use of the 'pure' structures of psychoanalysis? "'6 'Pure' structures means, as we 
saw in Bhabha's work, that we can use psychoanalytic concepts and theoretical 
mechanisms without reference to their original context as objective principles about 
how we know -and manage information about the world. In a recent critique of 
psychoanalysis and Freud studies, 'Fodd Dufresne has su ested, in somewhat blunt 99 
terms, that the only reason we continue to draw on the ideas psychoanalysis offers us 
is bad intellectual habit. He asserts that: 
There is little agreement about what Freud got right and what he got wrong. 
Let's just adnut the obvious ... Freud was bound to get something right. I am 
reminded of authors like Erich Fromm and Max Horkheimer who argue, for 
example, that the death drive theory rnay have been very wrong, but it was at 
least a correct recognition that people are aggressive. But, really, do we need 
Freud to tell us that people are aggressiv e? So why do we keep referring to 
Freud as though he was essentially correct about human psychology when, 
arguably, he was trivially or incidentally correct? (xvii) 
For Dufresne, there is relatively little to be gained from Freud in the way of either 
material description or critical insight. Instead, we draw on Freud, and in recent times 
on Lacan, to add a certain caJvI to our own work, or simply to indicate our 
intellectual SýTmpathies with certain theoretical interests and objectives. In Nandy's 
work, for example, I havc argued that a commitmcnt to psychoanalysis, via a reading 
of Erikson's ego-psychology, forms part of a comn-ii'tractit to non-violent forms of 
resistance. In postcolonial studies generally, a psychoanalytic approach has come to 
In her reading of how psychoanalysts has appropriated the exper6se of classical studies 
vvith its overdctcrinined readings of Grcck tragedy \\ inter suggests th-at this interest in the 
'pure' structure of a text (or the happenings in a tc_, a) is itself symptomatic of psychoanalysis' 
,. articul- drive to swallo-ý-, - other 
Fields into the body of its e_xpertise. See in p,. ar, her reading of 
Lac-an's reading of Oedipus (83-90). By using the terin 'pure' structures here I mcan to 
capture the iclea that, as Nvc sa-, -, - in Bliablia's work, \,, -c can use PSý-CIIO-, 111,11ý11C C011CCI-)ts and 
theoretical mcchanisims %vitliout reference to their original context is objective principles 
about how -, vc kiio-,, - and inanave information about the vvodd. 
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be identified with an interest in questions of desire, subjectivity and ethics and with a 
concern to expand our view of colonialism as more than a purely material or 
economic phenomenon. 
However, if psychoanalysis has become the predominant way to indicate a 
commitment to issues such as non-violence, questions of subjectivity and ethics, then 
the whole theoretical discussion is deeply impoverished. This is partly because 
psychoanalysis is clearly an imperfect theoretical tool for carrying the weight of such 
a broad range of concerns. Nfore importantly however, though we recognize the 
problems with psychoanalysis we continue to use it as the only available language for 
writing about desires instead of developing new languages. Instead of arguing about 
whether or not culture and the subject should take precedence over society, and the 
material grounds of critique (as Marxists critics and p sychoanaly fic-linguis tic critics 
confinue to debate) we should be searching for different ways to frame the 
discussion altogether. While we do undoubtedly turn to certain sources and master 
texts out of intellectual habit and feeling, I want to address the question of 
psychoanalytic structures in a less polemical manner than Dufresne. 
Dufresne asks 'do we need Freud to tell us that people are aggressive'P 
Obviously the answer to this is no, and he puts the question in reductionist terms to 
begin with. "' "Flic more significant question for us is, why can't we use 
psychoanalysis as a pure structure' The most significant problem is that without the 
specific context to ground it psychoanalysis begins to take the foreground in colonial 
critiques, sometimes to an absurd degree as we saw In Bhabha's work. Indeed, as 
W'inter observes, borrowing frorn psychoanalytic theories to read other cultural 
manifestations only proves Freud's own assertion in ToletvalielTeiboo that 
I', - Freud's theory of drives and Instincts must surely I)c recogni/, ed is something morc 
coniplcx than -pcoplc arc aggrcsslVc". hidecd, Frcud's contribution is not so imich that lic 
finds humatis to be a,, (, rcssi%, c but the he is able to theorize hov,, they chatincl and I Iz, I 
manaý4c the aggression thev feel toxvard, themselves and others. 
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"researchers in these other disciphncs 'lack' a 'technique to make sense of culture, 
while psychoanalysts simply need to become acquainted with the 'material' that hes 
ready to hand and 'awaits treatment... (210). The discussion inevitably becomes one 
about psychoanahIsts, rather than the (post) colonial. Bhabha's work is a very 
sophisticated attempt to deploy psychoanalvsis, but it is still not able to escape this 
problem -as we saw in chapter three. "" Indeed, Winter argues that historicafly 
psý-choanalysis has constituted itself as a discipline by readinganother discipline's 
texts (historical documents, Shakespearean plays, anthropological surveys) through 
psychoanalytic concepts, and then clairning uniVersahty for itself when it finds those 
coticcpts apparently displayed in those texts. 
Used in this way psychoanalysis itself grows stronger all the time until, like 
'McCtintock's fetishes, it can provide an explanation of everything from nineteenth- 
century adv, erfisements to Boer insignia, or one man's obsession with shoes to the 
, 
pe of the i scrutable Asian. I reduce it to these terms not i order to colonial stereotv in 11 in 
make it an easv target of my critique-I recognize the complex thinking the notion 
of the fetish represents in psychoanalytic registers -alone-but to demonstrate that in 
such attempts to use the fetish what matters most continues to be the fetish, the 
Oedipal complex; the psychoanalytic language rather than the postcolonial object. 
The psychoanalytic ideas become oddly empty and grandiose at the same time when 
we use them in such a broad and wide-ranging way. Perhaps, though it is not the 
purpose of my dissertation to enter into this debate, the time has come for another 
return to Freud in order to place the fetish back into its original context. 
In other words, the apparently useful analogies that we find in psychoanalytic 
theorv threaten to take ovcr the subject mattcr all togethcr. Psychoanalysis is able to 
'''I This secins to happen to Bliablia most often in his Intensely Lacatilan moments and this 
same problem seems to occur ]it the most recent -, -, -ork of Sesludri-Crooks Nvliose approach 
obvioush- shares something with Bliablia's. In /Vi-PMo Seshadr -Crooks a 1 tills to 
ansv, Ter some very important qLICStlons about race as a regnme of visibility but In trving to 
'complicate' our notion of race she ends by providing us vvith aii analysis so complicated as 
to be virt-Lially utirepcatabIc. 
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make the question of universality that it wants to pose about its own discourse-is 
psychoanalysis a universally applicable theory-a vital question in the theoretical 
project of postcolonial studies too. Deleuzc and Guattari alert us In Anli-Oediplls 
Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly alert us to the fact that it is all too easy to confuse 
the categories and problems psychoanalysis produces with the categories and 
problems that are actually at stake in various kinds of social analvses. The question of 
psychoanalysis' universal applicability is a distraction from the other questions 
postcolonial studies could and should be posing to psychoanalysis. From the 
perspective of postcolonial studies, the main problem with using pure psychoanalytic 
structures-and ignoring the question of content all togethet-is simply that it gets 
us no closer to understanding psychoanalysis as a colonial and colonizing discourse 
itself 
What Fanon, Nandy and Bhabha are not able to do at the same time as they 
make use of psychoanalysis for their own political projects is to expose the racializing 
and colonializing logic of psychoanalysis. Bhabha's work, which stands as an example 
of the theoretical practice most indebted to orthodox psychoanalysis in postcolonial 
theoiv, continually reminds us that the exact fit between psychoanalytic theory and 
colonial society is itself a question we have yet to pose with any determination to 
answer it. Though psychoanalysis answers Bhabha's demand for a hermeneutic that 
does not insist on the fixity of culture, he never explores the problems with 
psychoanalysis as a Western form of knowledge or the question of why 
psychoanalysis seems to describe colonial culture so aptly. 
If critics do acknowledge the racializing logic of psychoanalvs1s, they put this 
issue to one side for a moment or tlicý, accept that, despite obvious problems, there 
is still something structurally useful aboLit Frctidian schemes. ""' The question of 
"" We saw an example of this In Bliablia's tiotortous footnotc about gctider, as discusscd bý 
McClintock. A more recent example can be found In Seshacirt-Crooks (1cploynient of Lacan. 
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putting problems to the side, for a moment, often means that we never return to deal 
with the problems, or to the fact that we construct an analysis that works perfectly 
well until we remember that we have forgotten to account for the theory's laterit 
racism, hornophobia or sexism. Added to this there is the problem inherent in the 
notion that this consideration can be put aside-at least temporarily-in the minds 
of some, a suggestion that would not be palatable to others. For a feminist theorist 
the question of puttingaside misogyny or sexism for a moment seems unthinkable. 
Perhaps the time has come that we cannot put the racializing logic of psychoanalysis 
aside anymore either. I have already admitted the possibility that psychoanalysis may 
prove useful as a short-term tactic against the nhiS/ logic of Western knowledge, but I 
am convinced that we have come far enough in this critical project that we require a 
long-term strategy against the ratiali,.: Jno logic of Western knowledge. In 
psychoanalysis, perhaps because the problem of 'women' or 'race' has already been 
neglected, we make a tactical mistake by reaffirming that moment of silence, 
whatever our philosophical or political aims. 
Recognition that psychoanalysis is a colonial discipline is not, however, 
enough by itsclf. Though such an acknowledgement has been a long time coming, 
psychoanalysis requires painstaking working through in order to be emptied out of its 
theoretical power. The advantages psychoanalvsis offers are heavily counter-balanced 
by what it is Lruperfectly able to do. Even recognition of the material colonial 
practices of psychoanalysis is not cnough since fike Mannont's colonial racists the 
Berkelcy-Hills of the world can be understood as a few 'rotten apples' and not as 
signs of inherent raciahzing teridencies of psychoanalysis. This is a quite fair 
III Oesii-in", she writes "I 1mve tried to -, x-ork Nvith the richest aspects of the theory, 
and in the process have found it neccssary to -ývrestle with it ... I the 'appropriation' 
of Lacall that follows does not take the expected form of 'ideological revision' . .. AttentiOll 
to the person of Lacan and his political responsibility iti failing to detail a theory of race is 
not relevaia to my project" (3). 
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oblection but it does not discount the need to understand how psychoanalysis thinks 
race and the colonial order of things. 
We regularly choose, instead, to use psychoanalysis to explain race itself, as a 
category of experience, as a historically contingent category, as a category that hovers 
between the material and the cultural. Seshadrl-(-- rooks and Spillers both contribute 
to the dialogue between race and psychoanalysis, keeping close to Fanon perhaps but 
choosing not to say anything about psychoanalysis itself as -a discourse about race. 
Again I recognize the possibility here of a tactical political project that has 
considerable theoretical value. In fact, Spillers does subordinate psychoanalysis in her 
text as a "supplementary protocol" for investigating the lives and experiences of 
African-Americans (378). 1 do not dismiss any critical work that helps us to 
understand race in ways that complicate its 'common-sense' quahty as we live it and 
experience it. But, even these projects need to eventually go further and 'investigate 
what psychoanalysis has already said about race, and made it possible of impossible 
to say about race. 
In other words, I argue that there can be no more par6al engagements with 
psychoanalysis in which we attempt to make useful scraps of psychoanalytic thought 
for colonial analyses. Instead, I argue for a concerted critical effort to produce 
psychoanalysis as an oý)jea of colonial discourse analysis. Instead of accepting the 
limited terms that only psychoanalysis can speak to notions of subjecti-,, ity and desire 
(always pushing race to the limits and bordertines of subjectivity while it does so), we 
should try to understand how a theory of subjectivity that is always discounting race 
makes itself so authoritative as a universal theory of subjectivin. 
What I propose is not an excision of psychoanalysis from our critical horizon 
in postcolontal studies. That would be botli impossible, and intellcctuallv 
trrcsponsible. It is Impossible because, as Dcleuze and Guattari remind Lis, one 
cannot cotnplerclý- excise psychoanalysis from , in understanding of Western culture. 
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Even Dufresne does not desire such an excision since, as he reads it, psychoanalysis 
is a useful cautionary tale for the history of Western knowledge. But more 
importantlýý, one does not defuse a systern of thought by refusing to think it out or, 
put another wav, bV refusing to 'out-think' it. Instead, one decolonizes psychoanalysis 
best bN, investigating the truth-clairns it makes. The best way to deal with 
psychoanalysis, then, is to read it, write about it and think about it, but to do so in 
terms that refuse to participate in its logic. Deleuze and Guattart have shown us a 
waN, - that remains to be unpacked in colonial -and postcolonial studies. 
It is in this spirit that we turn to Dcleuze and Guattari. Although their focus 
is less squarely on the colonial scene than that of F-anon, Nandy or Bhabha, they 
nevertheless provide a critique of psychoanalysis that broaches questions of 
colonization and also works from the same premises about difference as Bhabha 
works from. Like him, they argue that the person of colour can no more, and no less, 
be read in terms of his or her culture than the White person. Deleuze and Guattari 
remind us that if psychoanalysis appears to answer all our hopes and dreams as an 
analytic, this is because it was designed preciselv to do so. This is not because it 
captures realltv or truth, but because it is an apparatus that educates our desires. We 
have been well schooled, rather than duped, since that would imply some type of 
conspiracy from which we can all considcr ourselves released. I suggest that one aim 
of postcolonial studies must be to help us deconstruct our colonial education In 
psychoanalysis and reassemble it for different purposes. 
Before I go on to discuss some ways in which we nught attempt this 
postcolonial re-education, I must acknowledge that there is yet one more possibilitv 
for a postcoloni-al use of psychoanalysis that -, ve have not yet considered here. It is a 
', gcsted, or a strategic abuse of psychoanalysis, a catachresis, as 
SpiVak has suý), 
contrapuntal reading, in Saids terms. Certain1v maiiv of the most interesting and 
persuasive feminist explorations of psychoanalysis have been hauritings and 
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possessions of Freud's texts (such as the work of Irigaray and R-oft-rian) and a 
postcolonial haunting would undoubtedly be a fruitful theoretical project. In some, 
sense all the uses of psychoanalysis that we exarmned here are catachreses in that 
they use psychoanalysis for different purposes than originafly intended. However, 
they do so within the confines of psychoanalytic terms, using the same concepts and 
assul-Illng that they work in apprommately the same way in colonial conditions as 
thev, do in metropolitan, bourgeols settings. 
Once again, I recognize the value of such an intervention, provided it is 
actually able to inhabit psychoanalysis and turn it to other political as well as 
epistemological ends. Nevertheless, it seems that such interventions often end bv 
being sophisticated reaffirmations of psychoanalysis because reading against the grain 
has, in some sense, already been provided for by the discourse itself. Psychoanalysis 
itself is full of uncertainties and incoherencies -and therefore reading it against the 
grain proves to be a theoretical challenge that one can only keep in sight by being 
radically anti-psychoan-alyfic from the beginning. I am also convinced that it is not 
possible to effect the kind of theoretical detachment from psychoanalvsis if one is 
trying to inhabit it at the same time. Perhaps the final appeal of my -argument should 
be simply the argument of novelty-we have already tried to inhabit psychoanalysis 
and deconstruct it without in significantly din-unishing its ontological and 
epistemological hold on us. Why should we not tr-v something more radicaP 
Psychoandlysis ds Postcolonial Object 
Psychoanalysis is a theory developed in the scientific and theoretical context 
of ninctectith-century scicntific racism. In drawing attcntion to its origins I do not 
t-nean to revive a well-worn arguinent against psyclioanalysis that I, reud xxas a racist, 
but I do want to emphasize that lic theorized in a climate where certain notions of 
race and racialization underpinned scielitific and philosophical enterprise,,,. If,, vc 
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inean to take account of this in our use of PS)Tchoanalysis for postcolonial purposes it 
seems absurd to continue to use psychoanalysis as an instrument of our analyses. In 
this last section I want to clarify what theoretical and critical attitudes would make it 
possible to put psychoanalysis at the centre of our analytical focus, since to 
demonstrate specifically how I would perform this critical task would be the subject 
of a study of its own. I want to draw attention to four issues that seem crucial. 
First, we must not forget what we are about in postcolonial studies or allow 
psychoanalysis to write its project in larger and bolder letters over our critiques. 
Spillers and SpiVak, though they both find interesting motifs and ideas in 
PSýTchoanalysis, maintain a critical detachmcnt from psychoanalysis that allows their 
larger point to come through. For Spillers, the specific questions that -affect, and 
emerge in, the Black American context are never weighted down by the 'pure' 
structure of psychoanalvsis. Sjmilarly, Spivak never allows psychoanalysis' drive to 
assert itself -as a universal theory to distract her from the task of showing how 
"feminism lives in the master-text as well as in the pores" (92). If we agree that 
postcolonial studies aim to understand and reveal how colonial history has produced 
many of the categories of thought, knowledge and subjectwity we have today, then 
we need to inVes6gate psychoanalytic categories in the same -vvay as we have already 
begun to destabilize the foundational categories of historical and literary 
rcprcsentation. 
Second, this task supposes that we abandon the 'reading against the grain' 
approach to psychoanali-sts, in the hope that it iTught tell us something it did not 
mean to tell us. J do not mean that we should only have recourse to readings that 
take psychoanalysis at face value (supposing that were e%-cn possible), or that 
deconstructive strategies should be tossed out of the N-vindow, but that we ought to 
be especially carcful with a inaster-text tikc psychoanalysts that is alwavs, atrctdv 
against the grain. It is simptv too casy to bccornc wean- of reading against the grain 
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and slip imperceptibly into it. It is the special preserve of psychoanalysis, however, 
that it seems to anticipate antagonistic reading beforehand and disarm them. Perhaps 
it is a form of interpretive cowardice to choose not to tangle with psychoanalysis at 
such close quarters, but it is worth observing that though Marxism is a coherent 
theoty that critiques the theory of capital, we do not have the equivalent theory that 
critiques the psychoanalytic economy of desire. I do not forever discount the 
possibility of using psychoanalysis as a theoretical instrument again, although I admit 
that from this view it is hard to imagine what such psychoanalysis would look like. 
Instead, I caution that psychoanalysis is a particularly elusive mastcr-text and trying 
to outwit it on its own terms is neither possible nor a particularly productive use of 
our scholarly energies. 
Third, postcolonial studies can and should rely more on literary texts 
themselves to answer our questions about identity in the colony. In the previous 
chapter, I noted that Delcuze considered writers the most gifted diagnosticians of 
society's ills. In other words, writers, much more than phvslclans, psychoanalysts or 
psvchiatrists were in -a position to produce meaningful accounts of the codings, 
dccodings and recodings of desire in any society since they were not bound to a 
diagnostic framework (i. e., squeezing c%, ery social conflict into the triangular terms of 
the Oedipal complex), and thev were in the position to allow the depiction of those 
desires to take their own form in the organic form, style, actions and tone of the 
novel. Where, in Deleuze's view, psychoanalysis profoundly failed as a 
syniptomatology, literature succeeded admirably. Hallward's work, as we saw in the 
last chapter, is one of the only studies v. -ritten from a postcolonial perspectix-e to 
follow Deleuze's cue. His book. -J1)so11,11(, 1), Posl, ýolonialproduccs a theoretical 
framework for thinking about the individLiation and relationality of colonial subjects 
bN- looking at how four different postcolontal writers write about identity and group 
relations. In Hallward's book the writers are the postcolonial theorists, not simply the 
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producers of texts we come to make sense of afterwards. If colonial desire requires a 
theoretical language of its own, it would seem that an excellent language is already 
provided by the authors we read. Though, regratably, I do not have the scope here 
to provide an example of how such an analysis Mlight work it bears further 
investigation. 
Fourth, as I alreadv sugpested in the previous section, we must keep the 
woman of colour in our theoretical sights. Though the woman of colour cannot be 
recuperated and restored as a subject she can figure as an analyst. Seshadri-Crooks 
has discussed the problems a woman of colour encounters when she tries to enter 
Freud's texts as -, in analyst. The task, then is by no means straightforward, but the 
woman of colour as analyst might force us to carry on questioning why we accept 
psychoanalysis as the predominant languagc of sub'ectivity and desire when it cannot 
be made to represent her desires and subjectivities. 
Despite the fact that I cannot undertake an actual analysis here, I want to 
explore a few ways of understanding this task before I conclude. First, it rmight mean 
that we consider psychoanalvs1s, as Doane and Brenkman have suggested, as an 
ethnography of whiteness. That is we can consider psychoanalysis as a discourse on 
race insofar as it constructs and deconstructs the boundaries of whiteness as the 
normativ, e subject position. Nandy's pro)cct is perhaps the only one that comes close 
to positioning psychoanalysis in these terms, though, as we saw in his discussion of 
culture, as well as NIannom's, that it is sometimes a question that they pose by 
omission. If culture explains 'Others, and psychoanalysis explains the 'self then the 
logical assumption must be that psychoanalysis is an etlinographv of the white, male, 
heterosexual self. 
What are the it-nplicatioiis of such an analysis for postcolonial studies:, First, it 
opens tip psychoanalytic texts atid practices as a rich vein of knoxvIedgc about 
i-acializcd sub)cctivitics. It means reading Freud, atid Lacan, as writing about the 
195 
subject's racial formation. Thus far only fenimist theorists have been willing to 
undertake this task, and in particular Walton and Doane, while thev acknowledge the 
Iii-nits of such an analysis, have already tried to undo the ways in which 
psychoanalvtic theon-, in its ferranist forms at least, writes race out of the analysis. 
Yet -, mother way of positioning psychoanalysis as our object, one that is 
perhaps the most germane to this study of postcolonial methods, is to consider 
psychoanalysis as a practice and text that we can read as an index of colonization. 
Here we return to Nandy's account of G. Bose, and the case of Indian 
psychoanalysis. Nandy provided us with a complex account of one Indian 
psychoanalyst's experiments with Hindu texts and Freudian concepts. While this was 
interesting as a way of understanding one moment, or one set of colonial documents, 
it did not do very much to help us understand how psychoanalysis even came to 
matter in the colonies. One example of such a study might be an investigation of 
how colonized sub'ects became 'psychoanalyzable', how theN- entered into and were 
captured by the discourse. Histories of colonial mental health practice tend to focus 
on the Europe-an doctors and their European patients since, unsurprisingly; the bulk 
of resources went to caring for the Europe-an or Anglo-Colonial patients. At the 
same time there was a lot of discussion of colonized people in terms of 
psychoanalytic and psychiatric disorders (Hindus as a culture were considered to be 
anal personality types for example) even while they remained relativ ely untreated for 
mental illnesses they actually suffered from. 
In fact, the problem went further than this. Colonized A fricans, as _j ock 
NlcCLilloch's work suggests, were actually not considered human enough to suffer 
from mental illnesses such as depression. The diagnosis of nictital illness presupposes 
a certain understanding of what craotions are, lioxv flicy are c-, ýprcssed and when it is 
suitable to express them. Africans could not suffer frorn nicinal illness because the\, 
supposedly, did not experience "gnilt, religious doubt and arttstic originality, 
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characteristics often identified as the vcrv- foundation of Western sub'ectivitv" 
(McCulloch 111). If Africans did not exhibit these characteris tics of Western 
individualism, the heightened sensibility of the civilized person, they could not suffer 
from depression. 
This is a social field that could be highly informative-what were 
psychoanalysts theorizing about race, how were they actually treating patients (and 
who were they treatingP), and finally, what inade it possible to speak in 
psychoanalytic terms about people one could not actually psychoanalyze, how and 
when did these people become psycho-analyzable? These kinds of questions keep us 
focused not on how psychoanalysts explain,, race, the colony, colonial stereotypes, as 
it explains everything else but on how race, the colony and colonial identifications 
were produced, educated and reproduced by psychoanalysis itself. Psychoanalysis, in 
this type of analysis, at last becomes the object of postcolonial studies, rather than 
the comptroller. 
The aim of this dissertation has not been to either attack or recuperate 
psychoanalysis. Indeed, I have argued that focusing on psychoanalysis itself diverts us 
from the task of postcolonial studies which, as I understand it, is to reveal how 
knowledge systems, academic disciplines and sciences have come to exert their 
influence over the ways in which we live race while all the time denying the 
importance of the category of race. I remain convinced that psychoanalysis 
participates in the colonial order of things in ways that we have yet to unpack, and I 
want to propose the task of scrutinizing colonializing and raciahzing logic of 
psychoanalysis as -a way of foregrounding the political project of postcolonial 
-choq studies-a project that should alm to re-rcad psý , nalysis or history or literary 
studies without being overrun by those disciplines. As Stoler has argued we routinely 
use Foucault without heeding his critique of psyclioanalysis, and though Dcleuze and 
Guattari are rising again in postcolotilal studies this has more to do with their critique 
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of capitalism and their rhizornatic theorý, of multiplicity than it has to do with their 
critique of psychoanalytic thinking. Stoler's patient questions about psychoanalysis in 
colonial historiograph), have been relatively rarely discussed in a work that was 
otherwise groundbrcaking in colonial discourse studies. If maný, of us still remain 
unconvinced that psvchoanalvsis bears examination as an object of analysis itself, 
then we have to ask ourselves what do we have invested in psychoanalytic ways of 
thinking that we are not prepared to examine. Deleuze reminds us "we have the 
belief,,, feelings and thoughts we desenve given our way of being or style of life" 
(Olkowski 46). If the repeated suspicion about psychoanalysis is resistance, then 
perhaps it is the task of postcolonial studies to resist. 
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